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Mathilde Gingembre-University of Sussex 
‘Being heard: local people in negotiations over large-scale land deals. 
A case study from Madagascar’ 
SUMMARY 
This thesis examines local people’s voices and influence in negotiations over large-scale land 
deals.  Drawing on ethnographic work on a case study from southern Madagascar, it 
highlights the variety of agropastoralists’ responses to, and experienced outcomes of, the 
implementation of an agribusiness project on their land. The purpose of this research was to 
understand the conditions under which certain local people get heard, and others silenced, in 
the context of corporate land access and the processes by which some of these local voices 
manage to influence the terms and conditions of the deal. It looked at how horizontal and 
vertical power dynamics interface with situated moral economies and contentious politics to 
inform variations in local people’s perspectives over, engagement with and experienced 
outcomes of the land deal. 
I argue that local voices and opportunities for influence in the context of land transactions in 
Madagascar are constructed at the intersection of national and village politics. I draw 
attention to the practices and discourses through which local state officials produce ‘powers 
of exclusion’ and ‘powers of compliance’ in their mediation of land deals. I show that, in 
socially-differentiated local populations, formal compliance with dispossession reflects 
processes of different natures: “compliance as acquiescence” for some, but also “constrained 
hope”, and potential challenging of local structures of domination or “compliance as 
resistance” for others. I explore the moral economies that underpin perspectives on corporate 
land access as well as choices to express, or suppress, subversive voices and observe a 
resistance, across social divides, to the “demoralising of land deals”. I show how the 
vulnerability of state authorities to social movements combined with competition for the 
resources of patronage and of authority associated with the control of corporate land access 
open interstices for influence. In a context of institutional bias however, only those who 
manage to activate key alliances with state officials and to unify village voices beyond inter 
and intra-class differences stand a chance of being heard.  
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GLOSSARY 
Afosa:  In Ihorombe, the hot season that precedes the rainy season 
(September to November). 
Akata horo:  A weed that is green all year even in contexts of rain 
shortage and that is particularly appreciated by cattle. 
Baiboho:   Alluvial soils along the rivers. 
Blé: A species of sweet potatoe. 
Confiage: Practice of entrusting cattle to other villagers.  
Dina:  Social convention or set of rules defined by the village 
community; the rule-making body itself. 
Fady:  Taboo. 
Fahasivy: Enemies or ancestors. 
Foko:  Group of belonging along kinship and territory. 
Fokonolona:  Local community (see footnote 13 in Chapter 2 for more 
details on the multiple, evolving definitions of the term). 
Fokontany:  Local administrative entity, generally encompassing several 
villages, under the management of a ‘head of fokontany’.  
Hitsaky:  Practice where the cattle are made to run in the fields to 
prepare the soil for transplantation of the rice. 
Kabary:  Customary discourses in Madagascar. 
Kalony:  Local vigilantes group set up to address cattle theft. 
Komity:  Unofficial village secretary. 
Lonaky:   Heads of lineage or sub-lineage in iBara.  
Loviana:  Lowlands. 
Malaso:  Term used in the south of Madagascar to refer to cattle 
thieves. 
Mpanarivo:  The wealthy (literally ‘those who have thousands’). 
Olobe:  Senior members of the local communities (literally ‘the big 
people’). 
Raïamandreny:  Local figures of authority. 
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Tanety (tazoa in ibara):  Highlands. 
Tany oraky:  Wet patches of soil which can sustain rice growth without 
relying on rain. 
Tany masina:  The ‘holy land’. 
Tany-pokonolona:  The ‘land of the people’. 
Tanindrazana:  The ‘land of the ancestors’, also used to refer to the nation. 
Topontany:   The ‘masters of the land’; the landowners. 
Titsiky:  Ritual ceremony conducted to restore social order. 
Vary afara:  The ‘late rice’ usually transplanted during the month of 
April. 
Vary aloha:  The ‘early rice’ harvested in January. 
Vary tonontaona :  The ‘seasonal rice’, rice grown by all during the rainy 
season (also called vary oraka). 
Vazaha: Foreigners; sometimes also used to refer to the police or 
allochtones. 
Voanjo:  Local species of round beans.  
Vondro:  Weed used as a construction material.  
Zanahary:  God. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
“Anay iaby izay” 
It was early September 2011. Madagascar was slowly making its way out of winter and 
moving into the dry season they call afosa1 in Ihorombe. Tsiory and I were setting foot in the 
rural municipality of Satrokala for the first time and discussing plans for the next day’s visit 
to Ankitry, the first village on our list. I was eager to learn a little of the iBara dialect, hoping 
that efforts at language skills, together with our boycott of motored vehicles as a means of 
moving around, would contribute in a small measure towards convincing villagers that my 
intentions were different from those of the other white foreigners present here, despite 
discussions revolving around the same topics. Concern with vazahas, as foreigners are called 
in Madagascar, had not been commonplace in the villages of this rural municipality before 
but much had changed in the past two years. With two French men, one Belgian and one 
Nicaraguan having now set up their base there, they had now become a part of the landscape, 
together with the large, beautiful premises boasted by the biofuel company they were 
working for and the cliches of power and money that were associated with them. 
 
 I knew the challenge ahead of me was not minor and my hopes of generating trust on a first 
visit were slim. Tsiory, whom I had met a few days before in the provincial capital of Ihosy, 
would himself be considered by some as an outsider. He lived in the provincial capital Ihosy 
and, as such, was a man of the city and, more critically, was originally from the capital 
Antananarivo. However, he had lived in the Ihorombe region for more than ten years now, 
had married a local Bara woman and would turn out to be known, and respected, by many 
villagers since he worked at registering people’s civil status documents at Ihosy town hall.  
He had been recommended to me as one of the few people who could speak both French and 
the local dialect. I spoke enough of Malagasy, the national language, to get by and hold 
everyday conversations, but my command was too limited to allow me to hold full interviews 
                                               
1 In other regions of Madagascar, afosa is used to refer to the month of May, the month of the harvest. 
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on my own and the national language was only of limited use in the rural areas of 
Madagascar. When I asked Tsiory what dialectical expressions I should learn in priority to 
show respect, he replied: ‘Don’t worry, when we get there, just let me do the introductions. 
And after I’ve spoken, you just say “Anay iaby izay” and then we can start the discussion’. 
 
Anay iaby zay, which could literally translate as ‘This is all of us’, is an idiomatic expression 
used to express agreement with prior talk.  In better English, it could translate as ‘We feel 
represented by what has just been said’. With small dialectical variations, it is used 
throughout Madagascar, mainly in the context of kabary (historic, ceremonial form of 
speech). As I would soon witness, its use within speeches is well routinised and serves to 
punctuate specific instances of interactions. It is pronounced by all men in unison after a 
person of authority has finished talking and as such, serves to reassert acceptance of hierarchy 
and power positions, while reflecting the critical importance of displaying consensus. In a 
society where the right to speak and power positions are mutually constitutive (Ottino 1983), 
asking who genuinely agrees, and with what, is critical. These questions are equally essential, 
this thesis stresses, beyond the case of Madagascar. 
 
In particular, this thesis pleads for a nuanced consideration of “local voices” in debates over 
the regulation of large-scale land deals. In its exploration of how agrarian populations 
respond to local negotiations for corporate land access, this thesis seeks to reveal the divisions 
that are obscured by the Anay iaby izay as well as the resistance, or absence of resistance, to 
pressures to speak one way or the other. It is therefore interested in understanding who 
actually gets a voice within consultation and local negotiation processes and who does not, 
whether these voices constitute an endorsement or a challenge to power relations, and 
whether those who do not get to speak may have different perceptions towards land deals. 
Besides this interest in (i) whose voices are expressed, why and under which conditions, the 
thesis asks (ii) who, of these voices, succeeds in exerting an influence on the terms and 
conditions of land deals or, in other words, who gets heard. After exploring the multiplicity 
of perceptions that local people can develop towards land deals, the thesis seeks to answer 
the main following question: How do the voices of local people get heard or silenced in the 
context of negotiation processes for corporate land access? 
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The discussion opens with a summary of the literature on “land grabbing”, pointing to the 
specific contribution this thesis hopes to make.  It introduces the main focus and objects of 
the research and the theoretical framework that was used to examine them. The introductory 
chapter then closes on a discussion of the objectives of this thesis. 
 
Local contestations around land deals: a conjunctural perspective 
This research project draws on scholarly debates on contemporary large-scale land deals and 
heeds calls to investigate the context-specific, contingent processes and differentiated 
outcomes of the ‘global land rush’ through more empirically-grounded studies. 
 
Albeit less unprecedented than initially assessed, the global rush for land that was accelerated 
by the finance-food-fuel crisis of 2007-2008 gained swift traction in the media and quickly 
imposed itself on top of the agendas of many development practitioners, policy-makers and 
academics (Cotula et al. 2009; Von Braun and Meinzen-Dick 2009; Borras and Franco 2010; 
Deininger et al. 2010; Zoomers 2010; Odhiambo 2011; Schoneveld 2011; Akram-Lodhi 
2012, Anseeuw et al. 2012). Much effort was initially put into trying to assess the drivers, 
impact and scale of this international “land grabbing” phenomena, with international 
solidarity organisations and scholars alike expressing concern over its wide-reaching 
implications on issues of socio-economic subsistence, socio-cultural fabric and 
environmental justice (GRAIN 2008; Daniel and Mittal 2009; Friends of the Earth 2010, 
Graham et al. 2010; Borras et al. 2011; DeSchutter 2011; Fairhead, Leach and Scoones 2012; 
Cotula 2013, Chung 2017). 
 
While most agreed that this phase of mostly fast ‘fact-finding’ missions and research was 
instrumental in putting this development issue in the spotlight, a second wave of literature 
highlighted the shortcomings of its outputs (Cotula 2013; Edelman et al. 2013; Scoones et al. 
2013). Qualifying ‘the prevailing alarmist picture of an inexorable advance of massive 
foreign land grabbing’ (Edelman et al. 2013: 1526), observers stressed the need to reconsider 
statements on the scale of the phenomenon, as well as the methodologies and epistemologies 
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that underpinned much of the research (Scoones et al. 2013).  A bias in perspectives and a 
lack of rigour in methodologies had led to exaggerations and generalisations (Pedersen and 
Buur 2016).  A wide variety of land deals had been lumped under the term “land grabbing”, 
obscuring processes at different stages and of varying sizes, nature and implications. The 
importance of variation in processes, drivers, responses and outcomes was emphasised 
(Edelman and León 2013; Baglioni and Gibbon 2013; Oya 2013; Borras and Franco 2013) 
and a number of original statements were qualified: quantitative assessments of the global 
land rush were revised downwards and refined (Anseeuw et al. 2013); the focus on north-
south investment was found to have been unduly obscuring the importance of south-south 
investments and the role of domestic elites in land deals (Borras et al. 2011; Margulis and 
Porter 2013); and observers insisted that not all land deals resulted in the displacement of 
local populations (Hall 2011; Edelman et al. 2013; Wolford et al. 2013; Hall et al. 2015; 
Pedersen and Buur 2016).  This thesis draws on these observations and heeds calls ‘to make 
sense of the political, social and economic implications of differentiated outcomes with 
different time horizons’ through empirically and historically-grounded studies of specific 
land deals (Edelman et al. 2013: 1525).  
Accumulation by dispossession? 
The land grab literature was initially dominated by political economy analyses in which 
David Harvey’s concept of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ featured prominently (Harvey 
2003). Drawing on Marx’s discussion of primitive accumulation (Marx 1990), the concept 
of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ (ABD) describes the way global capitalism has 
responded to the ‘chronic and enduring problem of overaccumulation [experienced] since the 
1970s’ (Harvey 2004: 64). In the post-Keynesian capitalism, Harvey explains, ‘assets are 
“released” at minimal cost through predation, fraud and violence’ so that overaccumulated 
capital can seize hold [of them] and immediately turn them to profitable use’ (Harvey 2003: 
144, 149).  
 
As noted by Derek Hall (2013), the use made of ABD in the land grab literature varied. Its 
loose use, en-passant, generally served to make a point about land grabs representing modern 
instances of alienation from the means of production for the accumulation of capital. When 
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its use was better defined, it served to describe the current land rush as the reflection of one 
or several of the following processes: (i) a response to global crisis, (ii) accumulation through 
extra-economic means, and (iii) as the creation, expansion and reproduction of capitalist 
social relations. As such, the concept has provided a heuristic lens to analyse a broad range 
of global processes formative of and formed by the current rise of interest in land.  
 
As Derek Hall argues (2013), there are, nonetheless, several problems associated with some 
of its assumptions which have guarded me from its use here. The first and main issue with 
the use of ABD in the land grab literature is its (implicit or explicit) implication that 
contemporary land deals are necessarily violent processes, leading to (massive) 
dispossession. This is further conveyed by the routinised use of the expression “land 
grabbing” in the literature: although it is frequently used in a loose manner to refer to ‘large-
scale land deals’, large in their surfaces or in the capital involved, the word “grab”, in its 
commonsensical way, suggests a process steeped in violence and coercion.  Some scholars 
justify its use as a way to bring attention to the broad power imbalances at stake in most 
contemporary land transfers (as opposed to suggesting violence) (Borras et al. 2013). The 
word ‘grab’, others have argued, should only refer only to those land deals that represent 
processes of ‘accumulation by extra-economic means’ (Levien 2013). Levien writes that ‘it 
only makes sense to talk about a “grab” when land is expropriated using means other than 
voluntary market purchase’. However, I take Hall’s point that it is not so easy to distinguish 
between economic and non-economic operations, since ‘land sales are usually shaped by the 
powers of legitimation, regulation and force’ (Hall 2013: 1593, referring to Hall et al. 2010). 
Likewise, defining what stands as a ‘voluntary market purchase’ and what exactly constitutes 
‘extra-economic coercion’ is fraught with challenges. Should ‘extra-economic coercion’ only 
be taken to suggest the straightforward use of political force and violence or should it also 
include the multidimensional and more surreptitious operations of power that Hall, Hirsh and 
Li (2014) have argued intersect in creating exclusion from land? In any case, these 
assumptions of violence that are frequently associated with ‘land grab’ and the ABD, both in 
the grey and academic literature, explain my reservation in using any of these terms. As Hall 
puts it, I am not refuting that force is used or that dispossessions take place in contemporary 
land transfers. I argue that they need to be demonstrated, rather than assumed, and that the 
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power processes involved in land deals are more complex than top-down processes of 
coercion.  
Embedded in the analysis of ABD can also be misled assumptions regarding the agrarian 
societies in which land transfers occur. By mobilising the concept of ‘primitive 
accumulation’ outside of its historical foundations, the risk is to assume that that people living 
on targeted lands are entirely outside capitalism. The case examined in this thesis highlights 
the caution needed to make definitive statements on whether a society is inside or outside 
capitalism. Finally, another assumption that is sometimes made is that large-scale land 
acquisitions in developing countries take place on land that is held in common by subsistence 
farmers (Hall, Hirsch and Li 2011). There now exists a large body of literature showing that 
customary tenure does not exclude individual rights2 and that most agrarian societies 
routinely engage in land markets,3 whether through rentals, leases or sales.  
Finally, accumulation by dispossession and primitive accumulation describe top-down 
processes that are assumed to be carried out at the expense of and against the will of local 
people.  Hall, Hirsch et Hall. (2011) point to the fallacies in this assumption, noting that 
‘smallholders in South-East Asia have at times vigorously engaged in enclosure and primitive 
accumulation “from below”’ (14). The scrutiny of Malagasy smallholders’ responses to land 
deal negotiations carried out in this thesis will similarly disclose the proactive role that some 
local people played in corporate land access, shedding light on the more ‘insidious ways in 
which capitalist social relations can take hold’ (Li 2014: 4).  
 
The thesis more generally follows calls to move the spotlight from global players to domestic 
players and local people as key mediators of large-scale land deals (Smalley and Corbera 
2012; Sikor 2012; Fairbairn 2013; Lavers 2012; Wolford et al. 2013).  The focus on the global 
political economy as a driving force falls short of explaining why “land grabs” happen in 
certain contexts and not in others. (Sikor 2012). Examining the negotiations of a land deal 
from a local perspective will reveal ‘the mess of actors and motivations’ (Fairbairn 2013: 
336) that lie behind the homogenising categories of the state and local community. The term 
                                               
2 See, for instance: Netting (1993), Peters (1994, 2004: 274). 
3 See, for instance: Cohen (1980), Bruce (1988), Besteman (1994) and Peters (2004).  Peters (2013) even talks of a recorded increases of 
market transfers of land in Africa over the past few decades. 
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‘local’ that is used in the title and throughout the thesis is used as a convenient, yet very 
imperfect shorthand to point to the fact that the focus is on populations living on and using 
land targeted for transfer as well as domestic elites and decision-makers.  As anthropologists 
and critical geographers have argued, distinctions between global and local are social 
constructions more than empirical realities, ‘with a “global” that is far more global in talk 
than it is in actuality and a “local” that is not nearly so local in reality as it is in the texts of 
social scientists’ (Cooper 2001: 24). As a social construct, it also has its effects, notably in 
the spatial construction of hierarchy. In the discussion of my research design (Chapter 3), I 
explain how I mitigate these imperfections by adopting a conjunctural approach such as the 
one adopted in Land’s End (Li 2014), in which the conjuncture under study is not bounded 
and the spatial scope is not understood as a hierarchy, with the global on top and the local at 
the bottom. Despite the close-up focus of the research, efforts were made to pay attention to 
the wider webs of force in which the specific conjuncture is embedded.  
 
Deconstructing the “local community” and “the state” 
Another shortcoming of the initial land grab literature was ‘to assume a priori, rather than to 
demonstrate, what the reactions of affected groups of people are or would be’ (Borras and 
Franco 2013: 1724).  Against common depictions of local people as either subservient 
victims of imposed land deals or unified resisters against them (Hall et al. 2015: 468), 
scholars emphasised the variegated ways in which misnamed ‘local communities’ could 
respond to and be affected by a land deal (Hall et al. 2015, Bagiolini and Gibbon 2013; Borras 
and Franco 2013; Edelman and Leon 2013; Oya 2013). By providing a compelling 
illustration of the uneven responses that can be brought to a same land deal, this thesis 
confirms that opposition, whether expressed or passively suffered, does not exhaust local 
reactions to land deals. It also highlights the inequalities within agrarian economies and 
foregrounds social differentiation and perceptions of relational justice within local 
communities, as a key dynamic in local responses to corporate land access.  
 
Developing finer socio-historical analysis of the current land rush also meant scrutinising the 
role of the state and domestic elites in shaping and stimulating these processes. Far from 
being passive actors suffering dispossession from global capital, host states were described 
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as critical actors in land deals (Lavers 2012; Peters 2013; Fairbairn 2013; Levien 2013). In a 
special issue, Wolford et al. (2013) stressed that ‘states never operate with one voice’, and 
emphasised the ‘need to unbundle the state, to see government and governance as processes, 
people and relationships’ (2013: 189). Variation and contention characterised the 
intervention of state authorities in land deals, with some initiatives bolstering corporate land 
access and others stalling it (Burnod et al. 2013; Gingembre 2015; Pedersen and Buur 2016), 
with contradictions found both across and within national contexts.  State-legal regimes 
responded in different ways to the land rush across countries, from a strengthening of 
regulation to measures of accommodation and incentive (Wolford et al. 2013). This complex 
landscape required moving beyond normative observations of ‘state corruption’ to be fixed 
by good governance agendas to consider the broader issues of sovereignty, territoriality, 
subjectivity and authority that inform the politics of land deals (Borras and Franco 2010; 
Corson 2011; Grajales 2013; Peters 2013; Wolford et al. 2013, Gebresenbet 2016). 
 
The intricate dynamics of contention and differentiation that operate both between and within 
the social groups involved in (or excluded from) land deal negotiations help to explain why 
in a global context of capitalist development, land deals take different forms and different 
trajectories. The thesis argues that the way these multi-scale, multi-level contestations 
articulate also contributes to defining the conditions under which the voices of local 
populations get heard or silenced during processes of land deal negotiations. The importance 
of this context of contention in answering this thesis’s main research question is 
acknowledged through the analytical theme of ‘negotiations’, chosen as one of the three main 
axes of analysis. ‘Responses’ and ‘outcomes’ constitute the other two. What exactly is 
included by ‘negotiation’ is defined towards the end of this introduction. I now turn to 
explaining how the thesis explores the issues of responses and outcomes.  
 
Understanding variation in responses to, and outcomes of, land deals for local 
people 
Two projects are at the heart of this thesis. The first is highlighting and making sense of the 
diversity and contradictions of villagers’ responses to corporate land access. Calls were made 
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for empirically-grounded studies to explore ‘how those most affected actually perceive and 
react to these large-scale land deals and why?’ (Borras and Franco 2013: 1724). The second 
aim of this work is to emphasise the contrasted implications that a same land deal can have 
for socially-differentiated populations.  Countering common assumptions that people’s 
responses were either ‘resistance’ or ‘resignation’, scholars observed that corporate land 
access could not be expected to be welcomed the same way nor have the same impact across 
gender, class, kin, age and occupational groups (Scoones et al. 2012; Edelman et al. 2013; 
Fairbairn 2013; Hall et al. 2015; Pedersen and Buur 2016).  
Competing Struggles in a Differentiated Population 
Countering images of passive populations powerless in front of attacks on their land, media 
reports and academic works have documented instances of bottom-up resistance initiatives 
to either land deals (Coordination Sud 2010; Nhantumbo and Salomao 2010; Sullivan 2013; 
Scoones 2015; Gingembre 2015; Grajales 2015; Baird 2017) or to the policies carrying 
threats of dispossession through market penetration (Sampat 2015). Observers have also 
described efforts of rural movements to link up with regional and national actors to defend 
their rights (Rutten et al. 2017; Sobreiro 2015) and with transnational actors to negotiate a 
better regulation of land deals through the UN Committee on World Food Security and the 
negotiation of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of Land and 
Fisheries (McKeon 2013).  
 
However, contemporary agrarian changes and the rush for land have also been welcomed by 
reactions of a very different nature. Scholars have documented how smallholders could look 
at corporate land access through a positive lens (see, for instance: Mamonova 2015) and 
demonstrate a keen interest in market integration on the part of many (La-Orngplew 2012: 
Cramb and Sujang 2013; Li 2014; Castellanos-Navarrete and Jansen 2015). As Edelman 
notes, ‘some sell their holdings with little or no coercion and even with relief and enthusiasm’ 
and critically, ‘sometimes smallholders may be agents of or complicit with land grabbers’ 
(2003: 1519, 1522).  
 
This variation in responses from below could also be observed across time and space but, 
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more critically, within a same “local community” in the context of a same land transaction. 
As summarised by Borras and Franco (2013), ‘it is common to see mobilisations against a 
land deal parallel to countermobilisations in favour of the same deal’ (1730). This reality 
made it compelling to bring critical agrarian questions back to the fore of analysis of 
contemporary land deals, and particularly that of social differentiation.  As richly 
documented in the literature in agrarian studies and on land politics, most agrarian societies 
are characterised by a high degree of differentiation (Peters 2004) and “customary” land 
tenure regimes are highly unequal (Platteau 1996, 2000; Amanor 2001). Understanding 
responses from below, as I acknowledge in this thesis, requires paying attention to dynamics 
of inter- and intra-class politics and social differentiation (Edelman et al. 2013) and to the 
political contestations that pit poor people against poor people (Borras and Franco 2013).  
  
Borras and Franco (2013) have proposed a useful categorisation of the different types of 
struggle which have been carried out in the context of capitalist penetration of agrarian 
societies:  struggle against expulsion (or dispossession); struggle against exploitation (or for 
better incorporation); and struggle against land concentration. They explain that, depending 
on the nature of capitalist penetration, on the local history of domination and resistance as 
well as on dynamics of differentiation within the local population, these struggles can either 
converge or conflict. In certain cases, one type of struggle prevails, whether it is pursued 
collectively or individually. In others, different types of struggle can be fought 
simultaneously within a same site. 
 
Two types of struggle are illustrated in the case study examined in this thesis: struggles 
against (partial) dispossession and struggles for better incorporation, which sometimes 
intersect, sometimes collide. Borras and Franco (2013) give useful details on the varied type 
of objectives that are pursued in both types of struggle, which allow for more precision in 
discussions of responses to land deals from below. 
 
As far as struggles against dispossession are concerned, issues of scale and conditions matter.  
Some land deals carry threats of outright expulsions, while others allow peasants to keep 
formal ownership of land but make them lose control of it through, for example, certain types 
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of outgrowing arrangements or leases (dispossession without proletarianisation) and others, 
as in the case presented here, imply “only” a partial loss of land. These different forms of 
dispossession may be expected to orient both the goals and repertoires of struggles (Borras 
and Franco 2013). Struggle for incorporation (or against exploitation) can either be a first 
choice, cases where local populations are open to the prospects of incorporation offered by 
the penetration of capital or a ‘second best option’, in particular when struggles against 
dispossession were unsuccessful or killed in the bud. Struggles against exploitation can 
incorporate agrarian struggles (such as demands of improvement in the lease contract or 
demands to be incorporated into the business through outgrowing arrangements and so on), 
and labour justice struggles (related to wages, work conditions, for example) (Borras and 
Franco 2013).  The incidence of struggles for incorporation are more likely to be observed in 
cases of capitalist ventures that need both land and labour as opposed to those that solely 
require land, which are more likely to result in displacement (Li 2011). 
 
In sum, issues at stake for local people in the context of corporate land access can be expected 
to vary, according to (i) the nature of the land deal and associated (agrobusiness, 
conservation, forestry, industrial, tourism etc.) project, and to (ii) agrarian realities as partly 
informed by social differentiation. These diverging issues carry important implications for 
the understanding of ‘outcomes’, the third analytical strand structuring this thesis. 
 
Knowing that struggles of a different nature in the pursuit of different objectives can develop 
in the context of capital penetration calls for nuance in the exploration of land deals and their 
outcomes on local populations. As noted by Fairbairn (2013), depending on their situation, 
some local people may not mind some degree or type of dispossession as long as it brings 
them other benefits. Besides, land deals may not translate into similar patterns of 
dispossession for all: the terms, scale and geography of land deals matter. Some, within the 
local population, may have nothing to gain and everything to lose. Others may be interested 
in being incorporated in some way in the project being developed on the land, whether a first 
choice or a damage-limitation strategy.  
Borras and Franco’s classification stresses agrarian agency. Local people are not all victims 
of land deals and they may seek, through different means, to try and influence their terms. 
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However, only certain grievances and aspirations convert into open struggles. This thesis 
explores the broader dynamics that can explain variation not only in objectives and related 
outcomes, but also in the choice to express a voice or not. 
Consent, compliance or acquiescence? 
The absence of resistance (sometimes called ‘non-issues’) has historically been the object of 
rich discussion in various disciplines, from political science to mobilisation sociology 
through agrarian studies.  In power-ridden land deal negotiations, open struggles are only one 
part of the story and silences also deserve ‘listening’ to (Moreda 2015). Which struggles are 
wished for but not fought? Who struggles openly, who struggles more silently and who does 
not struggle at all, and why? Or to phrase it differently, under which conditions are local 
people’s voices openly expressed, as opposed to disguised or concealed?  
 
With acknowledged limitations related to issues of data production and positionality 
discussed in Chapter 4, I strived to explore these questions by thinking about dynamics of 
consent, acquiescence and compliance. Consent, acquiescence and compliance can be 
understood differently in relation to different theories (of power, of development and so on), 
as I discuss in Chapter 3. For the time being, I shall just point at the non-academic 
understanding of each of these notions and how they can allow me to be clearer about what 
I am talking about.  Acquiescence is defined by the Oxford dictionary as ‘the reluctant 
acceptance of something without protest’4. As such, it is tacitly opposed to ‘resistance’: 
disagreement (with a decision, an opinion, an action) is either kept silent (acquiescence) or, 
on the contrary, is expressed and/or acted upon (resistance). Acquiescence is therefore also 
distinguished from ‘compliance’, which is also used in the thesis. Defined by the same source 
as the fact of acting ‘in accordance with a wish or command’,5 the term ‘compliance’ does 
not give any measure of the degree of enthusiasm or reluctance towards the ‘wish or 
command’ that is followed. What compliance implies is the existence of (implicit or explicit) 
instructions to act or behave in a certain way. The other term widely used in context of local 
consultation is ‘consent’, in particular in the form of the ‘Free, Prior and Informed Consent’ 
                                               
4 Oxford Living dictionary (2017) 
5 Oxford Living dictionary (2017) 
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that has become a standard of human rights in the context of economic transactions and 
debates about the regulation of large-scale land acquisitions (cf. FAO (2012): Voluntary 
Guidelines on the Governance of Forests and Tenure). The word consent, on its own, implies 
a ‘voluntary acquiescence to the proposal of another; the act or result of reaching an accord; 
a concurrence of minds; or an actual willingness that an act or an infringement of an interest 
shall occur’.6 The notion of consent implies, in sum, that the acceptance of a decision or a 
proposal is voluntary and wanted.  
 
By being clearer about what is meant when using these terms and illuminating the exploration 
of these discussions with theoretical insights and empirical data, this thesis hopes to challenge 
some commonplace assumptions about resistance or lack of resistance in the context of land 
acquisitions.  A widespread conviction is that resistance would be the path all land users 
would choose to take were it not for power asymmetries and their effects. In that frame of 
thought, compliance with corporate land access is seen as the necessary result of fear, 
coercion or intimidation, or of mystification caused by a lack of access to information and 
education. People are acquiesced or manipulated into accepting land deals. On the other end 
of the spectrum are those narratives holding compliance to consultation processes as proof 
of consent. Whether it is done implicitly or explicitly, categorising responses to land deals as 
either acquiescence or consent reflects normative assumptions more than it allows for a 
nuanced understanding of the dynamics at work. 
 
Rather than drawing a clear line between what qualifies as consent, compliance or 
acquiescence, what this thesis seeks to do is define what type of consent, what type of 
compliance and what type of acquiescence are expressed, and under which conditions. This 
endeavour is supported by the exploration of (i) dynamics of power, as conceptualised by 
John Gaventa (1980) following Lukes (1974), and (ii) issues of relational justice through the 
concept of moral economy, as conceptualised by James Scott (1976). The next pages explain 
why these concepts, which will be discussed in further detail in Chapter Three, have been 
chosen as the core theoretical frames of this research.  
                                               
6 West's Encyclopedia of American Law (2005) 
14 
 
 
Uneven influences 
This thesis therefore explores how power relations and considerations of relational justice 
intersect in influencing whether socially-informed aspirations or concerns towards projects 
of land acquisitions will be voiced or not. Because making oneself heard within land deal 
negotiations is not only about expressing voice however, it also explores the conditions under 
which some of these voices may transform into influence. 
 
In the face of the powerful interests that are frequently behind large-scale land deals, 
decision-making may seem to leave little space for agrarian voices (Vermeulen and Cotula 
2010). However, local people can, under certain circumstances, gain bargaining power and 
exert some influence over the conditions of land acquisition (Hall et al. 2015; Rutten et al. 
2017). Research on land deals in Madagascar and elsewhere have indeed established that 
there could be cracks in the prevailing patterns of state support for commercial land 
transactions, which can create opportunities for local voices opposed to corporate access to 
find support and echo (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010; Burnod et al. 2013b). These cracks are 
more likely to open in contexts where political systems are characterised by a degree of 
competition and are vulnerable to some extent to contentious politics (Rutten et al. 2017). 
While the internal dynamics of resistance matter, the successful exercise of influence “against 
the odds” can also be contingent on specific political configurations.  This thesis draws on 
the sociology of mobilisation to try and explain how particular forms of contentious politics 
can, in certain types of regimes and in specific conjunctures, contribute to shaking the 
institutional bias and provide room for subversive local voices.   
 
Pursuing influence does not necessarily involve adopting confrontational attitudes, however. 
As explained above, local people struggling for incorporation may be favourable to corporate 
land access, as long as they get a good deal out of it.  In cases where there are conflicting 
views within the local population, achieving influence may involve imposing one’s voice 
over that of the others or expressing it behind the back of village authorities. Scholars have 
noted that in countries where consultations are imposed by legal regimes, those have tended 
to favour the voice of local elites such as village leaders, chiefs, elders and so on (Nhantumbo 
and Salomao 2009; Sulle and Nelson 2009; Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). This thesis 
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demonstrates that land deal negotiations can also make space for less authorised voices and 
that compliance with corporate land access can also be a form of resistance against village 
power structures. 
In sum, this thesis asks who, within local populations, can gain bargaining power, when and 
how, and how these specific influences articulate with contentious politics, dynamics of 
power and considerations of social justice. 
 
Power and justice in being heard 
Discussions of ‘acquiescence’ and ‘compliance’ have pointed to the visible and invisible 
pressures that inform responses to land deal negotiations. Most analyses of land deals point 
to the performative role of power in negotiations for land access but only few focus on power 
itself (Cotula 2009; Rutten et al. 2017; Fairbairn 2013). Those who do generally look at the 
vertical relations between domestic elites and decision-makers on the one hand, and local 
populations on the other, although they note that these can be challenged, and that local 
people can gain bargaining power (Rutten et al. 2017).  Fairbairn (2013) describes how 
domestic elites use varied sources of power to force or talk local people into accepting land 
deals.  
 
In their socio-legal study of consultation processes in different countries, Vermeulen and 
Cotula (2011) observe that the balance of power is predominantly skewed towards corporate 
interests even in places where legal regimes are protective of smallholders’ land rights. As 
Wolford et al. (2013) explain, ‘certainly there is unevenness in power relations, but the 
particular forms, practices and effects of power must be understood in geographically and 
historically specific terms if we are to adequately address the multiple and diverse practices 
of land grabs’ (207). I add that there is also a compelling need to reintroduce a focus on 
horizontal power dynamics, those that operate within local communities. Hall, Hirsch and Li 
(2011) observe that processes of exclusion from land are not solely perpetuated from above, 
but also from below. To secure their land access, land users have to prevent the access of 
others.  Similarly, to make sure their voice is heard within the context of land deal 
negotiations, this thesis demonstrates that villagers may have to prevent others from 
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expressing their own voices. 
 
Drawing on Luke’s (1975) and Gaventa’s theorisation of power (1980), this thesis carries an 
in-depth investigation of the multi-dimensional, multi-scalar operations of power in land deal 
negotiations. The conceptual framework allows for an analysis of visible ways in which 
power is wielded in negotiating or resisting the land transactions, but, more critically, it 
includes the more invisible, diffused workings of power, in a way that is globally missing 
from the land grab literature. 
 
Responses to land deals, this thesis contends, are also informed by considerations of 
relational justice. Negotiating corporate land access with local populations raises questions 
about who has the right to decide on which land. In a context where local land tenure is 
characterised by flexibility and negotiability, the answer to these questions is never 
straightforward and a likely source of tension. Feelings of having been illegitimately robbed 
of one’s right to decide on a specific piece of land or, on the contrary, of being rightfully 
granted that right can be expected to influence perceptions over land deals.  
 
Making a case that land deals should not automatically be lumped under the homogenising, 
normative category of ‘land grabbing’ is also a way of saying that conditions of corporate 
land access are critical. While certain types of appropriation may be tolerable (or even wished 
for), others may generate outright indignation. Across a socially-differentiated society, what 
is considered acceptable and what is not both in the context of the land deal and in broader 
social relations may vary. Drawing on Scott’s conceptualisation of moral economy (1976), 
perceptions of justice are tied to contested understandings of others’ rights and obligations 
on economic matters.  How others (corporate and state elites but also other villagers) perform 
with regards to these rights and obligations constitutes an essential lens, this thesis argues, 
through which actors will not only develop their perceptions of land deals, but also determine 
whether it is worth taking the risk of expressing a voice, especially if that voice is (vertically 
or horizontally) subversive. Whilst highlighting how power dynamics can produce 
acquiescence, the thesis is therefore also interested in understanding how considerations of 
social justice can draw red lines that can entice people to challenge power relationships.  
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Negotiation, responses and outcomes 
The main research question ‘How do the voices of local people get heard or silenced in the 
context of local negotiations over corporate land access?’ emerged from the observations 
made above, and which can be summarised as follows: 
(i) Local people have varied, sometimes conflicting, visions of land deals, only some of 
which are openly expressed. 
(ii) Despite unfavourable odds, local people can, under certain circumstances, gain 
bargaining power and influence the negotiations for the land transaction.  
Data analysis and discussion were structured around the three research objects at the heart of 
that question: ‘negotiations’, ‘responses’ and ‘outcomes. 
 
The first component of analysis, ‘negotiations’, refers to this multi-sited, longitudinal 
process, during which the terms of the land deal are discussed, contested and decided upon. 
Empirically, it covers all repertoires and spaces of negotiations, from formal discussions and 
their outputs (consultation, meetings, contracts) to informal means of negotiating (lobbying, 
bargaining, resisting, communicating with the media, networking and so on), through back-
door instances of negotiation (blackmailing, secret dealings, use of rumours and threats, for 
example). 
 
Analytically, this strand reflects this thesis’s interest for the wider configurations of power 
and politics, in which “local” negotiations are embedded. To be able to understand whether 
processes of local consultation and the inclusion of local authorities make a difference, it is 
important to understand what is being negotiated at the local level and what is already decided 
or will be decided elsewhere.  Grasping the dynamics at work in these local spaces also 
requires exploring how these previous, simultaneous or future negotiations, discursively or 
materially inform responses and outcomes at the local level. Here the national and 
transnational levels of negotiation are mainly considered and analysed from a bottom-up 
perspective. Negotiations also refer to the agrarian context: negotiations take place within 
agrarian populations characterised by specific (dynamic and differentiated) ecologies, 
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livelihoods, constraints, capacities and socio-political structures, which all need 
consideration. 
 
Finally, behind discussions over corporate land access are also internal negotiations over 
socially-assigned positions, as well as over issues of authority and property: by taking part 
in land deal negotiations, local people are also vying for land rights, re-enacting land disputes, 
reasserting or challenging patterns of wealth and authority, questioning each other’s rights 
and responsibilities, trying to reinvent or preserve livelihoods and their position in society. 
This thesis also looks at these internal negotiations that underpin the direct land deal 
negotiations. 
 
The theme of ‘responses’ refers to analytical efforts to explain both: (i) the diverse, 
sometimes conflicting, perspectives villagers have of the corporate project and of the land 
deal negotiation process; and (ii) the expression, or non-expression of these perspectives, in 
the context of the land deal negotiations. Responses are conceived as fluid dynamics in which 
interactions with and perceptions of others, and of their past and potential future reactions 
are critical.  As discussions evolve, as the project develops, as decisions are carried out, actors 
may readjust their responses.   
 
Finally, the ‘outcome’ component of the thesis points to analytic efforts to assess the terms 
and conditions of the corporate acquisition of land as experienced by the villagers (lived 
outcome) in relation to initial aspirations. The assessment encompasses various aspects of 
the land deal: (i) the nature of the project (business model, type and mode agricultural 
production, labour policies and so on); (ii) the location and size of the land acquisition(s); 
and (iii) conditions of and retributions for land access (location of the corporate plantations, 
legal form of the company’s land access, nature, scale and destination of compensation, job 
opportunities and so on).  
 
Purpose and argument 
The purpose of this research is to understand the conditions under which certain voices get 
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heard, and others silenced, in the context of the negotiation process for corporate land access 
and the processes by which some of these voices manage to influence the terms and 
conditions of the deal. It looks at how horizontal and vertical power dynamics interface with 
situated moral economies and contentious politics to inform these variations in perspective, 
engagement and outcome. 
 
I argue that local voices and opportunities for influence in the context of land transactions in 
Madagascar are constructed at the intersection of national and village politics. The research 
highlights the central role of the state in mediating the consultation and ultimately 
appropriating the land to be used by private capital and argues that the contradictions and 
contentions that characterise its intervention open interstices for local influence. However, 
despite its role in both facilitating and stalling corporate land access, the state’s projections 
of power produce compliance with dispossession, which is only resisted by those villagers 
with the most power resources.  I show that, in socially-differentiated agrarian populations, 
compliance in the context of local consultation reflects processes of different natures: a 
reluctant resignation to top-down pressures or ‘compliance as acquiescence’ for some, but 
also ‘constrained hope’, and potential challenging of horizontal power relations or 
‘compliance as resistance’ for others. The thesis also draws attention to the contested moral 
economies that underpin local people’s perspectives on the land deal negotiations and choices 
to express or suppress subversive voices. It finally highlights that, whether struggling against 
dispossession or struggling for incorporation, local people’s chances of influencing high-
stake land deals are not only a matter of legal empowerment but are also contingent on state 
politics and community contention.  
 
Thesis outline 
The thesis first opens with a discussion of the Tozzi Green land deal that was chosen as the 
case study: it describes the corporate project that underpins it, the negotiation approach for 
land access, its success and challenges as well as the internal tensions that have pervaded the 
company. This chapter also discusses the global negotiation context: the socio-economic 
patterns and dynamics of change of the agrarian society living on the corporate project site, 
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the pliable legal-institutional context that characterises dynamics of land privatisation in 
Madagascar, and the transnational dynamics of legitimation and contestation that informed 
the fluctuating politics of the land deal (Chapter 2). Chapter 3 discusses the theoretical 
framework of the thesis, arguing in favour of a power-moral economy-contentious politics 
nexus in understanding the complex dynamics of voice and influence in large-scale land 
deals. After having outlined the research design and methodology that was derived from 
those conceptual insights (Chapter 4), the thesis presents the results of a 26-village 
comparison carried out in 2013, which provides a detailed illustration of the panoply of 
responses and outcomes that can be experienced at the village level (Chapter 5). This overall 
picture provides a useful background to discuss the three village case studies, on which the 
next phase of data collection and analysis focused (2014). Each of the cases is then the object 
of a full chapter (Chapters 6, 7 and 8), which tells their story through the lens of negotiations, 
responses and outcomes and where discussions of villagers’ voices and chances of influence 
within large-scale land deals progress through comparing and contrasting the case studies. 
Finally, I highlight the main insights of the thesis on how state and village politics articulate 
in informing voices and influence in the context of land deal negotiations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
CORPORATE LAND ACCESS IN 21ST CENTURY 
MADAGASCAR: AN ILLUSIONARY CARTE BLANCHE 
 
 
This chapter seeks to provide some elements of background to the discussion of agrarian 
voices in land deal negotiations in Madagascar and introduce the case study examined in the 
thesis. Madagascar is an important site for the study of land deals as both a major target in 
the rush for land and a country that has passed an ambitious land reform aimed at protecting 
agrarian populations.  
 
Beyond the infamous Daewoo scandal7 that contributed, in a significant measure, to the 
international outcry over land grabbing, the country is the source of numerous concerns and 
interests. Its rich and unique natural resources appeal to extractive industries, agribusiness 
and “green capitalism” (Teyssier et al. 2010; Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011; Evers et 
al. 2011, 2013; Neimark 2012; Seagle 2012; Medernach and Burnod 2013, Ferguson et al. 
2014; Huff 2016), as well as to international conservationists who are keen to protect one of 
the world’s biological ‘hotspots’ (Corson 2011, 2016; Duffy 2006). 
 
On the legal front, Madagascar is one of the few southern countries where people’s rights to 
consultation in the context of land deals are protected (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010). Since 
the 2005 land reform, untitled land is no longer considered as the property of the state but of 
its users, whose rights are recognised under the legal category of ‘untitled private property’. 
Under this legal regime, the state is no longer allowed to lease or sell untitled land:  for land 
to be transferred to private hands, it first has to be titled in the name of the state, which can 
only legally be done after local authorities and population have confirmed that the land is not 
subject to any claims. Large-scale land acquisitions are therefore particularly lengthy 
                                               
7 In November 2008, the Financial Times broke the story that secret negotiations were taking place between the Malagasy government and 
the South-Korean Daewoo corporation for the long-term leasing of 1.3 million hectares (ha) arable land. The news caused outrage and was 
used by Andry Rajoelina as a key argument to legitimise his overthrow of the Ravalomanana regime (2009).  
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procedures, where people’s rights are legally protected. Madagascar’s legal framework also 
promotes local participation in natural resource management and has transferred land 
management responsibilities to local governments (Teyssier et al. 2009). These measures of 
protection of small-scale farming, however, coincide with policies promoting more 
corporate-driven models of agriculture, whilst political practices still tend to hold untitled 
land as state property.  
 
In this chapter, I point to historical practices of ‘extraversion’ (Bayart 2000) to explain why, 
in this context of ambivalent policies, local state agents tend to ignore the laws that protect 
local land rights to further corporate interests (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011; 
Teyssier et al. 2010; Burnod and Andriamanalina 2014; Ferguson et al. 2014). I also observe, 
however, that despite this institutional bias, corporate land access can meet obstacles: 
competition over the benefits offered by corporate projects and the pressure of contentious 
politics in a context of electoral democracy can turn land deal negotiations into sensitive 
issues politically. These tensions encourage cracks in the institutional bias, with state agents 
at various levels finding an interest in supporting local land users struggling against 
dispossession.  
 
This chapter first discusses the political and policy contexts of corporate land acquisitions in 
Madagascar. It then introduces the Tozzi Green project and land deal, first describing the 
socio-economic context of the agrarian region which it developed and then highlighting the 
difficulties the company experienced on both agronomic and land access issues, relating the 
latter to the bottom-up resistance that was organised against it. 
 
Institutional bias and political uncertainty 
The first part of this chapter examines the policy and legal framework in which the Tozzi 
Green land deal negotiations took place. After highlighting the hesitation of national policies 
between family farming and agribusiness-driven models of rural development, I point to the 
bias of state institutions and actors towards corporate interests. I also explain that state 
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support for corporate land access is not unconditional, however and that under certain 
circumstances, political support can shift towards agrarian populations. Attention is finally 
brought to the specificity of the political context in which negotiations for Tozzi Green’s land 
access were being conducted, with the shortage of external funding in the wake of Andry 
Rajoelina’s illegal seizure of power (2009). 
The state in Madagascar: regulating or promoting land deals? 
The institutional and policy landscapes that structure issues of access to natural resources and 
land property in Madagascar are complex and contradictory. In this context, I argue that the 
historical practices of those enforcing laws on the ground as well as the power webs they are 
enmeshed in are as critical, if not more so, than legal-institutional regimes to understand local 
people’s chances to be heard within land deal negotiations. 
Confusions in policy landscape 
In Madagascar, as in many African countries, legal and policy frameworks on access to land 
and natural resources show hesitancy between two models of development (Teyssier et al. 
2010; Amanor 2012; Doss et al. 2014). Recognising small-scale agriculture as a critical sector 
of the national economy and an essential provider of livelihoods, a number of laws aim to 
protect local land rights. Simultaneously, politicians and policies promote a rural 
development model driven by commercial investments in land and natural resources.  
 
 Under the Ravalomanana regime (2002-2009), policies were passed to entice investors to 
come and develop commercial farming on what was defined as the country’s “idle land”.  In 
2009, the Ministry of Agriculture, Cattle Farming and Fishing was advertising the ‘eight 
million hectares of arable land’ reportedly still available on the island (Bouhey et al. 2010).  
In addition, for the first time in Malagasy history, foreigners were allowed to buy land.8 As 
in an important number of African countries (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010: 906), a special 
agency was created to promote and support corporate investments: the Economic 
Development Board of Madagascar, which ranked agribusiness among its six priorities and 
                                               
8 Law n° 2003-028 of 22 August 2003 setting up the organisation and control of immigration. Foreigners’ access to property was further 
facilitated by the new code of investment (Law 2007-036) of 14 January 2008. However, no implementing decree has ever been passed, 
and foreign investors therefore still lease land. 
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was empowered to authorise land prospecting. Simultaneously, regional governments were 
encouraged to create ‘Agricultural Investment Areas’ (AIAs) to accelerate land access for 
investors.9 These policies were continued by the following governments of Andry Rajoelina 
(2009-2014) and Hery Rajaonarimampianina (2014-) (Burnod et al. 2014) despite Rajoelina 
having run his destabilisation campaign against Ravalomanana on the Daewoo scandal, 
denounced as a ‘treason to the nation’ (Rajoelina, quoted in Pellerin 2009). The current 
president, Hery Rajaonarimampiana (2014-), regularly promotes the country’s landed 
potential on visits abroad10 and policy documents make numbered projections as to the 
amount of land to be transferred to commercial projects.11 
 
Legally, agrarian populations and hunter gatherers are not totally defenceless with regards to 
the corporate appropriation of their land and natural resources. A number of laws were 
designed to ensure that the environmental and social impact of agribusiness and mining 
projects were kept in check. Besides having to provide a business plan to allow for due 
diligence by the state, companies are required to obtain an environmental permit from the 
National Office for the Environment (ONE) if their project aims to develop over 1,000 ha of 
land.12 The permit is granted after the validation of an ‘environmental impact assessment’ 
(EIA) study that considers environmental and socio-economic issues, whilst setting out how 
impacts will be monitored and mitigated. Consultation with the local population are part of 
the requirements.  
 
Agrarian populations are protected by another set of laws specifically designed to protect 
their land rights. A first attempt towards the legal recognition of customary land rights came 
with a 1998 decree designed for local communities to whom the state had transferred 
management of natural resources.13 The next breakthrough occurred in 2005, when a land 
                                               
9 Although some of these zones have been identified, they have not yet been legally formalised (Burnod et al. 2013 b). 
10 See for instance: Valis (2014) ‘Une Chambre de commerce israélo-malgache’, Madagascar Tribune [Online], 7 June, Available at: 
http://www.madagascar-tribune.com/Une-Chambre-de-commerce-israelo,19998.html [Accessed: 7 June 2014]. 
11 The 2014-2025 official sector policy document for agriculture, livestock and fisheries mentioned plans to allocate two million hectares 
for agricultural and export-oriented private projects (Andriamanalina and Burnod 2014). 
12 Decree n° 99-954 of 15 December 1999 modified by the Decree n° 2004-167 of 3 February 2004.  
13 Decree n° 98-610 of 13 August 1998, regulating the implementation of the relative securing of tenure (Free translation). 
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reform replaced the ‘presumption of domaniality’ by a ‘presumption of untitled private 
property’: this meant that untitled land would no longer be considered as state property, but 
instead be considered as the private property of those who could prove their ‘occupation, use 
or development’ of the concerned tracts.14 To increase tenure security for the poor, land 
management responsibilities were delegated to local land offices at the level of municipalities 
(BIF), which were given the capacity to deliver legalised proofs of property (land certificates) 
at much faster and more affordable rates than the land titles delivered by regional land 
services (Teyssier et al. 2007). Even in the absence of land certificates, local land claims are 
granted protection under these laws since untitled land can no longer be titled or leased before 
a ‘commission of recognition’, including neighbours and the fokonolona (the “local 
community”15), confirms that the targeted land is available and not already under productive 
use (mise en valeur).16  
 
These laws protecting local land rights lack precision, however.  The rights of local land users 
during these ‘recognition’ missions are loosely laid out. As mentioned above, ‘neighbours, 
interested parties that have made themselves known and the fokonolona’ are to be invited to 
but their signature is not formally required17. The law only states that any disagreements with 
the titling procedure should be recorded in the proceedings of the commission, whose role is 
also to try and reconcile the different parties. No mechanisms of objection or mediation are 
clearly set up. Moreover, customary power-holders were given little decision-making power 
since recognition commissions are made up solely of state agents: they include a member of 
the regional land office (CIRDOM), which acts as its head; a member of the regional 
department of topography (CIRTOPO); a member of the municipality; and the head of the 
concerned fokontany (local administrative unit generally encompassing several villages). 
                                               
14 Law 2005-019 of 17 October 2005 fixing the principles governing land statutes (Free translation). 
15 The term fokonolona has recovered different meanings through space and time. With historic origins in the Imerina region, it is now 
used throughout Madagascar to  designate the ‘patrilinear and patrilocal clan (or sometimes lineage) unified in the same territory (fokontany) 
and [composed of]  descendants of the same ancestry’ (Marcus 2008, referring to Lejamble 1963 and to Condominas 1964). Under President 
Ratsiraka (1975-1991), it was recognised as an institutional structure and given responsibility in local governance and although its 
responsibilities have declined since then, its role is still recognised in the constitution. It is also understood as ‘the village assembly that 
gets together every time a problem comes up in the village or in the neighbouring village’ (Fauroux 2002).  
16 Article 18, Law 2008-014 of 5 January 2009 on the private property of the state (Free translation). 
17 Article 28, Decree n°2010-233 of 20 April 2010, regulating the implementation of Law 2008-014. 
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These state agents are then in charge of summoning the neighbours and the fokonolona.18 
The choice of whom to invite to the recognition is, therefore, left to these state agents.  
 
This marginalisation of non-state authorities and local population was not made up for by 
subsequent legislation.  In the 2010 guidelines on large-scale land deals,19 only one of the 
eighteen stages of the defined procedure included the ‘local population’ (cf diagram in 
appendix 1).  As is the case in most postcolonial countries, access control is therefore left to 
state agencies, while resource users are left ‘in the position of having to invest in relations 
with these agents in order to maintain access’ (Ribot 1995 quoted in Ribot and Peluso 2003: 
163). This dependency is particularly problematic because of the strong bias that Malagasy 
state authorities and institutions have been shown to have towards the strongest bidder 
(Ferguson et al. 2014). The next pages contextualise this institutional bias with regards to the 
historical ‘strategies of extraversion’ from those holding public power.  
The institutional bias of extraversion 
The case of Madagascar provides a compelling illustration of how, even in contexts where 
laws protect local land rights, ‘government agencies tend to align with the interests of large-
scale investors when tested in real negotiation’ (Vermeulen and Cotula 2010: 899) Empirical 
observations all concur in noting that little consideration is given to smallholders’ legal rights 
in land deal procedures, with untitled land still publicly described and treated as ‘state land’ 
by local land administrations (Teyssier et al. 2010; Burnod et al. 2013a). Missions of 
recognition nearly systematically conclude that there is ‘nothing to declare’, even where 
grazing and/or agricultural activities are evident (Andrianirina-Ratsialonana et al. 2011). 
Moreover, from my own experience, access to the minutes of these commissions is forbidden 
to the general public and labelled ‘secret’.20 There is therefore no means to check who 
participated and what was said, and whether protests about the land operation under 
discussion were voiced and reported. Other evidence of the double standards that preside in 
the state management of corporate land acquisitions is that most companies operate without 
                                               
18 Article 28 and 29, Decree 2010 -233 laying down the procedures for applying law 2008-014 (Free translation). 
19 In December 2010, the Rajoelina regime sent a letter of instruction to all the regional land offices across the country, spelling out the 
lengthy procedure needed for the acquisition of tracts of land equal to or greater than 2,500 ha. 
20 Repeated interviews with the Regional land services (Domaines) of Ihosy (2013 and 2014). 
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the necessary environmental permit and are not held accountable for this failure to abide by 
the rules (Ferguson et al. 2014). These practices reflect the general bias of state authorities 
towards commercial large-scale agriculture over smallholders.  
 
In states whose budgets depend mainly on external contributions, private investments, 
especially foreign ones, represent a critical source of funding: official and unofficial rent 
associated with them can help state agents deliver on their electoral pledges, support their 
patronage networks and ultimately, contribute to a strengthening of authority (Burnod et al. 
2013a; Wolford et al. 2013). The political scientist, J.F. Bayart, calls ‘strategies of 
extraversion’ those strategies of asserting power by mobilising the ‘resources derived from 
their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment’ (2000: 218). By 
demonstrating that dominant actors of African countries have historically gained from the 
insertion of their country as unequal partners in the world economy, he argues that governing 
through extraversion is a historical feature of governance in African countries that predates 
colonialism. The opportunities of extraversion offered by foreign agribusiness and mining 
projects (or what Bayart also calls the ‘rent of dependency’), I argue, contribute significantly 
towards explaining the partial application of laws protecting local land rights frequently 
observed on the ground.  
The contested politics of land deals 
Political obstruction to land access 
Despite the bias encouraged by extraversion, previous research on land deals in Madagascar 
have highlighted cases of local authorities and officials supporting local struggles against 
dispossession. An empirical study of recent large-scale land deal negotiations in Madagascar 
(Burnod et al. 2013b) showed indeed that it was relatively frequent for corporate land access 
to be stalled following the mobilisation of local officials against cases of land rights abuse. 
In three of the cases examined in the study, local state officials had backed local struggles 
against dispossession. In the case of Newprod, opposition claims had been voiced by an ex-
mayor and the Regional Direction of Forests and Water (DREF). In the case of N-Fuel, they 
had united a powerful Sakalava princess and a mayor, while in the case of Tozzi Green 
examined here, resistance efforts from cattle owners were backed by a mayor. Their official 
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complaints could be related to struggles over authority within the local administration and/or 
to competition over the resources offered by the project. In each case, these interventions had 
contributed to stalling corporate land access to a certain extent, thereby pointing to the 
potential of local officials in influencing land deals (Burnod et al. 2013b). 
 
The case of Tozzi Green illustrates how political competition can play out against corporate 
land access, while highlighting that the power of local politicians on such matters is 
dependent on political conjuncture and cannot succeed without the backing of figures within 
the national state. Before describing the sequence of events that led to a stalling of the 
company’s land access, I highlight how the context under Rajoelina’s government (2009-
2014) contributed to turning large-scale land deals into particularly sensitive issues, both 
politically and economically. 
Competition for extraversion rent aggravated during Andry Rajoelina’s ‘transition’21 
Under the ‘transitional regime’ that followed the overthrow of president Ravalomanana 
(2009-2014), Madagascar sank into economic recession, political turmoil and international 
isolation (Razafindrakoto et al. 2014). In reaction to the coup led by Rajoelina (Randrianja 
2012), bilateral and multilateral donors suspended budget assistance and all ‘non-essential’ 
aid funding. These measures dealt a hard blow to an economy for which foreign aid 
represented approximately 40% of the government’s budget and 75% of public spending 
(Ploch and Cook 2012). The political tensions and climate of insecurity that followed the 
coup adversely affected key sectors such as tourism, textile and construction and led to a 
sharp drop in the level of private investments.22 According to the World Bank, economic 
growth in Madagascar collapsed to just 0.6% in 2009, from 7% in 2008.23 
In this context, projects related to the extraction and exploitation of the country’s natural 
                                               
21 On 17 March 2009, a military directorate overthrew president Marc Ravalomanana and handed power to the mayor of Antananarivo, 
Andry Rajoelina, who was sworn in as president of the ‘High Authority of the Transition’ (HAT).  Order 2009-002 of 17 March 2009 
provided for a 24-month transition, but Rajoelina ended up staying in power until January 2014. 
22 International Crisis Group (2014) ‘A cosmetic end to Madagascar’s crisis?’ Africa Report n°218. 19 May. Available at: 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/southern-africa/madagascar/218-a-cosmetic-end-to-madagascar-s-crisis.pdf [Accessed: 
22 May 2014]. 
23 IRIN (2010) ‘Analysis: Madagascar's year of crisis’. Available at : http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportId=88447 [Accessed : 
20 March 2010]. 
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resources were one of the few sources of external funding remaining.  In the mining sector, 
some highly-lucrative deals were negotiated with new partners24. A total of ten new mining 
projects are estimated to have started under Rajoelina’s regime, three of which are huge 
investments concerning areas of over 500,000 ha,25 all adding to the concern over social and 
environmental damage already raised by major projects such as Madagascar Oil Tsimiroro, 
Ambatovy and QMM/Rio Tinto (Seagle 2012). Negotiation over large-scale land transfers 
were also conducted in the forestry sector as part of carbon-off setting schemes.26 The 
agribusiness sector for its part suffered from a sharp drop in investment (from 82 projects 
announced between 2005 and 2014 to roughly 10 projects still active in 2014), as concern 
for Madagascar’s political instability was compounded by the prospective investors’, general 
lack of expertise in the agricultural sector, and difficulties in securing land access 
(Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011; Burnod et al. 2014a).  
 
Whilst this context of financial scarcity reinforced competition over extraversion rent, large-
scale land deals had become a ‘hot issue’ since the Daewoo scandal. The successful 
instrumentalisation of the case by Andry Rajoelina to discredit the Ravalomanana regime 
had highlighted the destabilising potential that accusations of land grabbing could have on a 
government. The scandal had also put the civil society on high alert: the association of land 
rights defence which was set up by Malagasies based in France to ‘protect Malagasy land’27 
and which had played a critical role in publicising the Daewoo scandal at the time remained 
active hereafter (Coordination Sud 2010). Through its connections with national activists and 
transnational solidarity organisations, it has since been keeping a close eye and attracting 
public attention to other cases of large-scale land deals by communicating through the media, 
writing reports, sending petitions and calling the government to action. Whilst their requests 
                                               
24 Among them, the company WISCO which paid 100 million dollars to gain the right to access the iron-rich zone of Soalala. 
25 Petrochina (688 400 ha), Pan African Mining (1 million ha) and Mainland Mining (more than 2 million ha). These figures, as well as 
the other ones mentioned in this paragraph, are based on cross-referenced information from media articles, expert reports (Andrianirina et 
al. 2011; Raharinirina 2013; Burnod et al. 2014a) and civil society accounts (Andrew Lee Trust 2009; SIF 2013, Franchi et al. 2013 and 
newsletters from Collectif Tany). However, they cannot be considered to be definitive, in view of the opacity that surrounds these projects. 
26 An area of 40,000 ha was bought by Madawoodlands in the Sofia region (Re:Common 2013). In Makira protected forest in the north-
east, carbon credits were allegedly sold to Microsoft and the zoo of Zurich on an area of 320,000 ha (Collectif Tany, newsletter n°31, 
31/04/2014). 
27 Information from their website (exact reference not revealed for confidentiality reasons). 
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for transparency on land deals generally do not get any public response from the government, 
their action has inclined decision-makers to increased vigilance, as illustrated by Tozzi 
Green’s experience.  
 
The case discussed in this thesis indeed illustrates how the two contextual constraints outlined 
above, the shortage of external funding exacerbating competition over extraversion rent, on 
the one hand, and the political sensitivity of corporate land access in the wake of the Daewoo 
scandal, on the other, played in favour of struggles against dispossession. Before describing 
how these political dynamics played out in the context of the land deal, I first introduce the 
socio-economic context of the Ihorombe plateau on which the project developed.  
 
Tozzi Green project-site 
In view of its vast plains, the Ihorombe plateau was designated by the administration of the 
Ihorombe region as a priority area for commercial investment. It had already been 
recommended to Landmark, an Indian agribusiness company which had started developing 
a large-scale maize plantation project for a few years, but had stopped operations just before 
the arrival of Tozzi Green. 
The Ihorombe plateau: an agropastoral, marginalised region 
Bordered to the west by the Isalo National Park, the Ihorombe plateau is a region of savanna 
located in the district of Ihosy, Ihorombe region, some 600 km south of the capital 
Antananarivo, between the mountainous central highlands and the dry south of Madagascar. 
Its eroded plains (300 to 600 metres high) are prone to flooding, drought and locust invasion. 
It is an agrarian region in which most people live by semi-subsistence agriculture and 
extensive pastoralism, and have poor access to basic socio-economic services.28 
 
                                               
28 Most of the data mentioned in this section are drawn from the following three documents written by the regional administration: ‘Rapport 
annuel de mise en œuvre des programmes régionaux’ (Implementation of Regional Programs. Yearly report) (2014), ‘Profil 
Environnemental’ (Environmental Profile) (2006), and ‘Monographie de la Région Ihorombe’ (Monograph of the Ihorombe Region) (2003) 
(free translation). These were the most recent sources of official data that were found to be available on the region. 
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 Figure 1: Project Site. District of Ihosy. Region of Ihorombe, Madagascar. 
 
Small-scale farming and extensive pastoralism provide the basis of the rural economy in the 
Ihorombe region. The ex-province of Tulear, to which the Ihorombe region belongs, has long 
been the first region for cattle farming in Madagascar (Fauroux 1992a).29 Poultry and pig 
breeding is also practised but on a smaller scale. Contrary to pervasive stereotypes of the 
autochthonous Bara people being exclusive cattle farmers, however,30 agriculture has long 
been an essential component of local livelihoods. Agriculture is largely non-mechanised. For 
tillage work, cattle are used. 
 
Rice is the main farmed crop (75% of farmed land), and is complemented by other rain-fed 
crops, cassava (15% of the farmed land for the region), sweet potato (sonjo), maize, peanuts 
                                               
29 In 2014, 253,700 cattle were counted in the Ihorombe region, with the district of Ihosy accounting for the largest share.  
30 The Bara people claim autochthony across an area covering some 60,000km2 in south-central Madagascar, often referred to as the Ibara 
country. On the Ihorombe plateau, they have been joined by Malagachies from neighbouring regions (Antesaka, Itanalas, Antandroy, 
Betsileo, Merinas, Sakalava etc.) who soon came to call themselves ‘Bara’ as well. For historical and anthropological work on Ibara, cf St 
Sauveur 1998, Moizo et al. 1997, Lebigre et al. 1997, Elli 1993, Huntington 1973 and Faublée 1951. 
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(voanjo) and vondro (straw-like type of plant used for sewing and roofs) for my field site.31 
 
In 2014, the Ihorombe region’s index of poverty was at 78.20%, nearly seven points higher 
than the national level when Madagascar is already in the bottom 50 countries in the Human 
Development Index world ranking.32 Nearly three quarters of the population did not reach 
the minimal calorie intake of 2,133 calories per day. Despite being connected to the rest of 
the country via a national road (the RN7), the region of Ihorombe has low access to basic 
services, very poor health and hygiene infrastructure, few schools and teachers, and 
electricity is a rare luxury.  Dysentery is still one of the main causes of death, alongside 
malaria and acute respiratory infections. At the time of fieldwork, the region was also 
experiencing rising insecurity and a resurgence in deadly cattle theft. 
 
In the countryside, machines, hydro-agricultural infrastructure and transportation means are 
very scarce. Relying on the rain for their agricultural yields, farmers are vulnerable to the 
vagaries of the climate. This leads to intense competition for the low-lying seasonal wetlands 
and the baiboho (alluvial soils along the rivers). Despite complex institutional schemes to 
provide help to small-scale farming at the level of the local administration, state support to 
cope with common external shocks such as drought and insect invasion seemed to be rare 
(2013 and 2014 fieldwork). 
The rural municipalities of Satrokala, Andiolava and Ambatolahy 
The municipalities of Satrokala, Andiolava and Ambatolahy where the Tozzi Green project 
set up its base have the advantage of being close to a national road, allowing for an easier 
outsourcing of products and importing of infrastructure and other necessary inputs. The 
population of these municipalities is relatively low: 8,234 inhabitants for 1,125 km2 for 
Andiolava; 15,000 inhabitants for 2,135 km2 for Satrokala; and 12,000 inhabitants for 2,600 
km2 for Ambatolahy. Densities are therefore between four and a half people per km2 for 
                                               
31 Monographie Ihorombe 2003. 
32 Madagascar was ranked 154 in terms of HDI in 2015. Source: UNDP website- Available at: http://hdr.undp.org/en/composite/HDI. 
[Accessed on 07/10/2015]. 
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Ambatolahy and around seven people per km2 for the other two (data from 2012)33.  The 
latest available Development Communal Plans from 2006 highlighted high illiteracy rates 
(from 65% for Ambatolahy to 80% for Andiolava), very poor access to health care (with a 
maximum of 2 nurses per municipality and none for Satrokala), and extremely low municipal 
budgets (from 1,500€ per year for Satrokala to 8,000€ for Ambatolahy). In terms of land use, 
the same broad patterns were found across all three municipalities, with rice paddies 
occupying roughly a third of the total farmed land, followed by cassava.  
 
The three municipalities enjoyed varying capital and agricultural yields. Agricultural yields 
were, for instance, much higher in Andiolava than in the other two municipalities, which 
resulted in Andiolava topping the list in terms of production per inhabitant for both rice and 
cassava, despite having significantly less farmland than the other two. On the other hand, 
Satrokala had the lowest rice production per inhabitant, despite having more farmland than 
the others. Inequalities were also observable in terms of cattle wealth. In that respect, the 
municipality of Satrokala was doing better than that of Andiolava, but Ambatolahy was the 
one standing out. With a total of 42,450 head of cattle (2013), its official cattle wealth per 
capita was more than three times higher than that of Andiolava and more than two and a half 
times as high as that of Satrokala.34  
 
These figures sketch different profiles, a municipality with significant cattle wealth for 
Ambatolahy, one with good crop farming results for Andiolava, but conceal significant 
inequalities within the municipalities and within the villages themselves.  Whilst interviews 
with key informants revealed that Ambatolahy’s cattle was concentrated in the hands of a 
few, the agricultural yields of Satrokala’s villagers may have been much better than the 
municipal average in certain areas and much worse in others, depending on a variety of 
                                               
33 Ministère de la Décentralisation et de l’Aménagement du Territoire (2006) ‘Plan Communal de Développement de la Commune Rurale 
d’Andiolava révisé lors de l’atelier des 23-24-25-26 mars 2006’ (Municipal Development Plan for the Rural Municipality of Andiolava. 
May 2006) ; Ministère de la Décentralisation et de l’Aménagement du Territoire (2006) ‘Plan Communal de Développement de la 
Commune Rurale d’Ambatolahy’ (Municipal Development Plan for the Rural Municipality of Ambatolahy), August 2006  ; Ministère de 
la Décentralisation et de l’Aménagement du Territoire (2006) ‘Plan Communal de Développement de la Commune Rurale d’Andiolava 
révisé lors de l’atelier des 23-24-25-26 mars 2006’ (Municipal Development Plan for the Rural Municipality of Andiolava. Revised at the 
workshop held on 23-24-25-26th April 2006).  
34 Official document, 2013, Confidential source. 
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factors.  
 
Moreover, the way people make a living and whether or not this living ensures subsistence 
security and wellbeing is not the sole product of static ecological constraints and quantifiable 
capital. Instead, as Huff notes, livelihoods and subsistence securities are the result of 
‘complex social, ecological, and political processes’ that articulate differently according to 
setting, historical experience and agential processes (2014: 85). In her work on livelihood 
vulnerabilities in southwestern Madagascar, she demonstrates indeed how the variegated 
articulations of these complex processes can result in same type of external shocks having 
different livelihood outcomes across geographical sites and social groups (Huff 2014). The 
short description of livelihoods patterns and endowments on the Ihorombe plateau, given 
here, falls far short of rendering the contextual and fluid character of these ‘social, ecological 
and political’ processes. What these quick figures point to are the disparities that exist within 
misnamed “local communities” and the different livelihood assets and constraints, and 
varying land needs, with which local people may approach corporate land access.  
 
The three village case studies examined in Chapters 6, 7 and 8 will show how the general 
constraints outlined above, i.e. agrarian livelihoods with limited diversification and mobility 
and a lack of access to basic socio-economic services and infrastructure, are experienced and 
addressed differently in the context of the land deal negotiations, corroborating Huff’s point 
about the importance of historical experience, setting and agency. To contextualise these 
discussions further, it also seems important to give some basic elements of information on 
the local land tenure and pastoral system as well as on local governance.  
Pastoralism, land tenure and land use on the Ihorombe plateau 
Pastoral system 
Cattle possession on the Ihorombe plateau is simultaneously individual and collective. Herds 
are owned and managed at the level of the nuclear family but decisions regarding the overall 
village cattle are to be taken collectively by the village and in consultation with the lonaky 
(heads of (sub)-lineage and heads of village). 
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As in most of lowland Madagascar, people from the Ihorombe region practise extensive 
pastoralism, where cattle are grazed on wide areas and regularly displaced geographically to 
allow for pastures to regenerate. Grazing remains fairly circumscribed, however, as practices 
of transhumance were gradually abandoned at the end of the 20th century due to widespread 
cattle theft (St Sauveur 1998: 233), putting village pastures under stress. For some, the village 
land can provide sufficient pastures for the village cattle. For others, shortages are 
compensated through the system of fostering (confiage), by which wealthy cattle owners 
entrust their livestock to farmers who have little or no cattle themselves. These farmers will 
graze the patron’s cattle on their own land all year in exchange for the right to use it for the 
hitsaky. The hitsaky consists of 
making cattle run in the mud of 
the rice paddies to prepare the 
land for the rice transplantation 
(cf. Figure 2). Although a short-
term need, the availability of 
cattle during the planting season 
is, therefore, essential to crop 
farming and a need that is quite 
cattle-thirsty since roughly 40 
head of cattle are required to 
prepare a half hectare rice 
paddy.35  
 
The system of confiage, combined with the concentration of cattle wealth, supports large 
patronage networks across the region (St Sauveur 1998, Moizo 2001). For those tending the 
cattle, prospects of accumulation are low since it is rare to be allowed to keep the offspring. 
In certain cases, they even have to offer a portion of the farmed crop to the cattle owners in 
gratitude. However, besides covering for the necessity of having cattle to plough farmland, 
tending cattle ensures them a safety net since patrons are expected to provide help in times 
                                               
35 Village authority, Zazafotsy, Andiolava, 03/05/ 2013. 
Figure 2: Hitsaky-Village of Antranohazo, March 2014. 
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of need or distress.36 
Land tenure and land use 
The Ihorombe plateau is characterised by a community-based natural resource management 
system by which lands can support multiple rights differentially held and claimed.  The 
property-model designed by Schlager and Ostrom (1992) is a very useful tool to understand 
the different rights that can be distributed in different combinations on the same parcel of 
land. The scholars identified five different resource control rights: access rights (‘the right to 
enter a defined physical property’);  withdrawal rights (‘the right to obtain the “products” of 
a resource’); management rights (‘the right to regulate internal use patterns and transform the 
resource by making improvements’); exclusion rights (‘the right to determine who will have 
an access right, and how that right may be transferred’); and alienation rights (‘the right to 
sell or lease either or both of the above collective-choice rights’) (1992: 250-251). The first 
two are operational rights, while the last three are collective-choice property rights, referring 
to some capacity to make decisions on the parcel or tract of land.  
 
Applying this model to the Ihorombe plateau, some groups or individuals may have rights to 
walk through a parcel of land with their cattle (access right), or to walk and graze their cattle 
on it on a tract (access and withdrawal rights)  but not to make any decision on that tract. On 
the Ihorombe plateau, the collective-choice property rights (management, exclusion and 
alienation) are not split; rather, they are concentrated in the hands of a single collective entity: 
the village. On a particular tract, several villages may be allowed to graze but only one village 
can decide how to regulate its use, whom to include and exclude regarding its use, and 
whether or not to terminate this. The village concentrating these collective-choice rights 
would be referred to as the ‘topontany’, literally, the master of the land.  
 
Theoretically, rangeland is undivided within the village itself since it is the tany-pokonolona 
(the communal land). In practice, however, farmland and in certain cases rangeland as well 
frequently end up being distributed between the hamlets that make up the village. This zoning 
of the village land signals a rarefaction of land resources.  In some cases, land reserves have 
                                               
36 These observations are based on the data I collected on the Ihorombe plateau and may not apply to the whole of Ibara.  
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already even been distributed between families. 
 
On the Ihorombe plateau, with collective-choice property rights come obligations of 
surveillance against cattle theft. When cattle are stolen, hoof marks are followed to identify 
the direction taken by the malaso (cattle thieves). According to the collective surveillance 
system, every village whose land has been crossed by the thieves has a duty to track the 
itinerary of the stolen herd up to the limits of their own village land. The village whose 
direction has been found to have been taken by the malaso is then in charge of doing the 
same thing.  Finding where the stolen cattle left one’s territory is called ‘making marks exit’. 
The village which cannot identify the exact place where the stolen cattle left its village land 
has to pay the compensation to the injured party.  This system of collective surveillance 
contributes to asserting land control and to materialising invisible boundaries between 
villages. With the obtaining of access and withdrawal rights on another village’s territory 
also comes a whole set of obligations of help and reciprocity (Moizo 2001). 
 
The other characteristic of local land tenure on the Ihorombe plateau, which typifies many 
community-based natural resource management systems, is its negotiability and flexibility 
(Berry 1993). The fact that the distribution of the rights listed above is regularly discussed 
and renegotiated will be critical to understanding the contentious character of decision-
making in the context of land deal negotiations. 
 
Some twenty years ago, agricultural and pastoral activities in the iBara region were described 
as ‘complementary and even synergic activities’ since agriculture was ‘using little space and 
only in a seasonal way’ (St Sauveur 1998: 118). Rice culture on lowland would only use the 
soil a few months per year and the rest of the time it could be used for grazing the cattle as it 
returned to its state of marshes.  Nowadays, agriculture and pastoralism certainly remain 
complementary activities with agricultural profits contributing to the purchase of livestock 
and cattle being indispensable to crop farming activities. However, growing ecological and 
demographic pressures are increasingly turning them into rival activities. As a village 
official explained, ‘the population is increasing and needs more rice paddies. All the lowlands 
are already used, so now we have to use the tazoa (highlands) for agriculture. Nowadays, 
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there are cases where two families have to share one rice paddy’.37 Another villager explained 
that about three quarters of their rice paddies were located on the tazoa (highlands) as the 
loviana (lowlands) were not sufficient.38 The rarefaction of farmland is leading to an 
increasing number of rice paddies being formed at close distance from the villages, which 
leads to frequent crop damage by the cattle. 
 
These pressures on landed resources also contribute to the progressive closing of the 
territories to outsiders. 
If a member of our family needs land for livelihood, one of them can come 
and ask for our permission to come in. In that case, since it’s family, we 
don’t refuse. [..] But we don’t accept newcomers anymore because there 
isn’t enough land, even if we are friends.39 
These issues need to be kept in mind when examining villagers’ perspectives on the Tozzi 
Green land deal negotiations. Depending on one’s situation, the appeal of compensation and 
increased access to socio-economic services could be offset by the experiences of land 
shortages and vice-versa.  
Governance and authority in Ibara 
People from the Ihorombe plateau form a lineage society. Norms of acceptable behaviour, 
matrimonial exchanges, economic alliances, inheritance and access to resources are all 
defined by kinship, in conjunction with gender and age. 
 
The Bara define themselves according to their clans but in practice, it is the lineage or sub-
lineage that informs their socio-political organisation. Currently dispersed over extremely 
wide areas, clans do not have centralised authority structures and customary political 
authority is extremely fragmented (St Sauveur 1998). Lineages and sub-lineages are spatially 
organised in villages, under the authority of the lonaky. The lonaky is a hereditary function 
that falls to the eldest of the ruling family through paternal, indirect descent. Lonaky are in 
charge of the village internal affairs and their assent is needed on issues of matrimonial 
                                               
37 Head of fokontany Ambodilafa, 04/05/2013.  
38 Deputy head of fokontany, Andafa, 10/05/ 2013. 
39 Lonaky, Andalanotsy, 08/05/2013. 
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alliances, access to and cession of the village resources. Considered as the link between the 
living, the ancestors and God (Zanahary), lonaky are in charge of conducting the ritual 
ceremonies asking for blessing or forgiveness in cases of sicknesses, weddings, funerals and 
so on. Their intervention is also required to lift taboos (or ask the ancestors for forgiveness 
in case someone in the village has violated one) and to undertake any new significant task or 
work in the village. Their approval is required for most operations on farmland or rangeland, 
whether it is to dig new rice paddies, to farm on some portion of highland that was previously 
used for grazing, to sell a rice paddy or to allow newcomers to settle in the village. 
 
In the past decades, new figures of authority have emerged, contributing to some degree to 
‘the decline of the lineage power’ (St Sauveur 1998: 230) as significant cattle wealth was 
reaped amid the thriving cattle theft business and the increased commercialisation of 
agriculture. With this wealth came influence (Fauroux 2002). Often referred to as the 
mpanarivo, ‘those who have thousands’, their owners have constituted themselves a large 
clientele through the system of the confiage.  In the municipality of Ambatolahy, for instance, 
there are men at the head of more than 5,000 head of cattle, lending their cattle across several 
municipalities. 
 
In Madagascar, non-state local authorities do not have any constitutionally recognised 
powers. In places where they have remained distinguished throughout history such as the 
kings and queens of pre-colonial empires, they can enjoy quite strong recognition and are 
still seen as key decision-makers on issues of external relations (cf. Feeley-Harnik 1991; 
Berger 2006). However, in contexts where local leadership is less centralised as in the current 
Ibara society, the lines of respective jurisdictions between state and customary authorities are 
likely to be more fluid and the object of constant negotiations. While mayors may gain in 
legitimacy by being close to respected local leaders, lonaky usually need support from state 
agents to exert influence on external affairs. In this relationship of interdependence, the 
balance can vary from one case to the other.  
 
Other local figures of authority include the heads of fokontany (the village-level 
administrative units)  who have been answering directly to the regional state administration 
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since president Ravalomanana had them nominated by the head of district instead of elected 
by the peopleand  the komity, unofficial administrative secretaries of the villages, who have 
no constitutionally-recognised powers but serve critical function. Generally the only or one 
of the only person who can read and write in the village, easy to reach, and often next of kin, 
the komity are the go-to person for any paper work or contact with state administrationIn this 
context of unofficial legal pluralism, the distribution of local power between state and non-
state authorities is characterised by a certain degree of uncertainty and negotiability. This 
adds a level of complexity to decision-making in a context where local land tenure is already 
characterised by flexibility. . 
 
This sketch of the legal-institutional and socio-economic context in which Tozzi Green 
developed will help to make sense of the variegated responses to and outcomes of the land 
deal negotiations within the villages (Chapters 5 to 8). The next pages describe the evolution 
of the agribusiness project and outlines the successes and hurdles the company met in trying 
to secure land access.  
 
Tozzi Green land deal negotiations 
Unexpected difficulties in growing biofuel and accessing land in Madagascar 
A subsidiary of Tozzi Industry, an 
Italian holding working in the energy 
sector, Tozzi Green’s original plans 
were to develop a large-scale 
plantation of Jatropha curcas 
complemented by Moringa and 
Vetiver for purposes of biofuel and 
biomass production. Its business plan 
was projecting a coverage of 100,000 
ha by 2019 with roughly 2,000 trees per ha and yields of 5 tons of jatropha grains per ha after 
Figure 3: Base camp and field offices Tozzi Green, 
Satrokala, April 2013 
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five years of activity.40 The country managers started prospecting for land and setting the 
project up in 2010 under the lead of two foreign agronomists who knew the country well and 
who had influential contacts in the Ihorombe region. 
 
Land access was planned to be progressive with requests of 10,000-20,000 ha at a time, each 
new portion only offered ‘after observation, control and assessment of the activities on the 
ground by a competent authority’.41 After permissions were granted by the national 
government, Tozzi Green managers started negotiating land access inside the rural 
municipality of Satrokala, where the company set up its base and developed a tree nursery.  
A few months later, village level negotiations were extended to the municipality of 
Andiolava. The land of Ambatolahy was also targeted but, after ‘discussion with his 
population’, its mayor decided to oppose the implementation of the project in his 
municipality42.  
  
In 2012, upon completion of the lengthy top-down procedure defined by circulaire 310-
21//MATD/SG/DGSF (2010), a 30-year renewable lease was granted to the project. It 
consisted of a total of 6,558 ha spread over 15 non-contiguous tracts located in the 
municipalities of Satrokala and Andiolava (Figure 4).  
 
On the ground, in the meantime, the project was experiencing agronomic difficulties as 
awareness was growing that jatropha may not be the miraculous a plant it had been praised 
as. Most of the plantations visited in 2013 were showing poor results, with the height of the 
jatropha trees rarely exceeding 20-30cm. Whether cause or consequence, many of these 
plantations seemed to have been neglected, with random seeding practices for some and 
weeds between the rows of trees (Figure 5).  
                                               
40 Tozzi Green (2011) ‘Projet biocarburant et biomasse Ihorombe – Descriptif du projet et business plan’, 1st April. 
41 Tozzi Green (2011) ‘Projet biocarburant et biomasse Ihorombe – Descriptif du projet et business plan’, 1st April, p.29. 
42 Interview mayor of Ambatolahy, Ambatolahy, 07/02/2013. 
42 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Map of the land originally targeted by and ultimately leased to Tozzi Green 
 
Land  
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Only those tracts that had proved fertile 
showed signs of maintenance work, with 
trees 70-80cm high (Figure 6). 
 
 
 
 
 Tozzi Green agronomic staff explained that the 
poor quality of the soil and the lack of rain were 
at fault.43 By 2013, nearly four years after the 
start of the operations, no fruits had yet been 
harvested, whereas the business plan had projected that first yields would be obtained by then 
and the first exports be carried out by 2014. In April 2013, only 3,600 hectares were farmed 
(against the 20,000 planned in the business plan). Decisions were therefore made to shift 
from biofuel and biomass plantations to flexcrops.44 By 2014, Tozzi Green was growing six 
different crops, with maize and sunflower representing roughly half the total area farmed and 
jatropha only a fifth of it. A number of plots were totally abandoned and land occupation 
shrank to 1,500 ha.45 
 
In the meantime, the company had invested funds in socio-infrastructure for the local 
population. In the chef-lieu (main village) of Satrokala, they had constructed a dam, a 
                                               
43 Interview chief agronomist Tozzi Green, Satrokala, 13/02/2013. 
44 Flexcrops are crops that can ‘have multiple uses (food, feed, fuel, fibre, industrial material, etc.) that can be flexibly interchanged’ 
(Borras et al. 2016: 94). Interviewed agronomists at Tozzi Green confirmed that these crops had been chosen to allow the company to 
remain flexible about how and in which markets to sell them. 
45 Interview Stefano, Tozzi Green management team, Satrokala, 05/04/2014. 
Figure 5: Jatropha fields close to the village of 
Manambatra, Satrokala, 06/04/2013. 
Figure 6: Jatropha fields close to the 
village of Ampafika, Satrokala 05/04/2013 
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secondary school and a new town hall, made bore-holes and water pumps, rehabilitated the 
police station and set up a local health centre with staff paid by the company, and free 
consultation services for under five-year-olds. They had also invested in public electricity 
but this help had been short-lived. At the time of the last fieldwork (January-April 2014), 
they were also carrying out daily street cleaning. In Andiolava, they had also built a 
secondary school and rehabilitated a few other public buildings. 
 
Although some of these investments were highly appreciated (particularly the health centre 
and the water pumps), they were also creating frustration. First, these services were 
concentrated in Satrokala’s main village. Second, few of the promises of support made to the 
villages who had contributed land had been delivered on. Lack of consistency was another 
main issue with promises of help varying across time and space, generating confusion and 
frustration.  
 
High levels of staff turnover and important changes in corporate policies seemed to be part 
of the problem. These reflected the tensions and uncertainty that were pervading the 
company. With the agribusiness project showing signs that it was floundering, distrust started 
growing between the Italian headquarters and the country office managers, with the former 
lamenting the lack of result on the ground and the latter strongly disapproving of the new 
business approach that was being pushed for in that context.  The bitter feud that followed 
ended with the dismissal of the country director (2013), who had spent years designing and 
carrying the project on the ground, and the ordering of an audit on the ground following 
suspicions of embezzlement. Sent from Italy, the new managers had little knowledge of the 
national context. They arrived with clear orders to make sure the company ‘stopped acting 
like an NGO’ and focus more on production instead.46 A decision was also made to move 
towards an increasingly mechanised project where low-skilled workers would be less and 
less needed. In Satrokala main village, the implications this decision had in terms of labour 
opportunities were already being felt a year later and quite a number of migrants who had 
settled there to work for Tozzi Green has lost their jobs..  These decisions were made at a 
                                               
46 Tahiny, Tozzi Green management team, Satrokala, 02/04/2013. 
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time when tensions were growing on issues of labour rights. In 2013, a strike was organised 
to contest the differential treatment between resident and non-resident workers. 
 
The members of the Tozzi Green senior staff I met lamented the disconnection that existed 
between the headquarters’ ambitions and their day-to-day struggles.47 They explained that on 
the one hand, their Italian managers were asking them to go more quickly and cut non-
essential spending but on the other, both the local population and the state apparatus were 
always asking for more help and support. They complained of petty opportunist strategies on 
the part of the villagers, some involving dubious land claims, and of harassment for informal 
retributions and for different favours from the local administration.  Much energy and money, 
they regretted, was spent on trying to accommodate these various desiderata.48 
 
In the meantime, state support for the project began to waver. Shortly after the first lease was 
granted, the mayor of Ambatolahy and a dozen villagers from the municipality of 
Ambatolahy and Satrokala talked against the land deal at a press conference in Antananarivo 
(November 2012).  This grassroots initiative gained echo, thanks to the help of national and 
transnational activists, and led to vocal accusations of ‘land grabbing’ on social and national 
media. In the context of the tension that followed the Daewoo scandal and the illegal seizure 
of power by Andry Rajoelina (March 2009), this bad publicity generated anxiety within the 
government and a month later, the Ministry of Development and Country Planning ordered 
the regional land services to ensure the ‘immediate suspension of all ground operations 
related to the extension of the Tozzi Green project’ (December 2012). At the time of the last 
period of fieldwork, the moratorium had still not been lifted officially. The political sequence 
of events that led to these repercussions is contextualised and discussed in more detail below. 
While illustrating how the institutional bias is translated in practice and how it is legitimised 
through a specific rhetoric, it also confirms the state to be an ambivalent actor within land 
deals (Pedersen and Buur 2016; Wolford et al. 2013).  
                                               
47 Stefano, Tozzi Green management team, Satrokala, 05/04/2014; Leonce, Tozzi Green management team, Antananarivo, 21/05/2014. 
48 Julien, Tozzi Green management team, Satrokala, 14/11/ 2011; Mamy, Tozzi Green management team, Antananarivo, 13/05/2013; 
Tahiny, Tozzi Green management team, Satrokala, 02/04/2013; Stefano, Tozzi Green management team, Satrokala, 05/04/2014. 
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The successes of a bottom-up resistance in electoral times 
From committed support to requests of suspension 
The Tozzi Green project initially enjoyed widespread support among government officials at 
all levels. In compliance with Circulaire 321-10/MATD/SG/DGSF (2010), the first official 
endorsement came from an inter-ministerial commission which convened to discuss the 
company’s business plan. In this document, the agribusiness project was framed as an 
investment presenting great potential in terms of local and national development. The biofuel 
and biomass project would further the country’s energetic independence, whilst bringing tax 
revenues to the state. It would also strengthen local capacities in the clean energy sector 
through knowledge transfer and capacity building. The company also pledged to bring 
support to the local population on issues of human and cattle health, local food security, water 
infrastructure and rural electrification. Optimistic projections were also made in terms of job 
creation (33 permanent workers in Antananarivo, 520 in the field and some 5,000 seasonal, 
low-skilled jobs by 2019).49 While pointing to the country’s large ‘reserves of unused or 
insufficiently used arable land’,50 a critical commitment was made to spare ‘private land, 
villages, land used by peasants for crop farming and land already legally attributed to other 
projects or companies’.51 
 
These win-win narratives were quickly reproduced by decision-makers at all levels. 
Following approval from the inter-ministerial commission, an authorisation of prospection 
was delivered (May 2011). As the procedure moved down to the regional and local level, the 
high-profile Vice-President, also Minister of Development and Country Planning, put his 
political weight behind the project, carrying field visits and mediating the company’s socio-
economic compensation. 
 
Local and regional authorities also provided key support, especially by helping Tozzi Green 
secure land access at ground level. The mayors of Satrokala and Andiolava contributed to 
the effort by offering tracts from their own family possessions (or that of their in-laws). 
                                               
49 Business Plan Tozzi Green, 2011: 42. 
50 Business Plan Tozzi Green, 2011: 2. 
51 Business Plan Tozzi Green, 2011: 14. 
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Together with the regional officials, they also backed consultation efforts by helping the 
company organise public meetings in Satrokala and Andiolava and by accompanying them 
in the villages. In July 2011, a ‘regional commission responsible for the sensitisation, 
information and monitoring of Tozzi Green project’ was created and regional authorities also 
started to accompany its managers in their visits to the villages. In Ambatolahy, the Regional 
head himself made the trip. This positive collaboration was short lived, however. A year later, 
the commission was dissolved on the grounds that the ‘circulaire 321-10 had been 
violated’.52 
 
Soon thereafter, in December 2012, the regional land services (CIRDOM and CIRTOPO) 
received the afore-mentioned order to ‘immediately suspend all ground operations related to 
the extension of Tozzi Green project’53 (appendix 2). The order came through a memorandum 
signed by the General Director of the Land Department of the Ministry of Development and 
Country Planning (Directeur Général des Services Fonciers). Accused of having started 
procedures towards the granting of a second lease to the company, the regional land services 
recalled that ‘all requests for large-scale land acquisitions had to be approved by the superior 
authorities first’. The company was also notified of this decision. In the letter they were sent, 
they were accused of having breached procedures, since no request of extensions could be 
made before the government had verified that the land already allocated had been duly 
developed.54 
 
Any secret dealings between the regional land services and Tozzi Green are beyond the scope 
of this research. What matters is to highlight the rationale behind two decisions, the 
dissolution of the regional commission and the order to suspend extensions, that indicate a 
shift in position of both the regional and the central state. Discourse and document analysis 
suggest that they are less an act of regulation than the outcome of politics driven by electoral 
calculations under the pressure of contentious politics, on the one hand, and competition over 
                                               
52 Regional government of Ihorombe, Décision n° 216/12-RIH portant abrogation de la décision n°33/11-RIH du 23 Juillet 2011. Ihosy, 
01/08/2012. 
53 Vice Primature en charge du Développement et de l’Aménagement du Territoire (2012), Secrétariat Général, Direction Générale des 
Services Fonciers, ‘Note de service’, n° 392/12/VPMDAT/SG/DGSF, 01/12/2012.  
54  SG/MATD, Written communication toTozzi Green, 21/12/2012. 
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the material and political benefits associated with the foreign project, on the other. 
Contentious politics in a context of political competition 
When questioned about the nature of the ‘violations’ that had caused the dissolution of the 
regional commission, members of the Région (regional government) explained that the 
services déconcentrés (regional representation of the ministries) were ‘playing it alone’ and 
acting ‘secretly’ with the Tozzi Green company, thereby excluding the rest of the 
commission.55 Tensions between these two bodies of the regional state existed prior to the 
implementation of the Tozzi Green project. Interviews with personnel from both agencies 
painted a picture of mutual suspicion, fed by a lack of dialogue, unclear institutional statutes 
and overlapping jurisdictions.56 However, the mutual accusations of prevarication over Tozzi 
Green indicated that animosities had been exacerbated by competition fed by the foreign 
project. Grudges surfaced after the Tozzi Green company offered laptops and a 4x4 vehicle 
to the regional land office. Resenting an unfair distribution of benefits towards the services 
déconcentrés, the Regional head went to Tozzi Green to ask for the Région’s share. Tozzi 
Green local managers refused to yield to the pressures57. A short while later, the Région was 
officially asking its line ministry ‘to withhold, immediately, the boundary marking operations 
[…] as well as all the land procedures that were engaged for the Tozzi Green project’58, and 
the commission was dissolved. Recalling the sequence of events, Tozzi Green’s community 
advisor at the time explained: ‘The Région started spreading utter nonsense information out, 
all of that because of the 4x4, and saying that the minister had surely received presents from 
us and then came the instructions to stop the land extensions’.59   
 
Frustration over Tozzi Green’s unfair distribution of benefits was compounded by electoral 
calculations. The parliamentary elections, in which the Regional head was running, were 
approaching, while the resistance movement against Tozzi Green was gaining traction.60 
                                               
55 Senior member of the regional government, Antananarivo, 13/05/2013. 
56 Law 2004-001 of 17 June 2004 defines the Régions as ‘both decentralised territorial entities and administrative circumscriptions’ (art .4). 
57 Mamy, Tozzi Green management team, Antananarivo, 13/05/2013. 
58 VPDAT (2013) ‘Rapport de mission dans la Région Ihorombe, du 19 au 21 septembre 2013’ (Mission report in the Ihorombe Region, 
from 19th to 23rd September 2013). Unpublished. 
59 Mamy, Tozzi Green management team, Antananarivo, 13/05/2013. 
60 The parliamentary elections were finally held in October-December 2013 but had been announced as far back as 2010 (Galibert 2011). 
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In 2012, Tozzi Green wanted to extend its perimeters but the villagers were 
against it, explained an official from the Région. You know there are things 
that people really can’t understand: for them, it’s foreigners coming to take 
their land; they even talked of tombs being disrespected. And so, they went 
up to Antananarivo and then they talked on private radios, wrote in 
newspapers etc. That’s how things started degenerating and the Regional 
head said: “I’m not the one who signed the authorisation. It’s the General 
Director of the Land Ministry and even sometimes the Vice Prime-Minister 
who signs emphyteutic leases for tracts over 50 ha.61 They are the ones 
who should be approached”.62  
Besides shifting the blame on the national government, the Regional head tried to tame the 
simmering anger by postponing the boundary marking operations until after the elections. 
Before being officially leased to Tozzi Green, the 6,500 ha were titled in the name of the 
state, as required by law. However, the formal marking of the land on the ground was not 
carried out for another whole year, in July-August 2013, when the elections were over. This 
strategic move was deceiving: while boundary stones would not have left any room for doubt, 
rural populations rarely hear about leases being signed. The case studies discussed below 
highlight the critical impact of these ground operations on people’s perceptions of the land 
deal process. 
 
Fear of an electoral backlash over a land deal that was starting to stir public outcry can also 
be assumed to be behind the government’s decision to order a moratorium on Tozzi Green’s 
land extensions. Civil society’s attacks on the government’s management of the land deal 
were indeed singling out Hajo Andrianainarivelo, the Vice-Minister in charge of 
Development and Country Planning (VPDAT), who was then running in the presidential 
elections and had not hidden his support for Tozzi Green. As civil society reminded the 
public, the delivery of Tozzi Green’s gifts to the regional land services had been done under 
his official patronage. This manifest proximity behind the foreign company and the high-
profile Minister were feeding accusations of high level corruption. It is certainly no 
coincidence that the order of a moratorium on Tozzi Green’s land extension was issued only 
two weeks after the press conference against Tozzi Green, as the attacks on the Minister were 
                                               
61 Law 2008-014 stipulates indeed that all cession of land above 50ha in a rural municipality need to be approved and signed by the 
Minister in charge of state land (art. 27). 
62 Senior regional official, 13/05/2013. 
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in full swing. 
 
The political events of 2009 had indeed sent a strong reminder of the fine political skills that 
had to be applied in applying ‘strategies of extraversion’ within a national space whose 
political imagination gives a special prominence to the tanindrazana, the ‘land of the 
ancestors’ which has come to simultaneously mean ‘the nation’ (Galibert 2011).  The social 
upheaval that had happened shortly after the Daewoo scandal had been revealed, with its 
violent lootings, arsons and acts of vandalism, had sent a strong message to the Malagasy 
political class. In its targeting of president Ravalomanana’s agro-industrial and media 
empire, this unusual outburst of popular violence may have been partly orchestrated; it was 
also an expression of frustration and anger at a broken contract: the providential, self-made 
man of 2001 who was priding himself on his ‘Malagasy-made’ (vita gasy) social ascension 
had turned into an extraverted predator, ready to sell an immense share of the country’s 
farmland to foreign investors (Galibert 2009; Pellerin 2009). In Madagascar’s current moral 
economy, dealing with foreign investors interested in the country’s natural resources is a 
complex balancing act. These events had given a taste of the social sanction that would fall 
on those threatening the tanindrazana (the land of the ancestors) and the mobilisation against 
Tozzi Green had made it clear that civil society was watching. 
 
The caution of the government around that new potential case of ‘land grabbing scandal’ was 
prolonged by Hajo Andrianainarivelo’s successor at the MDAT who, after an official visit to 
the project, further threatened the company in cutting their land access (September 2013). 
The minister’s mission report indeed pointed to the change of farmed crops as non-compliant 
with the cahier des charges (technical agreements joined to the lease) and to the fact that ‘the 
marking made for the company included tracts that were already occupied and farmed 
traditionally or that were used as rangeland or as places of worship’. Following these 
observations, they proposed the partial cancellation of the lease contract.63 Indicating a major 
shift in official discourses, these criticisms and threats could be seen as a success for those 
who had actively lobbied for the protection of local land rights. 
                                               
63 VPDAT (2013).  
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However, the outcome of this mission was not advertised, no more than the previous order 
to suspend land extensions. As noted above, the order of suspension was discreetly 
communicated to the regional authorities by memorandum, an internal administrative 
document, and to Tozzi Green by letter.  This memorandum was circulated through social 
media and to the villagers who had taken an active part in the resistance campaign, but this 
can be assumed to be the result of a leak by disgruntled local authorities. Had the ministry 
wanted to communicate it widely, it would certainly have called the media or organised a 
press conference. A head of fokontany who was himself opposed to the land deal but had not 
heard of the moratorium explained his surprise: 
No, I had never heard about it [the order of suspension] before. And I’m 
surprised to hear that because as last Wednesday only, Tozzi Green 
obtained a tract here. That’s weird. Why don’t they publicise that decision 
at the level of the fokontany? And why don’t they talk about it on the 
radio?64  
It is also telling that no one wished to claim responsibility for this decision. On the one hand, 
the regional administration was insisting that the decision had come from the top,65 and on 
the other, the national government, in its official communication, explained that it was made 
following warnings sent by the Région.66 This lack of publicity and the absence of follow-up 
strongly suggest that these two ministerial interventions were pre-emptive moves in 
anticipation of political attacks rather than genuine attempts to pressure the company into 
following the rules and respecting local land rights.67 
 
Observation of the negotiation process for Tozzi Green land access highlights the bias of the 
Malagasy state towards commercial interests. The developments discussed above 
nevertheless show that this support has its conditions and can be easily withheld.  Some 
frustration developed within some members of the regional apparatus over what was felt to 
be an unfair distribution of extraversion rent. Compounded with the pressure of a vocal 
                                               
64 Head of fokontany, Location kept secret for confidentiality reasons, 04/03/2014. 
65 Interview with officials from the Regional land services, Ihosy, 25/04/2013. Interview with officials from the regional ministry, Ihosy 
12/04/ 2013 and Antananarivo, 13/05/ 2013. 
66 VPDAT (2013).  
67 More details on this episode and its repercussions were explored in a previous paper (Gingembre 2015). 
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protest campaign in a context of elections, this frustration encouraged them to report local 
struggles against dispossession to senior decision-makers.  In a political context haunted by 
the spectre of a previous land deal scandal, the minister in charge took the path of caution as 
well and ordered a halt to the company’s land extensions. Choices not to publicise the 
moratorium on Tozzi Green’s land deal suggest short-term politics, rather than genuine 
endeavours to enforce regulation and to prioritise local land rights, however. The case of 
Mangidy village, discussed in Chapter 8, shows that neither these political acts nor 
Ambatolahy’s mayor’s official opposition to the land deal stopped the Tozzi Green company 
from prospecting on Ambatolahy’s territory, confirming that victories gained by those 
struggling against dispossession in this context are fragile.  
 
To understand the complexities of negotiating land deals, the next two chapters introduce the 
theoretical (Chapter 3) and methodological tools (Chapter 4) used in this thesis. The chapters 
that follow examine the processes: first, at regional level across 26 villages (Chapter 5), and 
then in relation to three particular village case studies (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). 
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CHAPTER 3: 
VOICE AND INFLUENCE THROUGH THE LENS OF 
POWER, MORAL ECONOMY AND CONTENTIOUS POLITICS 
 
Introduction 
As stressed in both the discussion of the “land grabbing” literature (Chapter 1) and the politics 
of the Tozzi Green project (Chapter 2), land deal negotiations are the complex and power-
laden articulations of multi-level contentions. In Chapter 1, I also explained that the thesis’ 
main research question, ‘How do the voices of local people get heard or silenced in the 
context of negotiation processes for corporate land access?’, had been explored through the 
lens of Gaventa’s theories of power (1982, as inspired by Lukes 1974) and Scott’s theory of 
moral economy (1976). This chapter justifies and details the conceptual underpinnings of the 
thesis. 
 
The analysis of power dynamics will be shown to be instrumental in identifying the 
multiplicity of pressures that differentially articulate in informing both the type of 
perceptions and the nature of engagements that make up local responses to land deal 
negotiations. I briefly describe Gaventa’s theory to highlight how it can help our 
understanding of how power can prevent or allow certain voices to be expressed, and also 
influence people’s views on land deals in more invisible ways  
 
Power can be challenged, however, and I seek to understand under which conditions, thanks 
to the concept of moral economy (Scott 1976).  By bringing attention to the structuring 
importance of perceived fairness in the context of economic transactions, the concept of 
moral economy allows one to understand not only how relational justice can influence 
perceptions, but also the decisions to express voices or not, especially if that voice is 
(vertically or horizontally) subversive.  Perceptions of others’ performances with regards to 
their rights and obligations inform perceptions of land deals and decisions of whether it is 
worth the risk of expressing one’s voice 
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In sum, this chapter argues in favour of understanding local perceptions and engagements (or 
responses) to land deal negotiations as an articulation of power and moral economy. Whilst 
highlighting how power dynamics can produce compliance, it suggests that considerations 
of social justice may draw red lines that could entice people to want to challenge power 
relationships. 
 
Finally, this thesis draws on the sociology of mobilisation to look at the discursive and social 
mechanisms that are involved in the attempts to streamline local perceptions one way or the 
other and to impose one’s voice in a context of internal contention.  Tools from this literature 
are also used to try and explain how contentious politics and the mobilisation of relations 
within the state can galvanise local struggles and open room for influence, despite a context 
of institutional bias.    
 
Lukes’ and Gaventa’s three-dimensional approach to power 
Understanding the dynamics and conditions of peasant mobilisation in the context of change 
has been a longstanding concern within the field of agrarian politics (Moore 1966; Wolf 
1969; Paige 1975; Scott 1976). Noting that only a small fraction of the local population 
affected by land grabs around the world seemed to have openly voiced protest, scholars 
working on the global land rush stressed the need to also explore reasons as to why agrarian 
populations ‘fail or refuse to mobilise in the face of attacks on their livelihoods’ (Borras and 
Franco 2013: 1725). 
 
This question of non-mobilisation or quiescence is at the core of John Gaventa’s work on the 
mining boom of the US Appalachian region at the end of the 19th century (1982). His interest 
arose from the observation that very little remedial action had been taken by the workers and 
local population to protest against the injustices of that fast, industrial development, despite 
blatant exploitation by the holders of capital (Gaventa 1982). Political science, he inferred, 
should not simply be interested in explaining protests in the context of democracy, but should 
possibly more importantly work at explaining the lack of rebellion in the face of injustices. 
After Frey, he calls ‘non-issues’ those cases where situations of glaring inequalities are not 
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met by ameliorative attempts at influence (Frey 1971: 1097). 
Gaventa starts by swiftly rejecting the widespread conception that quiescence of the rural 
poor comes down to a lack of education and/or to traditional cultures that do not value 
democratic participation. As he aptly notes, ‘If these are sufficient components of 
explanation, how are variations in behaviour among such groups to be explained?’ (Gaventa 
1982: 8). He argues instead that ‘in situations of inequality, the political response of the 
deprived may be seen as a function of power relationships. Power works to develop and 
maintain the quiescence of the powerless.’ (Gaventa 1982: vi-vii). 
 
The effects of power are felt in different ways according to different theories of power. On 
the one hand, there are those theories that focus on the way power constrains people’s actions. 
Others, on the other hand, are those that contend that power has a more pervasive imprint in 
that it affects the conceptions of the social order. The methodology used here adopts Lukes’ 
(1974) and Gaventa’s (1982) three-dimensional approach to power since it provides the 
possibility of exploring both effects of power. The next section explains how this research 
engages with it to carry out an analysis of responses to farmland privatisation. 
 
What Lukes (1974) has called the ‘one-dimensional approach to power’ was developed by 
American political scientists Robert Dahl (1957) and Nelson Polsby (1963), two main figures 
of the ‘pluralist school’. Their work explored the exercise of power within spheres of 
decision-making and of conflict resolution, with a strong focus on the mobilisation of 
resources. In keeping with the field of the sociology of mobilisation, their theories stress the 
importance of material and immaterial resources in shaping decision-making and stress the 
importance of political competition for the realisation of accountability. However, the 
pluralist school excludes the possibility that non-participation may be a political problem. 
Since the political system of the USA is believed to be open to all voices, and grievances are 
assumed to be recognised and acted upon, it follows that the people with the most needs 
would participate in politics. Non-participation in politics is therefore deemed to be an 
individual choice based on genuine satisfaction with one’s situation. 
 
Schattschneider (1960) and after him, Baratz and Bachrach (1962, 1970) have highlighted 
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the limits of this approach by bringing attention to a ‘second face of power’. Ahead of debates 
and political battles, they recall, are choices about who participates and which issues deserve 
to be discussed. Power, consequently, is not only about winning a political argument; it is 
about deciding who and what makes it to the negotiating table. Looking at the processes 
underpinning participation and agenda in the space of official decision-making will be critical 
to our analysis of voices and influence in negotiating land deals. 
 
In Power and Poverty, Bachrach and Baratz call ‘the non-decision-making power’ the power 
to prevent issues from entering the decision-making arenas. Non-decision-making power, 
they explain, can be achieved through coercion, intimidation, co-option and biased legislation 
(or biased application of it), also referred to as ‘legal-institutional bias’ (1970: 42-46). The 
exclusion of the subordinates from decision-making arenas can also be achieved through less 
visible means. One of the most efficient processes lies within what Gaventa calls ‘the rule of 
anticipated reactions’. Disgruntled subalterns are discouraged from challenging situations by 
a sense of hopeless odds, compounded by a fear of sanctions (Gaventa 1982: 22). When the 
powerful are assumed to dominate in all situations, direct protest is a useless risk and other 
types of less visible resistance are preferable. As Gaventa explains, direct and indirect 
mechanisms are mutually reinforcing:  
The inaction of B in the second dimensional sense becomes a sum of the 
anticipation by B of defeat and the barriers maintained by A over B's 
entering the decision-making arena anyway, and the re-enforcing effect of 
one upon the other (1982: 22). 
These first two dimensions of power are mostly agency-centred. For a wide range of theorists 
of power, from Gramsci to Foucault, through Bourdieu, Giddens, Haywards, Balandier, 
Fanon and many others, power is embedded in much more structural dynamics that go 
beyond political muscle, coercion, intimidation and institutional bias. It manifests itself 
through internalised social norms that shape and are shaped by history. Although these 
scholars develop different understandings of the mechanisms of power, they all argue that 
behaviours and values are to a certain degree determined by the prevailing order with which 
people unconsciously comply.These theories relate to what Lukes and Gaventa call the third-
dimensional mechanisms of power:   
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Not only might A exercise power over B by prevailing in the resolution of 
key issues or by preventing B from effectively raising those issues, but also 
through affecting B’s ‘conceptions of the issues altogether (Lukes 1974: 
23).  
Whether one believes that there is a conscious instrumentalisation of dominant norms by the 
powerful (as Lukes does) or that everyone’s actions are conditioned as Hayward (1998), what 
matters here is to understand how feelings over inequalities and domination are influenced 
by prevailing norms and how this, in turn, affects (the lack of) resistance. As a result of 
prevailing paradigms and socio-historical patterns, the social order is either seen as natural, 
what Scott has called the ‘thick version of hegemony’, or as inevitable, ‘the thin version of 
hegemony’ (1990: 80). Non-issues (or quiescence in the face of injustice) can therefore be 
the result of two different manifestations of the third dimensional power: either a lack of 
consciousness over the arbitrary, unfair character of the social order or a belief that it cannot 
be changed. Discussing the ambiguity of Gramsci on the issue, Femia notes:  
On one extreme consent can flow from wholesale internalization of 
dominant values and definitions; on the other, from their very partial 
assimilation, from an uneasy feeling that the status quo, while shamefully 
iniquitous, is nevertheless the only viable form of society (1975 on 
Gramsci’s theory of hegemony: 32). 
 In the first case (the thick versions of hegemony), the less powerful may feel as if they do 
not have any grievances at all and they have been convinced of the desirability of the world 
at it is. In the second case, subalterns recognise grievances but are defeated either by the 
conviction that their fate is immutable, frequently the outcome of ‘a psychological adaptation 
to the state of being without power’ and ‘an adaptive response to continual defeat’ (Gaventa 
1982: 16-19), or by a failure to understand the mechanisms and responsibilities behind 
inequalities and domination that would allow them to design a plan for action. The subalterns 
might also be discouraged from action, Gaventa adds, because ‘B’s conceptions of self, group 
or class may be such as to make actions against A seem inappropriate’ (1982: 16-19). Non-
issues would proceed from a sense of internalised hierarchies that make protest seem 
illegitimate. In those theories, the acceptance of an idea or a situation by the dominated 
always implies a degree of compliance with the prevailing order, whether that compliance is 
conscious (and potentially resented) or unconscious.  
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 By incorporating invisible power dynamics in its analytical framework, the three-
dimensional approach, therefore, encourages caution with the concepts of ‘free consent’ such 
as the one defended in guidelines over corporate acquisitions of natural resources. The 
possibility that ideas and values may be influenced indeed rules out the possibility that 
consent may ever be completely free, even in cases where no visible pressures may be found.  
The three-dimensional approach of power also allows research to stay open to different 
contextual configurations of the workings of power and therefore, to different understandings 
of the underpinnings of ‘compliance’.  Three ideal-types of power-produced compliance 
could be drawn from this model: 
(i) Acquiescence. People are constrained to approve of a situation or process they 
disapprove of by coercion, intimidation, legal-institutional bias (second dimensional power 
mechanisms) and/or by a lack of resources to put up an opposition (first dimension of power). 
In those cases, people recognise and resent power pressures, but are acquiesced into 
complying with the situation. This ‘performance’ of compliance, as James Scott (1990) 
would call it, does not exclude subversive thoughts nor more hidden types of resistance.  
(ii) Naturalised compliance. Compliance is produced through more invisible means that 
pertain to third dimensional power dynamics. In this ideal-type, the acceptance of processes 
imposed from above reflects either (i) an internalisation that the prevailing order is desirable, 
however unfair (ii) a belief that no other order is possible.  
(iii)  Constrained hope. In a horizon of limited opportunities, compliance reflects hope 
that processes of change pushed by more powerful actors presents opportunities for those 
who collaborate. There is some acceptance of the prevailing order, reflecting third-
dimensional power dynamics but also some hope that it can be changed at the margins. 
 
As such, Gaventa’s framework supports the exhaustive exploration of the power pressures 
that can impinge on responses to land deal negotiations in varying articulations across 
geography and social groups. It was chosen for its thorough coverage of the different 
mechanisms of power as well as for the open research approach that it supported. Unlike 
thick and thin versions of hegemony, it does not rule out the possibility that the dominated 
may believe another social order is possible. As noted in the third ideal-type detailed above, 
people may consciously comply with one domination, without any discernible visible 
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pressures to do so, in the hope to encourage new socio-economic arrangements with promises 
of social change. This would reflect a third dimensional power dynamics, since the horizon 
of action is still constrained to a certain extent, but belie assumptions that non-issue amounts 
to attitudes of passive resignation with the prevailing social-order. Or, as noted in the first 
ideal-type, complying with the projects of the powerful can consist of a performance under 
first and second dimensional power constraints, behind which subversive thoughts or less 
visible acts of resistance are hidden. I shall now give a little more concrete detail about how 
this approach may illuminate the analysis of local voices and influences within land deal 
negotiations. 
 
The first dimension of power, highlighted by the pluralist school of thought, insists on 
resources as a key factor in terms of abilities to influence decision-making. As discussed in 
Chapter 2, in Madagascar’s current policy and political context, negotiations to gain formal 
access to land in are long and complex. Keeping control and influence over them requires 
technical, financial and knowledge resources. Considering first dimensional power dynamics 
in the context of land deal negotiations implies looking at how these resources inform 
pressures to comply and support attempts to resist these pressures. 
 
As other scholars have stressed, ahead of the battles that shape decision-making are key 
processes affecting what and who will be included in the discussions. Some of these issues 
are framed by law. Law defines or restricts rights to be included in decisions but also to 
protest them and hold decision-makers to account. As Cotula notes, different legal 
frameworks imply different conditions of difficulty for ‘land grabbing’ in the narrow 
understanding of the term (2013). More critically, understanding the second dimensional 
aspects of power requires looking at the way law is interpreted and applied. This is 
particularly critical in contexts where policy frameworks are ambiguous as in Madagascar. 
Chapter 2 highlighted the government’s general bias towards corporate interests but pointed 
to contexts which opened channels of influence for the agrarian population. Exploring power 
dynamics in the context of land deal negotiations, therefore, requires researching the 
conditions under which state authorities and administrators may apply procedures in a way 
that respects the participation and objection rights of the different stakeholders, and the ones 
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under which legal rights to voice are hampered by practices of coercion, intimidation and 
disinformation.  
 
As far as third dimensional power dynamics are concerned, it matters to look at how certain 
dominants norms and narratives may be shaping negotiations and responses. In this case, it 
consists of looking at how the institutional bias towards corporate land access outlined in 
Chapter 2 may be legitimised by certain discourses and at how these discourses may affect 
local people’s conceptions of their rights (or not). 
 
Attention to third dimensional mechanisms of power also implies considering local responses 
to farmland privatisation in the light of historically-informed relations and perceptions 
among groups and between them.  Historical patterns of inter-group relationships 
(domination, confrontation, interdependency, oppression and so on) affect the perceptions 
different stakeholders have of each other (the foreigners towards the Malagasy state and vice-
versa, the villagers towards the foreigners and vice-versa, the villagers towards the state and 
vice-versa) which, in turn, can be expected to influence considerations over rights to voice 
and opportunities of influence within land deal negotiations.  
 
The same three-dimensional frame of analysis should be applied to the exploration of 
horizontal power dynamics. For that purpose, it matters to go beyond the official distribution 
of power outlined in Chapter 2 to ask: Who effectively, in a specific context, has the resources 
to gain voice and influence within decision-making at the village level (first dimension of 
power)? Who formally has the right to speak and define the agenda and stance to adopt on 
issues of land alienation? Are authorised voices challenged in the context of land deal 
negotiations and under which conditions (second dimension)? Are there internalised norms 
of behaviour or powerlessness that constrain some for expressing their voices and seeking 
influence (third dimension)?  
 
Chapter 1 pointed to the variation in both perceptions and engagements that characterised 
local responses to land deal negotiations. In differentiated communities, local people have 
different goals and aspirations, some of which are expressed (to varying degrees and in 
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different ways) and others of which are kept silent. As the discussion of (declarative) consent, 
acquiescence and compliance have highlighted, responses to land deal negotiations cannot 
be understood without an exploration of visible and invisible power dynamics both at vertical 
and horizontal levels.  
To understand how local voices are heard or silenced, it therefore seems necessary to explore 
the first following sub-research questions: How can power dynamics inform local responses 
to land deal negotiations and how and under which conditions can power relations be 
challenged by these responses? 
 
 In the next section, I argue for the need to introduce the concept of moral economy to refine 
our understanding of compliance with corporate land access.  Looking at issues of relational 
justice across and within groups through the concept defined by Thompson (1971) and Scott 
(1976) will also allow for more caution in categorising situations as ‘non-issues’, since what 
may appear to the outsider as non-action against a blatant injustice may turn out to either not 
been seen as an injustice or be a way to challenge injustices in another field.  
 
The moral economy of land alienation 
This section describes how this thesis engages with the concept of moral economy to make 
sense of Malagasy peasants’ responses to the private appropriation of their land by foreigners. 
The anthropology of moral economies examines popular perspectives of justice with respect 
to economic transactions and explores the expectations that tie people to their rulers, 
especially in times of economic turmoil. By allowing for a better understanding of 
peasantries’ vision of relational justice, this conceptual tool helps to explore the subjectivity 
of contention. The next paragraphs provide a rapid overview of the concept. 
 
The use of ‘moral economy’ as a concept per se dates back to the historian Edward P. 
Thompson. In The Making of the English Working Class (1963) and his seminal article The 
Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century (1971), he analyses the 
values and norms behind food riots in England of the 18th century. By moral economy, he 
refers to the existence of shared beliefs among the poor, of the existence of rights and duties 
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over access to necessities. In an effort to belie the widespread ‘spasmodic vision of 
rebellions’ (1971: 188), he underlines the moral universe behind the protests and brings 
attention to the capacity of the poor to build norms, rights and obligations. He explains:  
It is possible to detect in almost every eighteenth-century crowd action 
some legitimising notion. By the notion of legitimation I mean that the men 
and women in the crowd were informed by the belief that they were 
defending traditional rights or customs; and, in general, that they were 
supported by the wider consensus of the community. 68  
Food riots, he argues, are not the mechanical effect of price spikes. Instead, they generally 
proceed from the violation of widely held moral expectations with regards to social relations 
structuring economic exchanges. This relied on the premise that the economy should be 
guided by moral principles.  In that they sought to uphold responsibilities in the context of 
economic turmoil, these rebellions were also defending conceptions of an economy fully 
embedded within social relationships in resistance to the philosophy of the laisser-faire that 
was gaining ground at the time. 
 
A few years later, James Scott, a political scientist by training, popularised the concept in the 
field of anthropology. In The Moral Economy of the Peasant: rebellion and subsistence in 
South-East Asia (1976), Scott looks towards popular conceptions of legitimate and 
illegitimate economic transactions for explanation of the desperate rage that fed some of the 
peasant revolts that shook South-East Asia during the depression of the 1930s. He defines 
peasants’ moral economy as ‘their notion of economic justice and their working definition of 
exploitation-their view of which claims on their product were tolerable and which 
intolerable’ (Scott 1976: 3). The empirical focus shifts from consumers seeking to obtain 
‘just prices’ on food markets (for Thompson) to peasantries who are both consumers and 
producers of essential goods (for Scott). Scott also puts a more straightforward focus on 
values and emotions in addition to Thompson’s stress on mores, norms and obligations. With 
Scott, ‘it is less about understanding what can and what cannot be done (normative 
dimension) as what is tolerable and what is not (evaluative dimension)’, explains Fassin 
(2009: 1249).69 Short of explaining the actual causes of rebellion, a challenge that Scott says 
                                               
68 Thompson, E.P. (1971) The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century, p.188. 
69 Free translation 
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has already been addressed with talent by colleagues such as Wolf (1969) and Moore (1969), 
his goal is to shed light on the conditions of possibility of revolt (1976) by outlining the 
longstanding values that underpin emotions. 
 
Since Thompson’s and Scott’s works, the concept of moral economy has found a wide 
acceptance among scholars and across disciplines, sometimes to the detriment of its original 
complexity, as critics point out (Fassin 2009; Siméant 2010; Edelman 2012). This makes it 
worth recalling that the strength of the concept, and its relevance to this thesis, is to tie 
together these two dimensions: the economic, or the production and exchange of goods and 
services, on the one hand, and the moral, or the constitution of norms and obligations with 
regards to these transactions, on the other. 
 
In his seminal work, The Moral Economy of the Peasant, James Scott contends that there are 
universal principles governing the moral economies of peasantries across time and space. 
There is, in particular, one overarching principle that dominates the lives of all those who 
regularly face the risk of famine or shortages: the need to ensure a reliable subsistence. 
Historical experiences of vulnerability to the vagaries of climate and other external factors 
nurture, over time, a preference for security over potentially higher, but risky returns. For 
most peasant cultivators, Scott (1976) argues that subsistence security is the ‘primordial 
goal’, in the light of which they examine their relationships with their neighbours, the elites, 
and the state.Through time, specific patterns of norms, values and obligations develop in 
support of the safety-first principle. Originally an economic issue, the quest for subsistence 
insurance therefore comes to be ‘socially experienced as a pattern of moral rights or 
expectations’ (Scott 1977: 16). The subsistence need becomes a subsistence right. 
 
Principles of reciprocity and paternalism are at the heart of these social arrangements. ‘It is 
above all within the village— in the patterns of social control and reciprocity that structure 
daily conduct— where the subsistence ethic finds social expression’, observes Scott (1976: 
40).  As meticulously demonstrated by Polanyi in The Great Transformation (1944), peasant 
societies distinguish themselves from those governed by modern market economies by 
forbidding individual starvation. Peasant societies ‘are not radically egalitarian. Rather, they 
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imply only that all are entitled to a living out of the resources within the village’ (Scott 1976: 
5).  This social prohibition of individual destitution creates implicit obligations of help, 
sharing and redistribution.  The pooling of resources translates into arrangements such as the 
sharing of use rights on communal land and the temporary borrowing of cattle. As far as 
inequalities within agrarian population are concerned, wealth is accepted provided it 
contributes, to some degree, to the overall good of the community. The strength of the 
principle of reciprocity and the degree of risk insurance provided by the village, as Scott 
notes, can vary greatly from one peasant society to the next however. 
 
The state, landowners and authorities are also expected to be considerate of the peasants’ 
right to a decent subsistence. ‘Complete subsistence crisis insurance implies a personal 
commitment of the landowner to the minimum welfare needs of his tenant’ (Scott 1976: 45). 
Claims on products and taxes are tolerated, provided they allow peasants the maintenance of 
a minimum income and are therefore adapted to what peasants can do in a given context. 
Talking about peasants’ conceptions of power abuse and exploitation, Scott explains the ‘test 
for the peasant is more likely to be “What is left?” than “How much is taken?”’ (1976: 7). 
Elites are therefore expected to show flexibility and apply reason in terms of the pressures 
they put on peasantries. Patronage and paternalism is expected in exchange for their 
domination. It is their duty to provide material help in times of need, to contribute to social 
and religious village life, to sponsor celebrations and so on.  ‘The violation of these 
[subsistence] standards could be expected to provoke resentment and resistance— not only 
because needs were unmet, but because rights were violated’ (Scott 1976: 6).  
 
Subsistence security may be found to be only one of the moral economic expectations at the 
heart of people’s perceptions of the land deal negotiations. In differentiated populations, 
people might also have different ideas of how to ensure it. Scott’s discussion of that safety-
first principle is interesting in that it points to how individual and collective entities of a 
locality are tied together by a web of expectations related to relational justice. As noted 
earlier, moral economic expectations not only apply to corporate or state elites, but also to 
village authorities or other members of the rural population.   
Another particularly inspiring insight which can be gained from Scott’s work is that the 
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violations of some of these essential rights and obligations may generate feelings of injustice 
that may encourage resistance, despite the risks known in situations of power asymmetries. 
This argues in favour of looking at power and moral economy as a two-way relationship. 
Considerations of relational justice can be influenced by power in the form of prevailing 
norms (third dimension of power). However, moral economies can draw red lines which, 
when transgressed, may drive actors to want to challenge (openly or discreetly) existing 
power relations.  
 
The concept of moral economy, therefore, shines a critical light on this thesis research topic. 
It supports the view that people involved in the land deal negotiations (corporate managers, 
state officials, brokers, other villagers and so on) are influenced  by tacit or explicit 
obligations, possibly related to subsistence rights, but possibly also to others. The company, 
as the other actors involved in the land deal negotiations, is expected to respect a number of 
conditions for the land deal to be considered fair. These different actors’ performances with 
regards to these obligations, therefore, inform both the local people’s perceptions of the land 
deal and also their decisions to voice their views, despite unfavourable power positions 
sometimes.  
 
Efforts to understand ‘how local people’s voices are expressed or silenced within the context 
of land deal negotiations’ (main research question) therefore requires an exploration of the 
second research question: What moral economic considerations underpin compliance with 
or resistance to corporate land access and with which implications on the perceptions of the 
outcome of the land deal? 
 
The next section introduces the last strand of theory with which this thesis engages; more 
specifically, it introduces some of the tools borrowed from the sociology of protest to explore 
the dynamics of influence within land deals.  
 
Defining and influencing outcomes 
Another major objective of the thesis consists of understanding local people’s potential 
66 
 
 
influence on land deals. The next pages outline how Gaventa’s analysis of power is 
complemented with insights from the literature on contentious politics to understand how 
local people not only suffer the consequences of power, but can also mobilise it. 
  
Gaventa’s theory of power and powerlessness holds that challenging injustices in an unequal 
power relation requires two necessary steps: first articulating grievances and then acting upon 
them.  
Several steps in overcoming powerlessness by B must occur before the 
conflict is on competitive ground. B must go through a process of issue and 
action formulation by which B develops consciousness of the needs, 
possibilities, and strategies of challenge. That is, B must counter both the 
direct and indirect effects of power's third dimension. And, B must carry 
out the process of mobilization of action upon issues to overcome the 
mobilization of bias of A against B's actions. B must develop its own 
resources -real and symbolic-to wage the conflict.70  
Three major thinkers of contentious politics, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, worked together 
on designing a research approach attuned to grasping the complexity and fluidity of episodes 
of contentious. In their book, entitled Dynamics of Contention71, they identified three main 
mechanisms as essential to both articulating grievances and acting upon them: the attribution 
of threat and opportunity, social appropriation, and brokerage (2001: 92). ‘Attribution of 
threat and opportunity’ refers to the process of producing and diffusing a shared definition 
of the likely consequences of a mobilisation and the likely consequences of a failure to act.  
The authors also establish that however transgressive a collective action may be, it usually 
thrives, thanks to the appropriation of existing social space and collective identities: this is 
what they refer to as ‘social appropriation’ (2001: 102). Finally, the articulation and 
mediation of grievances relies on brokerage which they define as ‘the linking of two or more 
previously unconnected social sites by a unit that mediates their relations with one another 
and/or with yet other sites’ (2001:26).  
 
Assessments of the opportunity and threat equation represented by corporate land access can 
be expected to differ within socially-differentiated populations. As McAdam et al. note, 
                                               
70 Gaventa, J. (1980) Power and Powerlessness. Quiescence and rebellion in an Appalachian Valley, pp.23-24. 
71 McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. G. and Tilly, C. (2001) Dynamics of contention. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
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‘threat-opportunity attribution often emerges from competition among advocates of differing 
interpretations, one of which finally prevails’ (2001: 95). Attribution of opportunity and 
threat and social appropriation can, in other words, underpin processes of gaining 
‘legitimating power’ (Hall et al. 2011: 171) in intra-village negotiations over the response to 
bring to the land deal.  The understanding of influence, therefore, requires an exploration of 
who manages to impose his or her attribution of opportunity and threat and the social spaces 
and means used to do so (social appropriation). Brokerage is also pervaded with power. 
Brokers can contribute to feelings of anticipated defeat, by spreading disinformation, 
rumours or simply sending reminders of the power of the dominant (third dimension of 
power) or they can exclude from decision-making through more direct means such as 
intimidation, coercion or denying people’s rights to voice (second dimension of power). 
However, the way people involve relations with brokers matters as well.  By building or 
activating relationships with third party actors, local people can gain ‘resource power’ in the 
context of negotiations (Rutten et al. 2017). The interventions of these ‘counter-networks’ 
(Li 2014a; Savitri 2014; Rutten et al. 2017) can help smallholders to influence the decisions 
made in the negotiations to their advantage.  
In sum, the analysis of the processes of attribution of opportunity and threat, of social 
appropriation and of brokerage provide a lens through which to look at how power is 
mobilised at the village level to articulate voices and communicate them at higher levels of 
decision-making. 
 
Looking at the outcome of these processes will serve to point to correlations between 
processes of voice formulation and influence.  As Gaventa indeed notes, mobilisations are 
no guarantee of success. ‘For a relatively powerless group, the combination of articulating 
grievances and organizing action upon them does not necessarily mean that the grievances 
will merit response-or even entry to the decision-making arenas’, pointing to ‘the capacity of 
power to repel, neutralize and even remain aloof from protest’ (Gaventa 1982: 24).  
 
A broad range of considerations may influence decision-makers’ inclinations to listen to or 
ignore local struggles against farmland privatisation. Despite the aversion to protest Gaventa 
points to and extraversion strategies, state officials do not necessarily obstruct local 
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opposition to land deals.  States are heterogeneous entities that are not aloof from the rest of 
the society. Their members are embedded within networks of belonging, allegiances or 
interpersonal relationships that make them more permeable, or fully indebted to certain 
entities. Influence on state agents could therefore be exerted at individual, low-scale levels, 
thriving, thanks to relational resources (first dimension of power). Chapter 2 confirmed the 
ambivalence and contradictions that have been observed to characterise state interventions in 
large-scale land deals (Wolford et al. 2013; Pedersen and Buur 2016). 
 
In states characterised by a degree of competition, as highlighted in Chapter 2, elected 
officials may also be susceptible to contentious politics. Scholars from the field of sociology 
of mobilisation have granted significant attention to what they have called ‘political 
opportunity structures’ to understand contextual aspects of successful mobilisations (Eisinger 
1973; Tilly 1978; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1988; among others). Different meanings have 
been given to the concept across the literature and across time (Tarrow 1996).  As far as this 
work is concerned, the purpose is less to assess the global opportunities that the Malagasy 
state offers in terms of the democratic right of the opposition, freedom of expression and so 
on, i.e. static opportunity structures, but rather to explore how struggles in the context of land 
deals can exploit certain political opportunities (flexible opportunity structures). McAdam et 
al. argue that ‘episodes of contention typically grow out of and depend on a perception of 
significant environmental uncertainty on the part of state and non-state elites and challengers 
alike’ (2001: 97). Chapter 2 highlighted the divisions and opportunistic realignments that 
political competition for extraversion rent, compounded with contentious politics, fuelled 
within the state and how this opened space for certain struggles to be heard.  
 
Influence within land deals consists of being heard both within one’s community and by 
decision-makers. Although mostly focused on outward resistance than on more passive forms 
of resistance, the literature on contentious politics provides additional tools to the ones 
provided by the three-dimensional approach to power to examine the means through which 
local voices can gain echo. Both these bodies of theories are mobilised to examine the last 
sub-research question that has guided data analysis and which asks: Which voices transform 
into influence and under which conditions? 
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Conclusion 
As introduced in Chapter 1, this thesis asks, ‘How can local voices be heard or silenced in 
the context of large-scale land deal negotiations?’ Drawing on the theoretical lenses 
introduced here, power, moral economy and contentious politics, it explores the process of 
negotiation, the responses that emerge and the outcomes through these perspectives.  
A scrutiny of power relations will serve to not only gain a fine-grained understanding of the 
processes through which compliance with the consultation process is produced or challenged, 
but also to grasp intra-community contention, to understand its form of expression (open or 
silent) as well as its impact in terms of whose voice gets heard. Gaventa’s three-dimensional 
approach (1982) underpins the nuanced exploration of sub-question 1: How can power 
dynamics inform local responses to land deal negotiations and how and under which 
conditions can power relations be challenged by these responses? 
 
The concept of moral economy opens a lens through which to reintroduce subjectivity in the 
analysis of land deals. It points to the importance of relational justice in understanding the 
socially-situated nature of responses to land deals, suggesting that both compliance with and 
resistance to corporate land access is underpinned by moral considerations.  Perceived 
performances of those involved in the negotiations with regards to these expectations may, 
in turn, inspire decisions to voice or silence one’s perceptions and to challenge or tolerate the 
outcomes of the land deal. They provide ‘legitimising notions’ (Thompson 1971:188) to 
responses, which are particularly critical when those represent a challenge to (horizontal and 
vertical) power dynamics.  As such, Scott’s work (1976) supported the identification and 
exploration of sub-question 2: What moral economic considerations underpin compliance 
with or resistance to corporate land access and with which implications on the perceptions 
of the outcome of the land deal? 
 
Finally, some tools borrowed from the field of contentious politics to understand how voices 
can be imposed over others and determinedly influence decision-making. Critical dynamics 
of contention such as attribution of opportunity and threat, social appropriation and brokerage 
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(Mc Adam et al. 2001) are explored to bring answers to sub-question 3 which asks: ‘Which 
voices transform into influence and under which conditions?’  
 
To answer these questions, a methodological approach was adopted, linking regional studies 
with detailed village-based case studies. The approach is outlined in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
  
This chapter lays out the research design process that underpinned data collection and 
analysis. It justifies the choice of a case study research to answer the main questions 
discussed in the introduction and highlights the inductive process through which the 
theoretical framework discussed above emerged. It discusses the conjunctural perspective 
that informed data collection and analysis and finally points to the ethical and methodological 
challenges encountered throughout the research. 
 
Inductive research process: from comparison to case-study 
This research has been designed and carried out following a phased approach, with research 
questions and conceptual frameworks partly emerging from first fieldwork findings. Building 
on methodological recommendations from Stake (2005: 443-467), I started with a topical 
issue (large-scale land deals in agrarian societies), an empirical focus (the process of 
negotiating land deals, under-researched compared to drivers and impacts of land deals) and 
a foreshadowed problem (the land rights of agrarian populations in Madagascar are being 
denied despite a protective legal framework because of political interests and power 
dynamics), but waited for the first insights from my data to sharpen my theoretical framework 
and research questions. 
  
I also let the choice of methodology partly be shaped by my fieldwork findings. Originally, 
I considered using a comparative approach. I visited five agribusiness projects that had 
recently started in different regions of Madagascar and gained a first understanding of past 
and ongoing negotiations for corporate land access by talking to key informants and 
individuals from the main three groups of actors involved or concerned by the local deal at 
the local level (the local state apparatus, the local population and the corporate staff and 
management). Whilst this exercise was relevant as a scoping exercise, it quickly showed its 
limits as a main research methodology to look at the issues I was interested in.  I initially 
thought that it would be more interesting to outline nationally relevant patterns rather than 
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regional context-dependent dynamics.  It turned out that broad patterns were relatively easy 
to discern across cases: local consultation in the context of large-scale land deals were at best 
very shallow;  local people were excluded from decision-making and deterred from 
negotiating or protesting out of fear of the state and of foreigners; state agents were generally 
welcoming of corporate land acquisitions as they hoped to gain benefits from them and were 
therefore using their power to accelerate land deals rather than seek to regulate them. 
However, these insights were also known and unoriginal. Understanding the conditions under 
which these patterns could be contradicted by focusing on one specific case study seemed to 
hold much higher value. For the depth that it could help me to reach in the understanding of 
complex processes, a case study research would also allow me to remain open to findings in 
a way that necessarily quicker and more rigid types of comparative fieldwork would allow. 
Besides, rather than vainly trying to abstract context to outline similarities, I acknowledged 
that context (or rather the articulation of context with agential processes) was precisely what 
was critical. As Flyvbjerg notes, ‘predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the 
study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is, therefore, more valuable 
than the vain search for predictive theories and universals’ (2006: 224).   
 
The two interesting, less expected observations that came out of this exploratory work (and 
already discussed above) also pushed for in-depth case study work. To begin with, there was 
a significant level of local discord surrounding these land deals, with local populations 
showing conflicting interests towards the corporate projects.  Second, local politics seemed 
to matter and did not only work the way I had expected of them. As discussed in Chapter 2, 
despite the enthusiastic support of most national and local leaders to the development of these 
projects, some of these land deals were being blocked because of the intervention of local 
officials.   Only in-depth ethnographic work, attuned to the specific agrarian, socio-economic, 
anthropological and political dynamics of affected areas and attentive to the fluctuations and 
contradictions of negotiations through time and space, could hope to bring light on the 
complexity of local voices in land deals.  
 
Out of the five projects examined, Tozzi Green was chosen for three main reasons. Firstly, 
local populations had been included in the discussions much more thoroughly than in the 
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other four cases. Whereas in the latter consultation had been limited to one or two meetings 
at the level of the municipality, the Tozzi Green project had adopted a village-by-village 
consultation approach. This case study also offered a compelling illustration of the variety of 
local responses that large-scale land deals can elicit at the local level. Alongside the silent 
resignation of some, stood outward civil protest, as well as a whole spectrum of perceptions 
and reactions, from enthusiasm for the corporate project to outright refusal through to more 
covert forms of resistance. Thus, while enthusiasm and acquiescence needed to be explored 
and accounted for, so did more or less overt forms of protest.  What drove some villagers to 
resist despite apparent power asymmetries between the state-backed corporation and 
themselves? Moreover, was enthusiasm towards the implementation of the project 
necessarily the result of manipulation?  Finally, the Tozzi Green land deal offered an example 
of bottom-up mobilisation against land privatisation that allowed me to explore dynamics of 
resistance and politics in the context of land deals. This mobilisation belied widespread 
perceptions of rural populations as disenfranchised and passive and, with the mayor 
spearheading the opposition, hinted at fissures in the support enjoyed by corporate actors 
within the state apparatus. It promised to provide critical material on the potential of 
grassroots resistance in influencing land deal negotiations outside formal spaces of 
consultation and on the process through which that influence might be exerted. In scientific 
terms, the case held critical potential for falsification (Popper 1972). Local voices could 
potentially find a way to be heard and influence land deals, despite the general bias of the 
state towards corporate interests which, in the typology of the rationales behind the selection 
of case studies outlined by Fryvbjerg, as such would make it a ‘critical case’ (2006: 230).  
 
Conjunctural approach 
Drawing on the work of the Manchester school in the 1950s and on the practice approach of 
Bourdieu (1977) and Giddens (1979), conjuntural approaches entail both ontological and 
methodological implications for socio-anthropological research (see for instance Gezon 2006 
and Li 2014). They describe research processes examining ‘history at one point in time while 
situating events in historically-constituted fields of forces’ (Li 2014: 18) and focusing the 
gaze on social relations, social differences and unequal relations of power. While interested 
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in people’s negotiation efforts along socially-patterned interests (Gluckman 1940), 
conjunctural approaches take clear distance from liberal conceptions of individuals as 
‘rational actors’ by considering instead the social and historical determinations of agents and 
focusing on dynamics of differentiation along lines of class, gender, generation, race etc.  As 
summarised by Gezon 2006, conjunctural approaches consider ‘human agency as neither 
determined by social structures but not entirely voluntaristic’ (Gezon 2006: 15). 
 
In line with this approach, this research granted special attention to the socio-historicity of 
the actions and discourses under analysis and, following feminist and postcolonial traditions, 
considered social relations and social differentiation as a critical lens through which to look 
at access to resources and dynamics of accumulation.  
 
Varying spatial and temporal scope 
As explained by Li, ‘the conjuncture(s) under study isn’t bounded. It is still composed of a 
set of elements that have varied spatial and temporal scope. […] Instead of drawing a 
boundary around a field site, or fixing the span of time, space and quantity to be investigated, 
these parameters can be selected flexibly according to their relevance to the matter under 
study’ (Li 2014: 19). 
 
In the context of this research, justice first needed to be done to the diversity of actors 
involved in these discussions (villagers, state officials, corporate staff and managers, 
activists, state civil servants, local elites, brokers, economic operators and so on), as well as 
to the conflicting positions, interests and perceptions that could be found both between and 
within these groups.  To understand local responses, their nature, their rationale and their 
implications, one also needed to be familiar with the broad context in which the local-level 
negotiations were embedded, from national politics to the legal-institutional context through 
the livelihood strategies and socio-economic dynamics of the agrarian populations under 
study. 
 
Analysing the outcome of local negotiations on land deals also required following 
negotiations through time. Data collection was therefore spread over several years, and 
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evolved from a multi-sited and multi-level approach –from Antananarivo to Ihosy through 
the rural municipality and from national decision-makers to villagers through regional 
authorities, transnational civil society and so on– to a narrower focus on a single broad 
category of actors: the villagers. As such, it shifted from a broad perspective, looking at a 
wide number of actors and negotiations spaces, to a more focused perspective on the 
responses of local people and the outcomes of the land deal for them. 
 
A total of three field visits were carried out (in 2011, 2013 and 2014) for a total of 10 months 
of fieldwork. Data collection was carried out through repeated semi-structured interviews, 
focus group discussions and informal discussions with a wide range of actors involved in the 
negotiation or affected by the land deal (a total of 142 research participants). This was 
combined with a search and review of documents related to the deal-making process (official 
documents, maps, protest letters, petitions, media reports and so on). All three periods of data 
collection engaged with the three themes highlighted above (negotiation, response and 
outcome), although with changing emphases. 
Scoping investigation (2011) and village visits (2013) 
The first field trip (September-October 2011) provided me with a first overview of the 
agribusiness project, of the ongoing land deal negotiations and of the various responses 
across villages. Interviews were held with corporate managers, regional authorities, mayors 
and heads of fokontany from the three municipalities targeted by the land deal, as well as 
with villagers from five villages from the municipality of Satrokala. Data collection was also 
aimed at gaining information on the history, ecologies, socio-economic fabric and 
government of the agrarian population of the Ihorombe plateau, as well as on local politics. 
 
During the second field trip (February-May 2013), a total of 26 villages were visited across 
the three municipalities. Driven by a concern to further my understanding of variation (of 
both responses and outcomes), I made sure my pool of villages included:  
• villages affected by the project as well as with villagers not (currently) affected; 
• villages who had complied with Tozzi Green’s land requests as well as with 
villages who had rejected them; 
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• villages of different wealth; 
• villages where land disputes in the context of the land deal had been reported; 
• villages where people had manifested enthusiasm towards the Tozzi Green 
project and others where animosity was expressed instead; 
• and villages from the two municipalities in which mayors had given consent to 
the consultation process and from the one where the mayor was opposed. 
Information on these criteria had been gained through the discussions and interviews held in 
2011 and supported by the prospective map of the first lease that I then had at hand and which 
the corporate managers confirmed was fairly accurate (cf. Figure 3). 
 
Apart from a few instances where local authorities were absent during the time of our visit, 
the views collected then were those of ‘authorised voices’. I borrow this term from Loera-
Gonzalez to refer to the voices that are ‘considered legitimate according to the current norms’ 
(2016: 242). As explained in Chapter 2, only a limited number of people is seen as having 
the right to speak on political matters and to mediate official relations with state officials or 
outsiders: the lonaky, the komity (unofficial village secretaries) and the head of fokontany. 
When these were absent during the time of our visit, villagers would orient us to other figures 
of authority or raïamandreny, such as the eldest member of a hamlet preferably or otherwise, 
to other respected elders). Those local figures of authority were those who were officially 
authorised not only to talk to us, but also to those in charge of mediating the land deal 
negotiations. Obtaining other viewpoints required more time and trust on behalf of both 
village authorities and of those more subaltern members of the community who may have 
different views but may have been scared or felt illegitimate to express them. Internalised 
prohibition to express, or to even have an opinion, a manifestation of third dimensional 
power, was a frequent obstacle to our access to non-authorised voices, in particular those of 
women.  
 
Data collection focused on the accounts these authorised voices were giving of responses and 
outcomes. I encouraged them to talk about: 
 (i) how their village viewed the agribusiness project and corporate land access on their 
land 
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 (ii) how they had engaged with the negotiation process in the way they had and why 
 (iii) how they assessed the outcome of the land deal on their village and whether they 
felt their voices had been heard. 
 
In that sense, this fieldwork was interesting in that it revealed that variations in responses 
could be found among authorised voices themselves. Across villages, local authorities had 
contrasted perspectives on corporate land access, had engaged differently with the land deal 
negotiations and were judging the outcome of the land deal in different ways. 
  
This broad pool was also driven by a concern to gain a closer, more nuanced, understanding 
of the broad context of negotiations in which these responses had been expressed, by looking 
at whether discussions had taken varying material and relational contours (different brokers, 
different durations, different places, different timings, different degrees of inclusions or 
exclusions in the talks and so on) and varying informational and discursive content (different 
requests, different explanations and so on) from one village to the next, and how these 
varying circumstances may have had an impact on the way negotiations had been  understood 
and experienced across villages. I was particularly interested in whether these authorised 
voices felt they had had some choice, leverage and possibility of initiative in the discussions 
and, if so, which ones and under which conditions. By talking to leaders from 26 different 
villages, I hoped to identify the patterns and inconsistencies of the consultation process across 
villages.  
 
This fieldwork also enabled me to gain a subtle understanding of the broader political and 
power dynamics of the negotiation process that are described in Chapter 2. These village 
visits were complemented by 40 interviews with actors involved in the consultation or 
broader negotiation process: from members of the local and national state apparatus, to 
members of the civil society and to staff members of the Tozzi Green company at different 
levels of responsibility. These interviews were multi-sited, carried out in the villages, in the 
regional capital Ihosy, and in the national capital Antananarivo. The purpose of this work 
was to gain insights into how discourses, actions and decisions of the corporate, state and 
civil society elites both informed and were influenced by the villagers’ responses with the 
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negotiation process. I also looked at the discourses corporate and state elites held on villagers 
to understand how their representations of agrarian populations may have affected the design 
of the consultation process. I paid attention to the way the positions of state authorities 
fluctuated in a context of tension, competition and uncertainties. Discussions with these 
authorities also sought to further the data I had on the terms and conditions of the land 
acquisition. 
 
The findings of the 26-village comparison are, for their part, presented in Chapter 5. They 
also provided me with the basis to choose the three village case studies that were explored 
the next year and discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
In-depth case studies (2014) 
During the last fieldwork period, I sought to move a step further in the analysis of local voice 
and influence in the context of large-scale land negotiations. I carried out three in-depth 
village case studies with an aim to: 
(i) gain insights into the variety of perspectives that existed within the villages and understand 
which of these perspectives were actually voiced (how and why) within the negotiations and 
which ones, if any, had become influential (how and why) 
(ii) get a better grasp of the fluid, contested process of negotiations by looking at how 
perceptions and actions had evolved through time, as the land deals were formalised into a 
lease (issued in 2012), and the agribusiness project had expanded and was continuing to 
expand. 
 
During this field trip, I engaged with a total of 88 research participants, most of them from 
the villages themselves but also with members of the state and the company. 
For purposes of comparison, the three villages were taken from a pool in which authorised 
voices had displayed similar perspectives towards corporate land access (concern over an 
unwanted land dispossession), but had taken diverse paths of action and 
encountered different successes in their struggle. I introduce these cases and discuss the 
rationales behind their choice in more detail at the end of Chapter 5.  
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A full month was spent in each of these villages. One hamlet was used as our base: the one 
where village authorities had kindly offered us a room, in their own homes in Soatanana and 
Mangidy and in the village school in Antranohazo. However, numerous visits were carried 
out in people’s fields and in the other hamlets of the villages.   
 
Data collection was driven by conscious, permanent efforts to gain access to non-authorised 
voices, whilst not showing disrespect to the village authorities and not putting any village 
member at threat, or under fear of being at threat, either.  Whilst time and trust helped me 
access some of the subaltern members in each of the three villages, I remained cautious not 
to equate their narratives with their “true voices”, conscious of the power dynamics data 
collection was embedded in, some of which were related to issues of positionality that are 
discussed in a little more detail in the section on methodological challenges below.  
 
Data collection on negotiations, responses and outcomes through interviews, informal 
discussions and some degree of participant observation was complemented by some basic 
geographical work. Using a Garmin GPS, georeferenced data were collected for both 
illustration and analytical purposes. Numerous waypoints were taken during the visits to the 
various hamlets and neighbouring villages, to villagers’ fields and pastures and to Tozzi 
Green’s plantations and other (previous or ongoing) attempts at land appropriation. The 
village maps drawn below, in collaboration with a Malagasy Geographical Information 
System expert, are based on these data. 
 
Data analysis was partly carried out using the Nvivo qualitative analysis software. The coding 
followed the phased approach, discussed above. As I went through my interview transcripts 
and field notes from the 2011 and 2013 fieldworks, successive insights on the afore-
mentioned foreshadowed research problem were formalised into ‘nodes’ which, at this point, 
were broadly classified under my three main research objects. Negotiations, responses and 
outcomes provided what is referred into Nvivo as ‘parent nodes’, under which all subsequent 
data were initially recorded.  
 
The phase of fieldwork and data analysis then led me to the theoretical framework discussed 
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in Chapter 3. Moral norms quickly emerged as an essential lens through which both responses 
to and outcomes of the land deal negotiations were discussed and justified, pointing to the 
heuristic potential of the concept of ‘moral economy’. Power dynamics, which were more 
consciously the object of observation from the beginning, were confirmed to be critical and 
their understanding was further refined. After a few moves back and forth between the 
literature and those data findings, I decided Luke’s and Gaventa’s three-dimensional 
approach could provide an efficient way to regroup and analyse the multiplicity of 
dimensions that power had been appeared to take in the context of land deals (and which had 
been formalised in numerous nodes in Nvivo). Following these choices, new ‘nodes’ were 
created in Nvivo, theoretically-informed this time.  
 
The versatility of Nvivo then facilitated a three-dimensional data analysis, through the 
crossing information inside and across the three following ‘parent nodes’ (or main strands of 
data): 
-our three objects of observation (negotiations, responses and outcomes),  
-the power and moral economy framework 
-the information on the villages, hamlets or individual research participant under observation 
(more information on the classification of these units below). 
 
The last fieldwork (2014) was illuminated by these first empirical and theoretical findings. 
The data collected then was added to the Nvivo-organised analytical framework described 
here.  
 
Methodological and ethical challenges 
Several methodological and ethical challenges were encountered during the research process. 
On the ground, the main difficulty centred on asserting my identity as a researcher despite 
prejudices that were associated with my racial identity. There were cases where people 
suspected me of being part of the Tozzi Green team and others in which I was thought to 
have been sent by the civil society to support grassroots resistance. In the three villages in 
which I spent time during the last field trip, a better level of trust was achieved. Yet it was 
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never certain whether I ultimately managed to convince everyone of the research purpose of 
my visits. These perceptions seemingly affected the way research participants would engage 
with me and their answers to my questions as well. 
  
A partly related difficulty consisted of accessing the voice of subaltern segments of the local 
communities, especially women. This required that two difficult conditions were met at the 
same time. First the discussions needed to be held outside of the control of dominant 
members of society (men, elders and so on). Crop fields generally constituted a good place 
or homes, at the end of the rice transplanting seasons. After the excitement related to the 
presence of a foreigner in their village had dissipated, I was more easily able to wander 
around the villages freely, although it was generally difficult to be able to have a private 
conversation with anyone as doors were always left open. The second condition was harder 
to meet: the members of these subaltern groups needed to be actually willing or feel 
legitimate to discuss these issues, especially with a foreigner. While their attitude of restraint 
provided material to reflect on internal power dynamics in a society where the right to talk 
publicly is reserved for men and elders, one of the main challenges was that a number of 
voices that were silenced in the negotiation process might not be willing to make themselves 
heard to me either.  I was also careful that people felt free enough to refuse to talk to me 
should they not be comfortable.  
 
During data analysis, I sought to reflect on the potential effects on those various power 
dynamics on the accounts of those who did talk to me. In the best cases I concluded, the 
accounts I was getting reflected the interviewees’ current perspectives on the land deal, as 
opposed to a “true” account of what their positions or responses had been at the time of the 
negotiations. In cases where there were clear signs of caution on their behalf (retaining 
information, contradictions, silences and so on), I focused on understanding what their 
attempts to reconstruct their retrospective accounts of the land deal negotiations, according 
to potential fears and representations, could reveal on the power dynamics at work and on 
the evolution of perceptions with time. These interpretations are discussed in the case study 
chapters.  
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Another challenge consisted of getting the necessary data to support my understanding of 
social differentiation across and within the villages. Villagers were generally reluctant to give 
me information on their capital (or lack of capital) in cattle, and unable to provide quantitative 
data on their land endowments. The information collected on annual crop food production 
and financial income from sales of cattle and crops was hard to use for comparative purposes 
since the units of measurement would vary from one place to the next.  On food crop 
production, villagers usually referred to the number of ox-carts they could fill per harvest. 
However, not only would the number of annual harvests vary from one place to the next 
according to the seeds and quality of land available, but their carts would not necessarily 
contain the same amounts of bags of rice and the capacity of their bags of rice would also 
vary. Moreover, it was not always clear whether the data given were for the hamlet or for the 
whole village. On population sizes, numbers given would at times include children, at others 
exclude them.  Considering the number of villages concerned by this study (26), I would 
have needed a substantial team of research assistants, and much more time, to carry the 
surveys necessary to gain comprehensive, comparable data for every one of them.  
 
 The unrealistic quest for assessing respective levels of wealth was therefore replaced by 
efforts to gain enough information to establish the varying levels of food insecurities and the 
broad class position of the villages (for the 2013 fieldwork- 26 village comparative analysis 
discussed in Chapter 5) and of the hamlets (for the 2014 fieldwork -three case studies 
discussed in Chapter 6, 7 and 8) under observation. In order to do so, I focused on 
determining: 
• whether the villages/hamlets owned their means of production (land and cattle) or not, and 
to what extent. I distinguished distinguishing between (i) villages or hamlets who owned 
cattle and lent some to others (and rough numbers), (ii) villages or hamlets who had 
enough cattle for themselves but could not lend to anyone and (iii) villages or hamlets 
who did not own so had to borrow.  Villages/hamlets were also classified according to the 
broad quantity and quality of farmland and grazeland they owned (using the criteria 
outlined in Chapter 2).  
• The degree of choice with respect to their engagement with the market.  This was 
assessed by trying to answer the two following questions: Were villagers forced to 
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sell some of their rice production to cover non-food related expenses while eating less 
valued and nutritional crops themselves?  Were they forced to sell their labour force 
to other villages or were they, on the contrary, employing labour force from other 
villages themselves? Throughout the thesis, I seek to be as transparent as possible 
regarding the basis of my assertions on these issues, and the quality of the data. 
These classifications were formalised in nodes in the Nvivo qualitative analysis software.  
 
Who and how to anonymise to best protect my research participants without reaching a level 
of abstraction that would empty the case study of its substance was another concern. After 
having anonymised Tozzi Green in previous publications, I decided that the nature of their 
operations called for transparency rather than secrecy and that it was individuals, rather than 
the company, that needed to be protected through anonymisation. The names of research 
participants were changed, as well as those of the various villages and hamlets, in order 
prevent any possible identification of local authorities while being able to tell what their 
function or position within the local society were. 
 
The thesis now turns to a discussion of the findings of the successive periods of fieldwork. 
Chapter 5 looks at the results of the 2013 data collection exercise, while Chapters 6, 7 and 8 
explore the three village case studies. Throughout the process, I draw on the insights these 
different units of analysis bring to the question of how local voices get heard or silenced in 
the context of negotiation processes for corporate land access.  
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CHAPTER 5: 
A REGIONAL ASSESSMENT OF LAND DEAL 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
Drawing on the comparative fieldwork research carried out in 2013, this chapter reports on 
the accounts of the land deal negotiations that were made by authorised voices across a total 
of 26 villages. These village-level data are complemented by information garnered through 
interviews with state and corporate officials and through the analysis of documents related to 
the official procedure and consultation. 
 
I first describe the broad context of negotiations in which the village consultation took place, 
elaborating on the involvement of the local state administration already outlined in Chapter 
2 and highlighting how the contours and content of the consultations varied across villages. 
The following pages explore the villages’ official responses to these differently-enunciated 
land requests and report on the attempts to influence the negotiations through means other 
than the official consultation (responses). Whilst compliance with land requests was shown 
to largely dominate the spectrum of official responses, it was also found to obscure 
contrasting perspectives on Tozzi Green, which ranged from enthusiasm to outright 
opposition. I note that these findings suggest differentiated vulnerability to power pressures 
with some village leaders who felt free to go against official directives and openly reject the 
land requests, and others who felt forced to comply. In the last section, I present the 
interviewees’ diverging perceptions on the outcomes of the land deal, pointing to the 
centrality of considerations of relational justice in reported judgements.  Finally, I draw some 
preliminary observations on issues of voice and influence and introduce the three village case 
studies that are discussed in Chapters 6, 7 and 8.   
 
Negotiation: the consultation process 
In this section, I explore the patterns and inconsistencies of consultation across the 26 
villages.  I was particularly interested in understanding whether authorised voices felt they 
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had had some choice in responding one way or the other. I first describe the regional and 
municipal consultation meetings that preceded the village-level consultation, as these 
previous interactions partly conditioned the villagers’ perceptions of the land deal and 
prefigured the type of brokerage the different mayors would conduct, with Satrokala and 
Andiolava’s mayors putting villagers under pressure to comply with Tozzi Green’s land 
requests and the one from Ambatolahy under pressure to oppose them. I then point to the 
different experiences that authorised voices reported having had with the consultation 
process, relating them to the varying material and relational contours of these interactions as 
well to their informational and discursive contents.  
 
First official efforts at consulting the local population were made through large collective 
meetings organised at the level of municipalities. Some of these meetings were carried out in 
the context of the Environmental Impact Assessment study that the company conducted in 
2011. The consultant company chosen for the study sent two young experts from the capital 
Antananarivo. They happened to be in the chef-lieu of Satrokala when I visited the 
agribusiness project for the first time in September 2011. Paid by the company, they were 
based at Tozzi Green’s headquarters and used their 4x4 to move around for their interviews, 
which would presumably have made it difficult for the population to understand that they 
were the independent entity they claimed to be. From the consultants’ complaints about the 
state officials systematically asking them for financial remuneration when they came to 
discuss with them, it seemed that even the state administration was struggling to make a 
distinction.72  
  
The consultants met with the three mayors of the rural municipalities to discuss the 
‘advantages and risks’ related to the agribusiness project and to suggest ways the company 
could try to mitigate them.73 The population was invited to participate in two of those 
meetings but from the information gathered in the comparative study, only a portion of the 
                                               
72 Informal discussion, Rivo and Mamy, EIE consultants, 14/09/2011, Satrokala village.  
73 Municipal council member (Ambatolahy) (2011b) ‘Tetik’asa voly savoa Ihorombe Tozzi Green, Fanadihadiana ny amin’ny Fiantraika  
(EIE) amin’ny tontolo iainana ny mponina-Tatitry ny fivoriana’, (Minutes of the meeting. Environmental Impact Assessment. Tozzi Green. 
Jatropha plantation project. Ihorombe), Ambatolahy, 16/09/2011. 
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local population was actually informed of the meetings. Official minutes of the meetings 
concur with villagers’ accounts to suggest the main contribution of these events was to spread 
official information on the project and display the state’s support of it.  No fewer than 22 
local and regional officials attended the first meeting held in Satrokala, from the head of 
district and the regional directors of various ministries through the mayors and the cabinet 
director of the regional government.74 After explanations were given on the project, local 
people were invited to voice their comments and opinions.  A head of fokontany reported that 
a few of those who attended did actually say they were reluctant to seeing the project develop 
in their area but ‘not many because people here do not dare to express their opinions’75. 
Likewise, the minutes of the meeting held a few weeks later in Andiolava noted that there 
was some reluctance on the part of certain villagers because of the bad experiences they had 
with the Landmark company which had tried to set up an agribusiness project in the area a 
few years before. The company was also reportedly asked to consider amicable solutions to 
potential issues of cattle encroaching on the commercial plantations. All of the other 
comments mentioned were manifestations of enthusiasm, however, with villagers from 
Andiolava, for instance, reportedly saying that the positive results shown by the Tozzi Green 
project in terms of socio-economic opportunities in Satrokala were providing them with 
strong incentives for welcoming the project in their municipality.76 Crucially, these meetings 
were recorded to have validated the ‘approval of the project by the local population’, a 
necessity to the procedure moving forward.77 
 
Aside from these collective meetings, the population was rarely approached directly by the 
EIE consultants.  Out of the 26 villages visited, only one said they had received their visit 
and been asked for their opinion on the project. In 2014, Tozzi Green’s local managers 
showed little, if any, knowledge of the findings or recommendations of the report that had 
                                               
74 Municipal council member (Satrokala) (2011a) ‘Procedure of approval of the biomass and biofuel project, Ihorombe Region, Minutes 
of the meeting’, Satrokala, 20/07/2011. 
75 Interview with a local official from one of the rural municipalities, Andiolava, 04/03/2014 
76 Municipal council member (Andiolava) (2011) ‘Fanadihadiana momba by fiantraika amin’ny tontolo iainana sy ny mponina. Tetikasa 
Biocarburant et Biomasse Ihorombe- Tatitry ny fivoriana’ (Minutes of the meeting-Environmental Impact Assessment. Biofuel and 
Biomass Project Ihorombe), Andiolava, 05/08/2011. 
77 Municipal council member (Satrokala) (2011b) ‘Letter from the municipality of Satrokala and Andiolava’, Ref 001-11/CR TG/PR, 
Official file on Tozzi Green, Ministry of Development and Country Planning, 20/07/2011.  
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emerged from this assessment and the project was operating without the required 
environmental license as the National Office for the Environment (ONE) was requesting that 
a new assessment be organised.78 
 
Village-level consultations were organised a few months after the EIA. All the villages 
affected by the land lease within the group of 26 villages we visited confirmed that some 
consultation had been held over the concerned land at some point. Discussions quickly 
highlighted that the main question was not whether there had been consultation, but who had 
been consulted and how. 
 
Out of the 26 villages visited, there were five cases where village leaders reported that they 
had not been consulted on the land transfer or only on some of it.  In none of these cases, 
however, was the land just appropriated by the Tozzi Green company without any approval 
from villagers. In all five, the land had been given by neighbours or family members (from 
another hamlet). One of the striking feature of this fieldwork was actually how much of the 
discussion about the consultation process revolved around local rules of land tenure being 
violated by neighbouring villagers. By favouring one hamlet over the others, and overlooking 
the importance of including all villages of the vicinity in discussions over a tract as opposed 
to just one, the consultation rarely included all of those holding claims on the land under 
discussion and ended up fuelling tensions between and within villages. 
 
The other important question was how these consultations were led as this can be presumed 
to have contributed to villagers’ perceptions of the land deal and of the choice they had 
regarding the land requests that were made to them.  
The change of Tozzi Green’s management team, as well as the high turn-over of the staff in 
charge of community relations, translated into important inconsistencies and contradictions 
in the promises of compensation that were offered, with the identity of brokers and the 
content of the discussions changing across time and space. Villagers approached at the onset 
of the project were told the Tozzi Green project would follow a contractual agriculture model, 
                                               
78 The ONE was requiring for a new EIA be conducted for the area affected by the first lease instead of the whole 100,000 ha. 
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a pledge consistent with the business plan of the project that mentioned 25% of the total 
surface of jatropha would be planted through contract farming, but these announcements 
totally disappeared from discussions after a little while. Some villagers were made more 
generous promises of compensation than others. Some villagers had received information on 
the Tozzi Green project beforehand by attending the main meeting discussed above; others 
heard about the project for the first time on the day they were consulted. People were only 
consulted once in most villages, but in two of them (such as Mitatra in Satrokala and 
Mavoreny in Andiolava) they were consulted several times and the discussions were recorded 
in minutes.  Some were approached by both Tozzi Green staffers and local authorities, some 
only by Tozzi Green staffers and others only by local authorities. Within the four years 
covered by the research, four different persons acted as Tozzi Green’s representatives for the 
consultation. 
 
Crucial similarities were observable across cases, however. First of all, in most of the villages 
visited, only scarce, fragmented and often false information was given on the process of the 
land transfer: villagers were frequently told the company was borrowing the land, but they 
were not told that this loan would be contracted with the state (after the land was titled and 
marked out) instead of with them directly. In the village of Mitatra, approached in the phases 
of exploration, the company even formally pledged that the land would never be titled and 
remain the property of the villagers, who would be paid some rent for it (cf contract in 
appendix 3). Two main pieces of (mis)information were generally given regarding the 
ongoing land deal: the first consisted of saying that the land deal had already been approved 
at higher levels and the second, that villagers had no legal rights on the land anyway.   Second, 
delays to reflect were rather short: the first état des lieux (the official recognition missions 
during which the availability of the land is checked and georeferenced plans are made) were 
all held in the space of a month (between 24/01 and 14/02/2012) and all the second ones on 
the same day, 17/08/2012). 
 
The next section looks at the official responses villagers brought to the negotiation process. 
Drawing on Gaventa and Pettit (2010), I shall distinguish between the voices expressed in 
‘invited spaces’ (in the context of consultation) and those expressed in ‘claimed spaces’ 
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(outside the consultation). These categories indicate different level of initiatives, with 
‘invited spaces’ pointing to the top-down process of delineation of the consultation and 
‘claimed spaces’ to the creation of new channels and opportunities of expression from 
below.79  
 
Responses: choice and initiative 
The domination of compliance in invited spaces 
In terms of the official responses to the consultation or responses expressed in invited spaces 
of decision-making, limited variation was found. A great majority of consulted village 
leaders complied with the corporate land requests (17 out of the 20 who were consulted). 
Two interesting findings emerged from these discussions of responses, however: (i) this 
compliance obscured different perspectives on the project, with some describing their 
compliance with the land requests as acquiescence under intimidation and some as consent 
driven by hope for some benefits; (ii) despite this general trend, some village leaders felt free 
to openly refuse the land requests, in line with their mayor’s directives for some (those from 
the municipality of Ambatolahy), in contradiction to it in others (those from Satrokala and 
Andiolava).  
Compliance under constraint 
Out of these 17 villages that officially cooperated with Tozzi Green’s land requests, eight 
conveyed a sense of constraint: three of whom explicitly said they had felt ‘forced to’ give 
land (those from Antafika, Mianarivo, and Antranohazo) and five who explained they had 
‘not been forced by the company but’. I included in this last group those villages where 
interviewees were replying negatively when asked whether they had felt forced to give land, 
but whose subsequent explanations made it clear that they did not think they had much 
choice. Most of them explained having been told that the land did not belong to them and 
that the land deal had already been accepted at higher levels anyway (Manambatra, 
Ampafika, Betongolo, Andoharano). This restricted understanding of choice is reflected in 
                                               
79  In the power-cube approach, Gaventa and colleagues distinguish between ‘closed spaces’ (to refer to the areas of decision-making from 
which the governed are excluded), ‘invited spaces’ (for those where people are invited to participate) and ’claimed spaces’ (for those which 
are claimed by less powerful actors) (Gaventa and Pettit 2010). 
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the explanations given by the leaders of Mavoreny who, at the beginning of the interview, 
were saying ‘we had the right to refuse’, but then explained that: 
After the meeting that was organised here, the authorities from Ihosy came 
here to ask for land. They said: "You are honoured of our presence here 
and of our request but these lands do not belong to you but to the state. If 
you have papers, show them”.80 
The same ambivalent explanations were given by the hamlet leader of Betongolo, who first 
said: 'No, we didn't hesitate to sign. […] It was a volunteer gift' but soon after added 'We 
accepted because we know these lands belong to the state; so, if we refuse, they will force us 
later. Even the minister came here’81. Village authorities of Mavoreny explained that it was 
the mayor who had chosen which land to give. In a more uncommon fashion, one interviewed 
village leader explained having been pressured not by state agents but by his own family 
members: they wanted to make sure they could access the health centre built by the Tozzi 
Green company that some villagers assumed, rightly or wrongly, was reserved to cooperating 
villages.82 
 
This serves to show the importance of going beyond asking people whether they felt forced 
to give land to understand how much share they had in the decision-making. Some research 
informants such as those from Mavoreny gave the impression that they had retained some 
degree of leeway in their response to the land requests, yet they had not actually chosen the 
land themselves. Others such as Antafika, on the other hand, were adamant that they had not 
been given any option to refuse giving land but that they had been able to choose the tract to 
be given away. Similar accounts of power pressures emanated from those three villages that 
said they had complied against their will. Interestingly, therefore, under the same reported 
power pressures, some were stating that they had not felt forced to give land and others that 
they had.  
                                               
80 Focused group discussion with the head of fokontany, the deputy head of fokontany and a raïamandreny from Maroveny, Maroveny, 
28/04/2013. 
81 Raïamandreny, Betongolo, 21/03/2013. 
82 According to Tozzi Green managers, the health centre is open to anyone, regardless of whether they contributed land or not. Some 
villagers said they had been denied access but others deny this, saying they had been allowed to go even though their village had not 
contributed any land to the agribusiness project. 
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Voluntary compliance? 
Authorised voices from the other nine villages who complied, on the other hand, insisted they 
had ‘not felt forced to give land’. These findings, as such, belied the understanding of 
compliance with the consultation process as being the sole result of (real or anticipated) 
coercion (second dimensional power).  It is of course critical to establish the extent to which 
this perception of choice emerged from misleading information (on the nature of the land 
deal, on their land rights etc) or from what some would call influenced worldviews (third 
dimensional power). These more complex issues are examined in the three village case 
studies.  
 
 For the time being, what matters is to understand that the project, as it was presented and 
understood, generated a number of positive expectations that made it worth ceding some land 
for a number of village leaders.  In some villages such as Ambohijafy (municipality of 
Andiolava), the enthusiasm had been such that people had even been pro-active in delineating 
land for Tozzi Green after having heard of its projects at the meeting held in the main village.  
Enthusiasm generally derived from prospects of waged-work and generous offers of 
compensation (from contract farming through the payment of rent to promises of socio-
economic infrastructure and other kinds of help). Some also mentioned a desire to live in 
harmony with the foreigners. Most of the time, acceptance was also related to the fact that 
the land transfer that had been agreed on was not expected to have any significant impact on 
existing livelihood activities, either because only a small amount of land had been transferred 
because the need for land was quite limited since the village did not own or look after much 
cattle or because land was plentiful (but that last configuration was less frequent). There were 
even cases where the land deal was seen as a weight off the village shoulders since cattle 
thefts (and related financial costs) were rife. However, there were also two interesting cases 
where village leaders had significant cattle wealth but said they had been happy to offer some 
of their grassland to the project, since gifts had been reasonable and been compensated and 
represented a means to build good relationships with wealthy foreigners (Antroboka). These 
counter-intuitive findings were belying simple correlations between wealth (and influence) 
and a position of opposition to the project. 
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Villagers can be assumed to have been more or less proactive in requesting compensation. 
All interviewed village leaders reported having asked for compensation, but only in the first 
village ever consulted were these commitments put down in writing (Mitatra). The fear of 
the state and of foreigners that was regularly brought up by research participants can be 
thought to have had dissuaded a number of them to actively negotiate for compensation, 
especially for those who were not explicitly asked what they wanted in exchange. In all cases, 
whether expressed or not, expectations were there: contribution to the land effort should be 
rewarded and promises should be kept.  All the village leaders who explained that the project 
was welcome indeed made it clear that their good dispositions were contingent on the 
company bringing them support and not taking more land than agreed. A degree of measure 
in terms of land alienation was also a condition of their acceptance:  all but two indicated that 
they would not be able to provide more land, were they asked to. 
Voiced refusal to comply 
Contradicting this trend of (constrained or voluntary compliance), three of the 20 villages 
that were consulted (Marohasina, Itaosy and Soatanana) openly rejected Tozzi Green’s land 
requests. For Itaosy, this rejection was in line with their mayor’s directives as they belonged 
to the municipality of Ambatolahy where the mayor was encouraging opposition. For 
Marohasina and Soatanana (municipality of Satrokala), this went against the mayor’s support 
for corporate land access. Contrasting with the forced compliance reported by others, their 
response raises the question as to the potentially varying levels of vulnerability to power 
pressures across villages. As in the three villages where leaders explained having been 
coerced to give land against their will, their reluctance was generally explained as a concern 
for livelihoods, in a context of scarce land and extensive pastoralism.  The land transferred 
to (or feared to be targeted by) Tozzi Green was either land they used for grazing or important 
land reserves that would soon be needed in the context of the growing population and related 
increased pressure on landed resources. 
 
Although dominant, compliance was not the only response that was given to the consultation 
process across the local population, belying the ‘approval of the project by the local 
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population’, reported after the main meetings held in Satrokala and Andiolava83 with three 
villages where consulted leaders openly refused to give land. 
Asserting or reclaiming voice through claimed spaces  
The five (group of) village leaders who had been excluded from the consultation process, but 
were affected by the project generally shared the feelings of those who had felt forced to give 
land. Grievances and concern were generally even stronger because of the experience of 
exclusion which had deprived them of the opportunity not only to influence the choice of the 
land, but also to ask for compensation.  A few of them sought different channels of expression 
to try and regain a voice in the process, as did others discontented with the way the project 
or land deal had evolved, or worried about the way it could affect them in the future. These 
actions outside of the controlled spaces of the consultation are examined in the pages below. 
 
The appropriation of ‘claimed spaces’ (Gaventa and Pettit 2010) to express voice was varied 
across villages and not only a function of exclusions or discontentment. There were village 
leaders who opposed the project through several different channels of expression when, for 
some, their land had not been officially requested yet. There were others where no action was 
taken to contest the ongoing land deal at all, despite the project causing them significant 
concern. 
 
As the Tozzi Green’s project was slowly making progress in the area and the company’s 
intentions were publicised through the collective meetings and first consultation visits 
mentioned above, three of the 26 villages sent letters to state authorities to let them know of 
their disagreement in principle with the project and their refusal for it to develop on their land 
(Andalanotsy, Anvalala and Talata).  Two of them also sent representatives to the press 
conference that was organised the following year by civil society in the country’s capital, 
Antananarivo, to campaign against the Tozzi Green project. They were joined by members 
of another two villages in doing so, one of which had also taken prior action to resist the 
privatisation of their land (the village of Mangidy, municipality of Ambatolahy, had written 
                                               
83 ‘Letter from the municipality of Satrokala and Andiolava’, Ref 001-11/CR TG/PR, Official file on Tozzi Green, Ministry of 
Development and Country Planning, 20/07/2011. 
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a protest letter), and one of which had not (Antranohazo, Satrokala). 
 
Among the villages visited in 2013, a total of seven tried to influence the terms of the land 
deal through letters to state authorities. Their purpose varied slightly. As mentioned above, 
in three of them it was used to proactively express disagreement in principle, while in others, 
it was used in a more reactive way, to complain against promises of financial and material 
compensation that had not been respected for some (Mitatra), to ask for more support from 
the company (Betongolo), or to contest what they deemed as an illegitimate transfer of their 
land by other villagers (Manambatra and Soaravy).84 
 
Out of the eight village leaders who complained some of their village land had been given to 
Tozzi Green by others, three communicated their grievances to state or corporate authorities 
(Soatanana verbally and Manambatra and Soaravy through letters). The tone and targets of 
these protest letters could vary quite substantially. In Soaravy, the tone was quite 
confrontational, seeking the support of state authorities in repairing a manifest injustice. The 
actions of both their neighbours and the company were a source of indignation. Their 
neighbours were accused of having ‘sold’ land on which they allegedly had no rights at all 
and which did not even belong to their municipality, while the company was guilty both of 
having ‘stolen’ it and of having excluded the rightful landholders from the discussions 
altogether: ‘What surprised us is that they did not approach us at any time and there has not 
been any discussion, which is a way of trampling our rights’.85 In Manambatra, instead, there 
was a manifest willingness to sort out the problem through a direct dialogue with the 
company. Manambatra had been consulted and agreed to give some land but another one of 
their tracts, which they needed, had been given to the project by ‘an old neighbour’86. The 
encroachment was directly attributed to the ‘old neighbour’ and not to Tozzi Green. Showing 
that he was not scared of addressing Tozzi Green managers directly, the hamlet leader I talked 
to explained that he had gone to their office twice to follow up on the letters. He also 
                                               
84 The 2014 fieldwork revealed that two other villages had written letters to protest land transfers by neighbours. This is discussed in 
Chapter 8. 
85 Fokontany Andalanotsy, Letter sent to the head of Region, the Head of district and the mayor of Ambatolahy 25/08/2011. 
86 Interview son of the lonaky, Manambatra, 06/04/2013. 
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mentioned the intention to go and talk to the country manager directly to try and find a 
solution about a water problem that Tozzi Green’s project was causing to some of their crop 
fields. There seemed to be some degree of confidence in the company following previous 
interactions in the context of consultation. 
 
The intention to go and talk directly with the corporate managers was brought up within three 
villages, either to try and find a deal (for Ambondro, which wanted to offer an exchange of 
land), ask for bigger compensation (Betongolo) or to ask the company to honour their 
commitments (Ampafika). Some even said that they had threatened the corporate managers 
with precluding them from working their land should they not honour their commitment to 
provide them with a dam soon (village of Isorano).  It is difficult to know whether they 
followed through on these declarations and the extent to which these were encouraged by the 
discussions we had together. The Tozzi Green managers themselves said that no complaints 
had been voiced to them directly87. In any case, it seemed that such intentions were voiced 
when there was still a level of hope and trust and direct contact with senior staff from the 
company. 
 
A more common way to try and limit land loss or communicate grievances was to go and 
talk to less senior corporate or state actors, such as Tozzi Green’s tractor drivers, state civil 
servants in charge of the land deal procedure at the village level and/or the mayor. Sometimes 
villagers’ attempts at influencing the land deal would stop there. At others, as in Soatanana’s 
case, that would be accompanied by efforts to lobby more senior authorities. 
 
Some of the post-consultation grievances were expressed at other villagers instead. Three of 
the eight villages complaining of an illegitimate land transfer went to see the accused 
neighbours to voice condemnation and put pressure on them to deny their land gift to the 
company (Soaravy, Soatanana and Bemamory). Pressure was also put by cattle owners on 
those villages to whom cattle was lent since it was feared that their transfer of land to Tozzi 
Green would threaten their cattle’s health (Soakija).  Some villagers such as Soaravy and 
                                               
87 Stefano, Satrokala, corporate manager, 05/04/2014. 
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Soatanana also communicated with state and corporate leaders regarding the contested land 
transfer, but others, for example, Bemamory, stopped at pressuring others. 
 
In other villages, Ambondro, Mandritsara and Mitatra, contestation of the land transfer was 
not voiced in any way. One of the reasons raised for not voicing complaint, even towards 
those accused of the illegitimate land transfer, was the fear of conflict or tension.  There were 
cases where the land had been offered by members of the family (from the same village but 
living in another hamlet), which sparked fears that complaints would jeopardise the family 
cohesion (Manosarena). There were those where tensions with the village that they accused 
of having given their land preexisted the corporate land deal negotiations and had led to 
serious violence, including murders, jail sentences and village relocation (Ambondro). With 
the risks entailed with any reactivation of the conflict, the arguments for and against a 
complaint had to be weighed carefully. 
 
The exploration of responses outside of the invited spaces of decision-making revealed the 
use of different repertoires of action, in the pursuit of different purposes (redressing a 
grievance, pre-emptively expressing opposition, negotiating better compensation), through 
different targets (corporate managers, state authorities or other villagers).  
 
Although most of the consulted leaders complied with land requests in invited spaces of 
negotiation, the perceptions of choice behind their compliance varied significantly. 
Contrasted decisions as to whether or not to invest new spaces to try and negotiate better 
terms of incorporation or oppose land alienation also suggested different perceptions of the 
rights, relevance and risks of expressing voice in other fora or through other means.  The next 
pages describe how village leaders’ perceptions of outcomes varied from complete 
satisfaction (with both the land transfer and compensation) to complete discontent.  
 
Variegated outcomes  
The 2013 village visits highlighted that no simple, one-way correlation could be drawn 
between certain types of engagement with the negotiation process and the outcomes of the 
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land deal. As the next paragraphs indicate, in each broad category of response (refusal, 
compliance, exclusion from consultation with or without reaction through claimed spaces), 
a whole spectrum of outcomes was experienced. 
 
As mentioned above, three village leaderships openly refused Tozzi Green’s land requests 
during consultation. Although that decision was respected by the company, the villages were 
not equally successful in preventing the project from developing on their land. Marohasina 
and Itaosy were totally spared. Soatanana, however, suffered losses because of a land gift 
made by their neighbours. They managed to recover some of this transferred land following 
a meeting with Tozzi Green and the regional authorities. How they reached this deal will be 
looked at in further detail in one of the empirical chapters (Chapter 7). 
 
Different outcomes were also experienced among the group of 17 hamlets that complied with 
the land requests, both in terms of the significance of the land transferred and the 
compensation received. Eight village leaders said their village was not suffering from any 
adverse consequences from the land loss and that they had received satisfying compensation 
(Ambatofotsy, Andoharano, Betongolo, Analaroa, Zazafotsy, MianarivoSouth, Soakija, 
Talata). Interestingly, in one case, this positive outcome was reported, even though the 
villagers had not had any say in the choice of land (Andoharano). In Zazafotsy and 
Ambatofotsy, the land transfer to Tozzi Green was even seen as a boon, since it was land that 
used to be a source of concern as it was prone to bushfires and/or cattle thefts.  Another case 
worth mentioning is that of Talata, briefly mentioned above: the lonaky explained that the 
land transfer had not had any negative impact on their livelihoods since it was far from their 
hamlet and that Tozzi Green’s health centre was greatly appreciated by some members of his 
family. However, he personally had been and was still opposed to any transfer of the family 
land endowment, and had actually formalised this opposition in one of the first protest letters 
to be written and sent to local authorities. Nevertheless, for his cousins, who lived in another 
hamlet within Talata, he had ended up consenting to offer land since they insisted they 
wanted their sick daughter to be able to access Tozzi Green’s health centre. Pointing to the 
diverse perspectives that can coexist within villages, Talata’s case shows that village leaders 
do not always impose their decision on the rest of the family and that protest initiatives can 
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be defeated by internal dissent. It also shows that lack of adverse impact and (relative) 
satisfaction with the support provided by the company to the local population do not exclude 
positions of opposition to the project. Others explained their village was not suffering from 
the land loss but that they were unhappy with compensation or job offers (Mianarivo, 
Mangidy, Anafohy and Andoharano). The case of Mangidy illustrates how perspectives on 
corporate land access are dependent on the company delivering on its promises of 
compensation. After having explained how enthusiastic ‘all of them’ initially were about the 
agribusiness, their lonaky explained: 
Tahiny [one of Tozzi Green’s local managers] came here to ask us for land. 
And we know very well that these lands belong to the state, so we didn't 
hesitate to give them. But now we are sad because so far, they still haven't 
built us any schools. Whereas they say we're the best ones [in terms of 
agricultural yields]. So why haven't they built a school? And why are they 
not paying us? [...] We are really sad because we accepted giving land to 
get jobs.88  
Whilst providing another illustration of the misconceptions in which perceptions of ‘free 
choice’ can be grounded in, Nakania’s explanations highlighted the high hopes that foreign 
projects can generate among certain villagers. The village leader was also concerned the 
population would grow resentful against his brother and himself since they had been the ones 
brokering the land deal. Regarding the issue of wage arrears, he explained that the villagers 
who had worked on the corporate plantations had not been paid for a few months but that ‘it 
wasn’t Tozzi Green’s fault, but it’s the project officers who aren’t paying us’ and that he 
intended to go and talk to Tahiny about it.89 This was the only time I heard of problems of 
wage arrears but complaints about insufficient salaries, and/or short-term character of waged 
work opportunities were frequent. 
 
There were two villages where research informants explained land appropriation by the 
project was causing them problems, even though villagers had had a say in the choice of the 
tract and that choice had been respected by the company. In Antafika, the land passed on to 
Tozzi Green was close to their grassland which meant having to increase surveillance of 
                                               
88 Lonaky, Ampafika, 05/04/2013. 
89 Lonaky, Ampafika, 05/04/2013. 
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cattle substantially to avoid any damage to the corporate fields.  Research participants within 
the village explained that it was the least detrimental tract to offer under what they felt was 
an obligation to contribute. Outcomes in Isorano were more ambivalent: on the one hand, 
there was relief the concerned tract had been ceded to the company since it was a place where 
cattle used to be stolen. On the other hand, villagers were complaining that now that jatropha 
trees had been planted, cattle could no longer be taken to the neighbouring village’s grassland 
since Tozzi Green’s fields stood in the way. 
 
Finally, within those villages that had complied, there were three in which research 
participants said that Tozzi Green had appropriated more land than agreed to and that 
compensation was either insufficient (Mitatra and Manambatra) or completely non-existent 
(Antranohazo). For the first two, some of the contested land had allegedly been given to the 
company by their neighbours. Their complaints through letters had not yet brought any 
results. For the last one, the reason why the company had taken more land than agreed was 
unclear to them and the cause of strong resentment. Their case is explored in further detail in 
Chapter 6. 
 
In villages where authorised voices said they had been excluded from the consultation also 
experienced different outcomes. Some saw some of their village land included in the first 
lease (Ambondro, Bemamory, Manosarena), while others did not (Anvalala, Vadilongo, 
Anjorobe, Soakija, Soatanimbary, and Andalanotsy), and some had access to some of the 
socio-economic opportunities offered by the project anyways. 
 
In the three villages where village land was transferred to Tozzi Green, interviewed village 
authorities knew that the land had not been taken by force by the company but had been given 
to them either by family members from within the village (Manosarena) or by neighbours 
(Soanirana and Bemamory). They were all concerned about the impact of the land loss on 
their livelihood activities, but the immediacy of threats caused by the land transfer varied.  
Mandritsara and Soanirana seemed the most affected. People in Mandritsara explained that 
they now had to take their cattle some eight km away from their village for grazing and that 
they were worried because some of Tozzi Green’s plantations were very close to their 
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stockyards. In Ambondro, lost land was fertile land that they used to use not only for grazing 
but also for agriculture. No compensation was given in any of these three “excluded but 
affected” villages. However, Mandritsara said they used the services of the health centre set 
up in Satrokala village, from which they were close geographically and, as Bemamory, they 
enjoyed some of the job opportunities offered by the project: some 10 villagers from 
Bemamory worked for Tozzi Green and a ‘good number’ of them for Manosarena. Those job 
opportunities proved rather limited, however: 
Yes, many of us worked for them because we needed the money. But it 
was a few weeks only. And last time, it was during the rainy season while 
we had some work to do on our own fields, so we didn't work very long.90 
Within my pool, these were the only three villages that had lost land without interviewed 
village leaders having been consulted at all. All the others had either been consulted to some 
extent or not consulted but not included in the first lease either (Anvalala, Vadilongo, 
Anjorobe, Soakija, Soatanimbary, and Andalanotsy).   
 
Among that last group, all the research leaders I discussed this with said they were satisfied 
with this outcome (no land loss, no compensation) since they were opposed to the project 
setting up in their village. It is difficult to assess their own influence in this satisfactory 
outcome since all of them belonged to the municipality of Ambatolahy whose mayor was 
then blocking the project from using any of the land within his jurisdiction. Some had 
engaged more proactively in the resistance campaign than others, however. Some of the 
leading figures of the opposition campaign came from Andalanotsy and Anvalala: both 
villages had written letters to say they did not want the project and both had sent 
representatives to the press conference held in Antananarivo in November 2012. These two 
villages also officially endorsed the position of protest expressed at a large meeting organised 
by Ambatolahy’s mayor in November 2011.91  Sent to state officials at all level, the minutes 
of this meeting (cf appendix 4) were followed by 493 signatures, collected from a total of 
nine fokontany and more than 25 villages, in which Anvalala and Andalanotsy featured 
                                               
90 Lonaky, Mandritsara, 04/04/2013. 
91 Municipal council member (Ambatolahy) (2011a) ‘Opposition to the project requiring large tracts of land in the municipality o f 
Ambatolahy, Minutes of the meeting’, Ambatolahy, 18/11/2011. 
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prominently.  Anjorobe’s authorities can also be assumed to have taken an active part in this 
meeting, since their signature topped the list. The other three ‘excluded but not affected’ 
villages in my pool had not signed that letter (Soakija, Iakatra and Vadilongo). The 
explanations given by authorised voices suggested it was not because they opposed the 
resistance to Tozzi Green but because of the constraint of distance as they were located 
further away from Ambatolahy chef-lieu where these meetings were held. Iakatra and 
Vadilongo had actually written letters to oppose the previous agribusiness project that had 
started operating in their villages, and Atsimandra explained they had tried to talk their 
relatives (and cattle borrowers) in Mianarivo into not giving land.The difficulty of knowing 
whether these villages would have been equally successful in their struggles against 
dispossession even in the absence of support from their mayor reminds us that (perceived) 
positive outcomes should not be assumed to be the product of villagers’ sole endeavours.   
 
As far as compensation was concerned, it is also hard to know, without closer scrutiny and 
follow-up of the negotiation process through time, the extent to which villages getting more 
support than others could be related to the villagers’ own efforts to gain better terms of 
incorporation. The change of corporate policies and brokers through time can also be 
expected to have had an effect. In Mitatra, the promises of compensation were formalised in 
a contract which was given to the villagers (cf appendix 3). As much as this could have been 
the product of villagers’ proactive engagement in the negotiations, it could also have been 
motivated by the company’s strong quest for legitimacy at the beginning of its operations 
since Mitatra  was the first village to be consulted. This certainly provided the villagers with 
a strong asset on which to base their claims compared with other villagers. 
 
There were, therefore, cases where outcomes were clearly consistent with responses as in the 
three villages that refused Tozzi Green’s land requests against the opinion of the mayor and 
whose land was mostly spared as a result or those other ones where compliance with the land 
requests seemed to have helped mitigate the impact of land loss and gain satisfactory terms 
of incorporation. However, there were also counter-examples, where compliance ended up 
with unwanted land loss or unsatisfactory compensation or where expressions of opposition 
through either invited or claimed spaces did not help retrieve contested land loss, or only 
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partially. Whilst local people’s responses could be a critical factor in influencing outcomes, 
they were generally not a sufficient condition in obtaining satisfaction.  
 
It is also critical to recall that judgements on what constitutes satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
outcomes discussed here were those of authorised voices; what may be seen as satisfactory 
for them (no land loss but no compensation, for instance) may be seen very differently by 
less dominant members of the village. 
 
Preliminary observations on voice and influence 
This conclusion draws some of the insights allowed by these data on issues of local voice 
and influence in the context of land deal negotiations. I also indicate how these justified the 
three theoretically-informed questions discussed in Chapter 3 and raised the need to explore 
these through in-depth empirical observation. I then introduce the three villages that were 
chosen as case studies for Chapters 6, 7 and 8.  
 
The 26-village comparative study highlighted that within the context of a same project and 
within the same geographical area, village authorities could express contrasting perspectives 
on the setting up of a foreign agribusiness project, from seeing it as a threat to livelihoods to 
considering it as an opportunity to access compensation, jobs and socio-economic services. 
Their account of the negotiation process also reflected different understandings as to how 
much choice they had in the response to give to the land requests. Some village leaders had 
felt forced by the state and the company to comply with corporate land access despite a 
reluctance to do so, while others had not. Among those who had been excluded from the 
talks, some had felt emboldened to contest land transfers and ask for repair in other spaces 
and others had not. Within the villages themselves as well, some had felt entitled to express 
their dissent with authorised voices and some had not. 
 
This pleaded for a close scrutiny of the power dynamics that were playing out both vertically 
and horizontally and, as such, confirmed the importance of exploring sub-question 1: How 
can power dynamics inform local responses to land deal negotiations and how and under 
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which conditions can power relations be challenged by these responses? and more critically, 
these results highlighted the need to examine this question together with sub-question 2: What 
moral economic considerations underpin compliance with or resistance to corporate land 
access and with which implications on the perceptions of the outcome of the land deal? The 
next paragraphs explain why. 
 
As far as vertical power pressures were concerned, most village leaders had mentioned 
pressures from government officials to act one way or the other but these pressures seemed 
to have been either exerted or experienced differently. On the one hand, there were those 
three villages where authorities explained that they had felt free to reject the land requests 
despite efforts by local officials to try and talk them into complying. On the other, there were 
those who were adamant that they had been left with no choice but to give land. Others had 
less clear-cut accounts of the extent to which their compliant responses had been influenced, 
clearly stating that they had ‘not been forced to accept giving land’ but also mentioning 
pressures from the authorities brokering the deal. It is tempting to conflate their insistence on 
the lack of external constraints with an unconscious internalisation of domination (third 
dimension of power). The data, nevertheless, encouraged caution towards these 
interpretations. Acting the way that was expected of them by complying with their own 
dispossession did not seem to sign an unconscious endorsement of their subaltern position in 
society or reflect manipulated thoughts. Their critical comments on the process and outcome 
of the negotiations showed indeed that collaborating with the consultation process did not 
mean blindly and unconditionally accepting the land deal. There were conditions to, and 
expectations behind, their compliance.  
 
The difference in emphasis between those who were talking about full-constraint and those 
who were saying it was a free choice, and then mentioning pressures when discussing the 
content of the discussions seemed to be at least partly related to their perceptions as to how 
the company had performed with regards to these expectations. The more negative the impact 
and the more grudges village leaders held towards the conditions of corporate land access, 
the more they would insist on the coercion that had constrained them to comply. Judgements 
over the justice or injustice of corporate land access was generally related either to 
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considerations over the legitimacy of those expressing voice and/or over the fairness of the 
conditions of and retributions for land access. When compliance was described as 
‘voluntary’, it was always assorted with expectations (fair compensation, measured land 
appropriation, respect). Resentment at the land deal, on the other hand, was generally justified 
by one or several of the following accusations: (i) violated alienation rights in the context of 
the negotiations (neighbours or other villagers having given “their land”), (ii) disappointed 
expectations over compensation, and (iii) disproportionate or non-contractual land 
appropriation by Tozzi Green.  
 
Official responses (compliance or opposition) could also be suspected to have obscured 
desires within the village to respond differently, desires that may have been suppressed under 
horizontal power pressures. As much as certain village authorities may have felt forced to 
give land by state or corporate leaders, some villagers may have felt constrained not to give 
land by more dominant actors of the local population (their mayor, the village leader and so 
on). On the other hand, reports of land transfers having been made by members of the village 
community behind the back of their authorities indicated that, in certain cases, subaltern 
villagers dared to challenge horizontal power relations. The fact that in certain cases, 
authorised voices were challenged and in others were not hinted at another possible 
intersection of power and moral economy. Could the conditions under which (horizontal) 
power relations are challenged by responses (sub-question 1) be related to perceptions of 
relational justice within the village? Or to be more precise: In what context and under which 
conditions can a deal with the private company be seen as worth antagonising local 
authorities and how can these calculations be related to moral economic considerations? 
 
Socially-situated perceptions of outcomes 
Fewer insights emerged from these data on dynamics of influence. As discussed above, the 
data made clear that no simple correlations could be drawn between responses and outcomes. 
They also highlighted that the analysis of (perceived) outcomes, as that of responses, could 
only be understood in relation to villagers’ differentiated positions and constraints. Not only 
did perspectives on the balance of threat/opportunity represented by the agribusiness project 
vary from one village to the next, but because some villagers had more to lose than others, 
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the potential for grievance was higher, regardless of the company respecting their choice or 
not. In some cases, although the village had not had any say in the choice of land to transfer, 
the impact on their livelihoods was relatively small since the village still had enough 
grassland available in relation to their needs (for example, Andoharano). On the other hand, 
the opportunity to express some choice in official spaces of negotiations and the respect of 
that choice by decision-makers were not sufficient enough conditions to allow for a positive 
outcome of the land deal in the village.   When pressure on landed resource was already 
strong, any land loss, chosen or not, could cause an adverse impact (for example, Antafika).  
There could also be unexpected consequences, such as in the case of Isorano, where they had 
not foreseen the problems of access that would be caused by the development of plantations 
on a tract they did not need. 
 
The data did, however, point to a critical finding on local people’s influence on land deal 
negotiations. A good number of the cases where detrimental outcomes were reported seemed 
to be related to cases where some of the village land had been given either by neighbours or 
other family members behind the back or against the orders of their village authorities (such 
as in Talata, Soatanana, Manambatra, Soanirana or Mitatra). This made it clear that when 
expressed, conflicting views within or among villages could hamper the influence of 
authorised voices on the negotiation process. It also pointed to the importance of 
understanding the subjectivity of influence and of asking ‘which voices transform into 
influence and under which conditions?’ (sub-question 3). 
 
By bringing light on the complexity and contingency of each of these cases, these findings 
also argued in favour of complementing this research with close-up, fine-grained village 
studies. Out of the 26 villages considered in 2013, three were chosen for that purpose: 
Antranohazo (municipality of Andiolava), Soatanana (Satrokala) and Mangidy 
(Ambatolahy). Their potential to bring some elements of answers to the thesis main research 
question is outlined below. 
 
Selection of village case studies 
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The cases of Antranohazo, Soatanana and Mangidy were chosen for their comparative 
potential on the one hand, and for their own intrinsic value on the other.  
 
In all three, some of the village land had been titled and incorporated in the first lease, but 
both the scale of the transfer and its impact varied considerably. Their experience of the 
consultation process had been quite diverse as well: in Antranohazo, in 2013, research 
participants claimed they had been forced to give land, while in Mangidy, they explained not 
having been consulted at all but that land had been given by their neighbours instead. In 
Soatanana, on the contrary, they had been consulted and, despite some pressure, had decided 
to refuse the land requests. All three villages had also expressed themselves in claimed 
spaces, by participating in the public movement of resistance against the project for 
Antranohazo and Mangidy and by protesting a transfer of some of their village land by their 
neighbour for Soatanana and Mangidy. Whilst all three had lost some critical grassland, 
Soatanana had lost considerably less than the other two and (their leaders) had had a much 
higher degree of influence on the land deal. All three were communicating concerns and 
grievances towards the company but outcomes of the land deal were especially resented in 
Antranohazo and Mangidy, where the company and its support within the state were accused 
of having ignored both their voices and their subsistence rights. In sum, Antranohazo, 
Soatanana and Mangidy offered three cases where actors in similar positions of authority 
within their village (village leaders) had similar goals (struggle against dispossession), but 
developed different responses in different negotiation contexts and encountered different 
successes. Comparing and contrasting these three case studies will serve to identify certain 
factors and dynamics that appear to have articulated in orienting dynamics of voices and 
influence. 
 
These cases were also chosen for their intrinsic value. While reflecting general patterns on 
vertical power dynamics and on internal dissent over local responses to land deals (with two 
cases of inter-village disputes), they each had specificities that would allow me to question 
assumptions and add some complexity to my understanding of the research focal issues.  
Antranohazo was interesting as one of the only villages of Satrokala that had participated to 
some extent in the resistance movement spearheaded by the mayor of Ambatolahy and yet 
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seemed to be amongst some of the worst affected villages. Soatanana was among this very 
minority of (two) villages that had felt emboldened enough to openly refuse Tozzi Green’s 
land requests against the mayor’s instructions. Mangidy had this interesting location at the 
border between two municipalities, raising potential issues related to the distortion between 
lived and administrative spaces. It was also, to my knowledge, the only case where struggles 
against dispossession had been lost in Ambatolahy despite the support of both the mayor and 
activists.  
 
Each of their experiences is reported and discussed in separate chapters (Chapters 6, 7 and 
8), dynamics of negotiations, responses and outcomes being analysed from the lens of power, 
moral economy and contentious politics.  Cases of voice had been heard for one and ignored 
for the other two; their parallel in-depth investigation will help bring out some of the 
conditions for local people’s influence in the context of land deal negotiations.  
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CHAPTER 6 
EXCLUSIONS AND FRACTURES 
THE CASE OF ANTRANOHAZO  
 
In Antranohazo (municipality of Andiolava), a significant amount of village land was marked 
and leased to Tozzi Green. Although the company seemed to have halted its activities there, 
the project was causing significant concern in the village and having an impact on both 
grazing and farming activities. Both corporate and state managers were resented for that 
outcome, for none of the voices that had expressed themselves during the negotiation process 
seemed to have been respected and the village had lost critical land without receiving any 
compensation. While analysing the power dynamics that had constrained choice during the 
consultation, the chapter also relates some of what is perceived as corporate treason to less 
visible responses from certain segments of the village community. I argue that vertical power 
dynamics on the one hand, and conflicting responses in a context of tacit moral economic 
frustrations on the other, prevented the effective challenging of these unwanted outcomes. 
 
The chapter starts by discussing the outcome of the land deal in Antranohazo, listening to 
villagers’ voices to understand why it could have such wide-reaching implications on 
livelihoods despite the absence of the project on the ground.  It then moves on to describe the 
context of the negotiation, discussing (i) issues of agroecology, livelihoods, socio-economic 
ties and leadership in Antranohazo and (ii) the specific form of consultation carried out across 
the municipality of Andiolava. I then point to the difficulty of knowing what exactly had and 
had not been agreed by those villagers who were consulted, and the degree of choice they 
had been given, in a context where what had turned out to be a losing deal made it difficult 
to admit any type of unconstrained interaction with the company. Nevertheless, in the broad 
context of exclusion from decision-making and information which characterised negotiations 
in Antranohazo, fieldwork revealed firstly, that dominant villagers had been less excluded 
than others, and secondly, that less authorised voices had most probably engaged in some 
backdoor bargaining with the company. The enthusiasm that the initial offers made by the 
company turned out to have generated in the most dependent villagers was nevertheless now 
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played down and concealed from the rest of the village.  The next section describes the 
bitterness generated by the outcome of the land deal across the village, relating it not only to 
material issues, but also to a moral indignation. Both those who had brokered the land deal 
and those who had acquired the land had violated moral economic expectations, by making 
so little a case for both their struggles against dispossession and for incorporation. This 
chapter concludes that the villagers’ lack of influence on the land deal is partly due to their 
vulnerability to first and second dimensional power dynamics, and the impossibility of 
achieving collective action in a socially-fractured context. 
 
Ghost project, real impact 
At the time of the 2014 fieldwork, Tozzi Green seemed to have lost interest in Antranohazo’s 
land.  In a context of anticipated coercion, the project had wide-reaching implications 
nonetheless, and was putting further stress on an economy that was differentially exposing 
villagers to land shortages, dependency and food insecurity. 
The weight of uncertainty 
Tozzi Green’s presence was strongly felt in Antranohazo with fields of jatropha to the west 
and east of the village and signs of tractor work in the south (tracts in grey and black in Figure 
8 below). 
The tracts to the west and east of the 
village had been planted in 2011, titled in 
the name of the state, leased to the Tozzi 
Green company in 2012, and demarcated 
with boundary stones in 2013. At the time 
of the last fieldwork period, however, it 
had clearly been a little while since the 
company had last cared for these fields: 
they were now covered with weeds and 
only a few jatropha trees had grown over 
30-40 cm (Cf Figure 7).  
Figure 7: Jatropha fields to the east of 
Antranohazo, 17/02/2014 
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Figure 8: Map of the land deal in Antranohazo (2014) 
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Villagers explained that they had not seen anyone tending these fields in more than a year, 
generating doubts within the village as to what Tozzi Green was planning to do with these 
parcels. Despite the neglect, however, villagers were not grazing their cattle there. There was 
indeed a high level of uncertainty as to what was and was not allowed on these half-
abandoned tracts and this uncertainty, in a context of fear of sanctions, was playing in the 
villagers’ disfavour. Some villagers explained that they had received ‘a visit from from Tozzi 
Green’ after they had been seen grazing on their fields and that they had then been explicitly 
forbidden to do it again.92 Others said the 
prohibition was only temporary and would be 
lifted once the jatropha trees had reached a 
reasonable size, ‘but it’s a problem, since even a 
year later, the trees are still very small’.93 
Showing Tozzi Green’s plantations to the north 
of the village, Figure 9 indicates that the project 
plantations in Antranohazo were not all as 
neglected as those mentioned and illustrated 
above (Figure 7).  However, none had reached 
the size of trees either. Some said they were still 
allowed to graze but that the jatropha plantations 
affected the quality of the pastures because the 
jatropha trees’ leaves ‘killed the good pasture’ 
and they could not regenerate them through 
slash and burn anymore.94 
 
Compounded by inconsistent corporate policies, the lack of clear information was feeding 
rumours and inciting caution. Those who explained that they ‘did not think it was forbidden 
to graze where the jatropha was’ added, ‘but we are always worried anyways. Can we graze 
                                               
92 Hamlet leader, Antranohazo Manalobe, 17/02/2014. 
93 Villager, Antranohazo Tsivory, 16/02/2014. 
94 Hamlet leader, Antranohazo Voroka, 22/02/2014. 
Figure 9: Jatropha fields to the north of 
Antranohazo, February 2014. 
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our cattle there where these tracts are theirs now?’.95 This fear was accelerated by the 
damages that villagers from a neighbouring municipality had allegedly been asked to pay, 
after some of their cattle had damaged Tozzi Green’s maize fields on the Sariaka plain. 
Chapter 8 discusses this incident and the different versions that are given of it. Considering 
the high price of the fine that their neighbours in Sariaka had reportedly been asked to pay, 
it was a risk they could not afford to take, in spite of how unlikely it seemed that their pastoral 
practices could cause any hindrance to the company at the time.96 
 
In this context of fear, the Tozzi Green project not only restricted available grassland, but 
also compounded daily difficulties and work. Even in the hamlet of Andranovory where land 
was only ploughed but not yet planted, elders were asking children to check on the cattle all 
day to make sure they did not go on to Tozzi Green’s land.97  ‘Now it's proper miara-
kandrovana [cattle keeping] that we have to do’, their hamlet leader commented. ‘We have 
to check on them all the time now’.98  
 
Traditional practices of free-roaming had already been hampered by the pressures from 
agriculture. Tozzi Green’s shadow was lending them a definitive blow: 
We don’t let the cattle roam freely [without human supervision] anymore 
no, because the rice fields are growing, so we always fear that they will 
damage them […] When I was small, there weren’t any rice paddies here, 
so we could leave the zebus there all day without worrying […] But at the 
time I got married [roughly seven years before] people started doing rice 
paddies here and after that, we would only let the zebus there on their own 
after the harvest. But now with the foreigners here, even that we can’t do.99 
In this context of anticipated coercion, fear and rumours, the effects of the absent Tozzi Green 
project were very real. Were the project to resume its activities there, then crop farming itself 
would also be affected. 
                                               
95 Villager, Antranohazo Tsivory, 20/02/2014. 
96 Risks of zebus damaging the corporate cropfields are much lower in Antranohazo than in Sariaka (since cattle dislike jatropha, whereas 
they are fond of maize) and the company’s interest in Sariaka-where they had guards patrolling the plantations day and night- was manifestly 
much higher than for Antranohazo. 
97 Villager, Antranohazo Andranovory, 16/02/2014. 
98 Rota, Antranohazo Andranovory, 19/02/2014. 
99 Nathan, fields Antranohazo, 07/02/2014. 
113 
 
 
Threats to crop farming 
First, there were concerns of cattle not being able to access the fields for the hitsaky, the 
practice by which cattle are made to run on to rice paddies in large numbers for a few hours 
to prepare the paddies for transplantation. In certain areas, indeed, no cattle corridors had 
been left. With jatropha fields west and east, the villagers of the hamlets of Analamary, 
Tsivory and Voroka were only left with a three-metre-wide dirt road to bring their cattle to 
their fields; it was certainly too narrow to allow the passage of the 20-to-50-head herds that 
were needed to plough an average-sized rice paddy. As Manina from Analamary commented: 
‘It’s hard enough to drive a cart on this road, let alone dozens of zebus!’100 At the time, most 
farmers were still cutting across the fields of jatropha since ‘there is no other choice really’.101 
However, were the trees to reach their mature size, it would become difficult to manage the 
herd, considering the limited spaces left between each tree and their rows.102 
 
For some, the corporate fields also caused problems in terms of irrigation. Narindra, the 
hamlet leader of Voroka, explained that the way the fields were ploughed had affected the 
natural slope of the terrains, resulting in the water falling more slowly onto his rice paddies. 
Similar complaints had been reported to us in a few other villages the year before. 
 
Finally, there was the issue of Tozzi Green’s plantations being at a close distance to a number 
of villagers’ rice fields since it meant that when cattle could still access the fields for the 
hitsaky, they could no longer graze in the surrounding area after the hard work. 
Georeferenced work revealed that some rice fields to the north of the village were close to 
being totally surrounded by the jatropha plantations, with distances of 30 to 50 metres 
between the jatropha and the fields.  
Differentiated outcomes 
The geography of the land appropriation translated into unequal burdens across hamlets.  
Tozzi Green’s main fields were concentrated around the hamlets of Tsivory and Voroka to 
                                               
100 Jonah, Antranohazo Analamary, 14/02/2014. 
101 Jonah, Antranohazo Analamary, 14/02/2014. 
102 Space between the aligned trees was of 1.5 to 3 metres. 
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the east and Manalobe to the west (Cf Figure 8).  
 
These fields surrounded by jatropha, mentioned above, belonged mostly to Narindra’s 
nuclear family (from Voroka) and to people from Tsivory: ‘This is what makes us unhappy 
here. After the hitsaky, the cattle need a lot of pasture. And now, where can they go?’103 
While people from Voroka could still graze to the west of their hamlets, in Tsivory, the 
situation was quite dramatic since most of their grassland had been appropriated, whereas 
they were currently tending 400 head of cattle: 
Now the space for grazing our cattle is very narrow, because there are 
jatropha fields to the west and to the east [of the hamlet]. And all we have 
left for grazing is our rice paddies. And there’s no space left for the cattle 
to access the fields.104 
 The situation of Manalobe, to the very west of the village, was also worrying: 
Now we only have the east side of the village left to graze our cattle. But 
the problem is that there are more and more rice paddies as well over there 
so we don’t really have any tazoa left to graze the cattle.105 
The excessive strain the project was putting on already heavy workloads and stretched 
resources was deeply resented, and infringing tacit rules embedded within the villager’s 
moral economies: 
It’s really a big problem for us to have their plantations there. But do 
foreigners think it’s easy to raise cattle? There is always a risk that they 
might escape if we don’t wake up during the night to check on them. And 
that’s not only when it’s raining. Now with the jatropha there, we really 
have to keep a close eye on them all the time.106 
As Marcel was making clear here, it was not only the loss of land, but also the lack of 
consideration for their daily strife that was a cause for bitterness.  
 
The examination of the negotiation process and of villagers’ responses to it served to 
investigate whether those villagers who were most affected had had a say in the corporate 
                                               
103 Nini, Antranohazo Tsivory, 20/02/2014. 
104 Nini, Antranohazo Tsivory, 15/02/2014. 
105 Hamlet leader, Antranohazo Manalobe, 17/02/2014. 
106 Marcel, Antranohazo Voroka, 04/02/2014. 
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land acquisitions and to what extent. The next section presents the context of the negotiation, 
both in terms of village internal dynamics and their experience of the consultation process. 
 
A village community under pressure 
The next pages describe the village context of the negotiation, pointing to the lack of unified 
leadership within the village and to issues of dependence and vulnerability that differentially 
affected villagers. 
Erosion of community ties 
The 300 inhabitants of Antranohazo were spread over eight hamlets, some of which were an 
hour’s walk away from each other. Beyond the discursive insistence of forming one family, 
there were competing senses of belonging within the village. Antranohazo had moved from 
one single lonaky to four. The original split was made to allow for the respect of social 
prescriptions related to kinship rules: by marrying his niece, the lonaky became socially lower 
than his younger brother—from older brother to son-in-law—who was therefore made a 
lonaky of his own. Across time, new groups of belonging (or foko) emerged as a result of a 
series of matrimonial alliances with outsiders, all of whom created new hamlets with their 
own lonaky. At the time of research, the main line of difference experienced seemed to be 
between the hamlets of Voroka and Analamary, ‘the families of the two [founding] 
brothers’,107 on the one hand, and those of the other five hamlets on the other. Although the 
last five did not seem to form a unit of their own, they were distinguished as different foko 
from those claiming to come from the original male branch of the family. ‘We’re all from 
the same family, but we come from the man and they come from the woman’.108  As the 
eldest of this dominant branch, the lonaky of Analamary should have prevailed over others, 
according to local rules of kinship. In this case, however, he was very old and did not own 
cattle. As a result, influence seemed to be exercised by authorities in Voroka, especially 
Narindra who, with his two other brothers in the hamlet, was the only one who owned cattle 
and Jimmy, his elder son, who could read and write and had been chosen as komity to take 
                                               
107 Jonah,  Antranohazo Analamary, 14/02/2014. 
108 Lonaky, Antranohazo Analamary, 14/02/2014. 
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charge of the village administrative tasks.  They were the people we were referred to in both 
years we visited.  
Critically, they were close to the key broker in the resistance movement against Tozzi Green, 
Hervé who had informed the civil society based in Antananarivo about Tozzi Green’s 
development on the ground and of the opposition put up by some villagers. Hervé used to 
run a number of development projects in the region and had helped Antranohazo build one 
of the rare cement-built schools in the region. When he still lived in Ihosy, the provincial 
capital, he used to visit the village every week. Although contacts were far less frequent now 
that he had moved to the capital Antananarivo, they would give each other telephone calls 
now and again, a slender but essential means to access outside information in a context where 
access to information is difficult. 
 
Besides this diluted leadership between the four lonaky and the de facto authorities from 
Voroka, there seemed to be tensions between some hamlets, although it was difficult to know 
how exacerbated these were. Our suspicions were aroused when villagers of Tsivory 
explained that they were no longer sending their children to the school in Voroka because of 
the river, when the water levels were actually quite low, even at the end of the rainy season. 
The contemptuous comments made by villagers in Voroka about the “lack of manners” of 
Tsivory villagers when we came back from our visit there further lent credit to that 
hypothesis. This fractured sense of belonging was certainly accelerated by the context of 
inequalities and divided resources that characterised the village socio-economic fabric. 
Demographic pressure on land 
In Antranohazo, indeed, the whole village land (farmed land, grassland, land reserves and 
even tracts that were not propitious to rice cultivation) had already been divided and 
distributed between the families. As had been revealed during the previous fieldwork, this 
was an indication of land shortage. In villages where there was still land to expand, grassland 
and land reserves remained accessible to all. During our walks across the village, Narindra 
would frequently point to areas where grassland had recently been converted into fields to 
accommodate the younger generation’s land needs.  Far from the “free and idle” land 
corporate and state managers usually alluded to when justifying the Tozzi Green large-scale 
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agribusiness project, the highlands or tanety were instead hosting fields of cassava and 
peanuts and increasingly, rain-fed rice fields as well. 
 
In that context, no option was available to compensate the loss of pastures caused by Tozzi 
Green. To my question as to whether it would not be possible for people from Tsivory to 
graze on Voroka’s land since they had so little left themselves, Moha replied: 
No, they have to stop to the east of the river [boundary between the land of 
Voroka and the land of Tsivory] because we already share the zones to the 
west with Manasoa; so, if Tsivory wanted to graze there as well, it would 
be three of us grazing on a common zone.109  
This lack of option was all the more worrying as those two hamlets that had lost the most 
grassland (Tsivory and Manalobe) were already among the most vulnerable in the village 
since they did not have any cattle possessions of their own. This lack of material wealth 
makes them vulnerable to external shocks, but does not mean they do not need grassland. As 
explained in Chapter 2, grassland can allow cattle-less villagers to tend the cattle of others, a 
way to have access to cattle for the preparation of their rice paddies but also to gain a degree 
of protection from wealthy cattle owners.  The next section discusses the unequal distribution 
of cattle in Antranohazo and other indicators highlighting different levels of livelihood 
vulnerability within the village. 
Differential dependence and vulnerability 
While some 700-800 head of cattle were kept within the village, only 100 actually belonged 
to Antranohazo’s villagers and this cattle wealth was mostly concentrated in the hands of 
Narindra and his two brothers in the hamlet of Antranohazo Voroka.  The other villagers 
tended cattle from the rich villages of Analaroa and Anjorobe (municipality of Ambatolahy) 
where their family originally came from, and these critical arrangements seemed to be in 
jeopardy. In both Manalobe and Tsivory, a fair number of cattle had recently been taken back 
by their owners, following the death of several heads during the dry season. With the 
discretion warranted by these sensitive issues, a young man from Voroka told us that Tsivory 
had lost 200 head in the past year, which is half of the cattle they used to look after. In 
                                               
109 Moha,  Antranohazo Voroka, 20/02/2014. 
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Manalobe, 100 had reportedly been taken back.110 Also in the hamlet of Analamary they said 
that a portion of the cattle they cared for had been taken back.111 The owners either feared 
the cattle did not have sufficient pastures or they needed more cattle themselves to 
accommodate their growing families. Other hamlets feared the same fate might soon await 
them and that Tozzi Green exacerbated risks: 
At the moment, we are making very big efforts to try and acquire cattle, as 
we don’t know whether the cattle owners will take them back or not. But 
we need good land for that, whereas nowadays, they’re all farmed by 
Tahiny [the head agronomist of Tozzi Green project].112 
Villagers of Antranohazo were also suffering some degree of food insecurity. The lack of 
infrastructure, access to technology and help from the state made them particularly vulnerable 
to the vagaries of the climate. Their dam had broken some twelve years before. In 2013, a 
locust invasion had caused the production of the hamlet of Manalobe to shrink to half an ox-
cart of rice down from the eight they would produce in a good season. In the hamlet of 
Manasoa, production was said to vary from ten to five ox-carts.  
 
The difficulty of getting comparable data on population size and agricultural production, for 
the reasons mentioned in Chapter 1, made it hard to carry a rigorous comparison of the 
respective wealth of the different hamlets. An estimation of their positions within the local 
economy could be reached, however, by crossing information on cattle wealth on the one 
hand, and on villagers’ positions on the local agricultural job market, as either employers or 
labourers on the other.  Being able to afford to recruit a workforce during the rice 
transplantation season signals a capacity to have savings and a certain degree of farmland 
wealth. In Antranohazo, only members of Narindra’s nuclear family could afford that luxury. 
In their hamlet alone, they would usually recruit some 40 people, mostly women from the 
main village of Satrokala.113 Jimmy, Narindra’s elder son and komity of the village, said he 
usually recruited three daily labourers during three days for his own rice paddies, for instance, 
and Nathan, one of his middle children, also recruited people ‘because we have a lot of rice 
                                               
110 Laza, Antranohazo Voroka, 18/02/2014. 
111 Lonaky, Antranohazo Analamary, 21/02/2014. 
112 Mara, Antranohazo Andranovory, 19/02/2014. 
113 Nini,  Antranohazo Voroka, villager, 12/02/2014. 
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paddies’.114 In another indication of the relative wealth of their family, Jimmy had recently 
bought a  rice paddy ‘from someone in the family who needed money’. The hamlet of Tsivory 
stood on the other side of the spectrum, with its members frequently seeking work in other 
villages themselves to complement their earnings. In the hamlet of Andranovory, it was only 
in times of good harvest that they could think of hiring people while, in the other hamlets, 
villagers explained that they usually did not have the means to recruit anyone. 
 
In an agrarian society where wealth and influence are to a large extent underpinned by capital 
in cattle and land, Antranohazo stands at a modest position, with a shortage of land resources 
and most of the village cattle being borrowed from outside. Those who possess cattle are in 
a position of economic strength in the context of the village community. As will be confirmed 
by the exploration of the village’s responses to the land deal negotiations, those economic 
elites only have limited leverage on less privileged members of their village community: their 
political authority only extends to some hamlets, whilst they lack the patronage resources 
they would enjoy were they able (or willing) to lend some cattle to poorer villagers. 
 
The next pages describe the formal context of the consultation process in Ambaratabe, 
looking at who brokered it and how, at who spoke on behalf of the village and how much 
space for discussion and negotiation was perceived to be offered then. The discussion also 
sheds light on some of the discussions that happened behind the scenes, pointing to the 
explanatory potential of social determinants such as class and gender in perceptions over land 
deals. 
 
Constrained and selective consultation 
Antranohazo was among the 26 villages Tsiory and I had visited in 2013. By the time we 
arrived the first time, we had already visited a dozen villages across the municipality of 
Satrokala and Andiolava. As explained in Chapter 5, a clear majority of those whose land 
had been transferred to Tozzi Green had said they had been consulted to some extent, or 
knew their neighbours or fellow villagers had on their behalf. We were therefore quite 
                                               
114 Anasthasie, Nathan’s wife, Antranohazo fields, 14/02/2014. 
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surprised with Antranohazo’s terse account of the consultation process in their village, as 
being entirely forced from the top, without any villager(s) having had a say: 'These lands 
[given to Tozzi Green] come from a decision of the fokontany […] Tozzi Green forced it on 
us. They didn't ask our permission'.115 
 
The findings that emerged from the longer fieldwork carried out a year later helped to both 
make sense of and qualify these accounts. However hasty and pressured, some consultation 
had been held but, as discussed in the following section, the negative outcome of the land 
deal encouraged those few who had had a chance to express their voices to conceal the little 
say they did have. Closer scrutiny of these dynamics highlighted that some villagers may 
have been less excluded than others and that narratives of the consultation are also processes 
of internal negotiations within villages. 
Formal and informal consultation 
Based on the information reluctantly or discreetly given to us in 2014, two groups of villagers 
had had some opportunity to express a voice regarding the land deal in Antranohazo: the de 
facto authorities from the hamlet of Voroka on the one hand, and villagers from the hamlet 
of Tsivory, including women and young people, on the other. 
 
First, Antranohazo had been invited to the meeting organised by the mayor and Tozzi Green 
with all the villages from the municipality, in April 2012.  At this meeting, according to 
villagers from Antranohazo, people were not asked whether they would be willing to 
contribute land and if so, against which compensation, but instead they were asked which 
land they could give. Brokering the meeting, local state authorities were reportedly those who 
restricted the agenda to a decision of ‘where’, as opposed to ‘whether’: 
When Tozzi Green came to Satrokala, the mayor summoned the people 
and then he said, “Tozzi Green needs land to grow jatropha, so we ask you 
which part of your land you can offer”. That’s when we chose to give the 
tract to the west of the village.116 
                                               
115 Focus group discussion, Antranohazo Voroka, 23/03/2013. 
116 Nini, Antranohazo Voroka, 13/02/2014. 
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When asked who took the decision to give this tract to the west (cf tracts in light grey on 
Figure 8), Narindra said that it was the ‘Antranohazo family’. Discussions with other 
villagers highlighted that only the komity, Narindra and possibly a few other raïamandreny 
had attended the meeting and that the de facto village leaders had not conferred with the other 
village authorities prior to attending the meeting,117 whether they had been given time to do 
so or not. Whether the choice of the tract to give had been made by them, by Tozzi Green or 
by state authorities, it had excluded the hamlet of Manalobe, whose land was primarily 
targeted. 
 
Although the only instance of consultation publicly acknowledged, in reality this meeting 
was not the only time people from Antranohazo were consulted in the context of the Tozzi 
Green land deal. During a discussion outside the control of their elders, young people from 
Tsivory told us that their hamlet had actually received a number of visits from Tahiny, one 
of the core members of the Tozzi Green local management team. While their explanations 
initially stressed resent and disappointment with the project, they also revealed that there had 
initially been some enthusiasm towards the project from some specific sections of the village 
community. Their explanations pointed to economic subordination and gender as critical 
variables for understanding positive perspectives over corporate land access. Very soon after 
we started talking about their experience with Tozzi Green, Nicole, a woman in her early 
twenties, brought up the promises made by Tahiny to help women develop projects of poultry 
breeding and vegetable farming, provided they first constituted themselves into associations. 
Whilst all the villagers interviewed so far across Antranohazo’s different hamlets had 
lamented the project, she pointed to the prospects of autonomy that these new livelihood 
projects could open up for women in the village: 
In this season [between rice transplantation and harvest], there is no work 
for us [women] to do. We just wait here and look after the children and we 
wait until the rice is ripe. So, we’re just staying here with nothing to do. 
But if we had this kind of project, we’d have things to do. People think that 
we women don’t take decisions. But we are the ones who ask for these 
projects […] Yes, we have the weaving [providing some cash], but we only 
make enough money to buy a bit of petrol and some washing powder. For 
the rest, it’s the men who decide [how to use the money]. Here it’s always 
                                               
117 Hamlet leader, Antranohazo Manalobe, 26/02/2014. 
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the men who make the decisions. But if we had some hens and it was us 
doing it, it would be us deciding [how to use related cash incomes]. […] 
Like for the weaving, yes.118 
For women, Nicole made clear that the new livelihood opportunities promised by Tozzi 
Green were as much valued for the prospects of cash generation as for the prospects of 
increased autonomy offered to them in the context of patriarchal society. The few other 
instances when I managed to access female views on these issues highlighted that her views 
were not necessarily generalisable to all women, however. Most of the other women who did 
not self-censor their opinions on the Tozzi Green project were of a certain age and married 
to a raïamandreny or village authority and all of them expressed opposition to the Tozzi 
Green land acquisition.  As such, the contrast between Nicole’s position and theirs stressed 
that although gender seemed to stand out as an important parameter, it also intersected with 
other determinants of identity in informing responses to large-scale land deals. It certainly 
should not be excluded that the opposition expressed by these more senior women was 
encouraged by a fear of openly disagreeing with their husband. It is also reasonable to 
assume, however, that the relative wealth these women enjoyed compared to younger, 
disadvantaged women such as Nicole led to a different cost-risk assessment of the project. 
The intervention of Gozy, an 18-20-year-old man, corroborated the relevance of the 
‘dependence factor’ in generating positive prospects over land deals, while stressing that 
dependence was not only a result of gender: 
Yes, I would like to know how to create these associations as well. Because 
Tahiny sensitised us now and I think that if these projects worked, we 
wouldn’t need to look after other people’s cattle anymore. We could hand 
them back to them.119  
The fact that a number of people across the hamlet had taken up the menial job opportunities 
offered by the company at the onset of the project confirmed that the need for cash generation 
was not only restricted to women. Tsilavo, the hamlet leader, said that a ‘lot of them’, men 
and women, had worked for the Tozzi Green project, weeding the areas to prepare for the 
planting, providing them with wood for their fences and taking the termite mounds out. In 
contrast, no one from Voroka had worked for the company. Giving another example of how 
                                               
118 Nicole, Antranohazo Tsivory, 16/02/2014. 
119 Gozy,  Antranohazo Tsivory, 16/02/2014. 
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gender alone is not a sufficient determinant of perceptions over corporate land access, 
Anasthasie, one of Narindra’s daughters-in-law, showed contempt at the idea of working for 
the foreigners. ‘Even if they offered me work, I would say “no”. I prefer it here’.120  
 
Whether Tsivory hamlet villagers’ compliance with the negotiation process reflected a 
genuine enthusiasm with the deal offered by the company as Nicole and Gozy suggested, or 
tactics of ‘necessary self-preservation and calculated extraction of whatever could be 
extracted’ (Sivaramakrishnan 2005: 347, referring to Thompson 1971), in an understanding 
of asymmetrical power relations, is hard to say. In any case, these perceptions evolved as the 
project developed and failed to honour, or blatantly transgressed, moral economic 
expectations, as discussed later in the chapter. The next section looks at villagers’ public 
accounts of the consultation, highlighting the power dynamics they point to and how these 
significantly restricted villagers’ mental and material space for negotiation. 
Token consultation? 
In Antranohazo, as in most villages visited, the capacity to impinge on the decision-making 
process was affected by the lack of educational and informational resources needed to follow 
the ins and outs of the negotiation process (first dimension of power, see Chapter 3). More 
critically, their access to decision-making spaces was extremely limited in the first place 
(second dimension of power).  
From villagers’ descriptions, consultation spaces likened more to a channel for reproducing 
misconceptions rather than a platform for promoting local voices and free, prior and informed 
consent. First, few clear and detailed explanations were ever provided on the nature and scale 
of the agribusiness project. More critically, misinformation was given on the terms of the 
land deal under discussion. No one explained to the villagers that the land would need to be 
titled in the name of the state before it could be leased to the company, meaning that even if 
Tozzi Green ceased its activities there, the state would, from then onwards, be the rightful 
owner of the land and therefore be allowed to claim it or lease it to another company without 
any other form of local consultation. Instead, state and corporate brokers insisted that it was 
                                               
120 Anasthasie,  Antranohazo 14/02/2014. 
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only a temporary loan, which led to the understanding that the land could be recuperated after 
a while. In Tsivory, villagers were told that the land would be borrowed for five years only.121 
There was therefore a huge sense of surprise and betrayal when villagers saw surveyors 
marking the land. 
 
Compliance was also accelerated by misinformation on the democratic right of land users to 
contest the land deal under discussion. The mayor reportedly insisted that villagers had no 
choice but to comply with Tozzi Green’s land requests since they had no right to untitled 
land, whereas by law, untitled land is ‘presumed’ to belong to its users as opposed to the state 
and, as such, cannot be titled without their approval (Chapter 2). With regards to the lack of 
communication that surrounds the land reform, there are grounds to believe that the 
misinformation was unintentional. In any case, the mayor played a major role in suppressing 
aspirations to protest, by stressing that opposition was useless since the land belonged to the 
state and that the project was supported by the national government.  
 
As explained above, at the meeting in Satrokala, villagers were not asked whether they 
approved of the land transfer and what their conditions for the voluntary cession of their land 
were; instead, they were asked which land they could contribute. As such, they were given 
very little space to influence the terms of a land deal that, as was made clear to them, had 
already been decided elsewhere.  The few apparent opportunities to have some say in the 
discussions were quickly defeated by the rush with which the land deal was being 
implemented: ‘The day the mayor came to ask where our pastures were’, explained 
Manalobe’s hamlet leader, ‘I didn’t even have time to reply because the same day, the tractors 
came to plough the land’.122 The same practices of fait accompli were reported by his 
counterpart in Tsivory: 
We saw the mayor in a car with the foreigner one day. […] That was maybe 
a month after they had ploughed the tract close to the road. We asked him 
what they were doing and he said, “We’re just going for a ride with the 
foreigners and then we’re going to assemble all the people here if there are 
                                               
121 Nicole and Gozy,  Antranohazo Tsivory, 16/02/2014. 
122 Nampoina, Antranohazo Manalobe, 17/02/2014. 
125 
 
 
any news.” And the tractors came shortly after that.123  
The laying of the boundary stones was also carried out without any prior notice. Although 
land had already been officially titled and leased to the company by then, this lack of 
information on the procedure again deprived them of any chance to control the consistency 
between decisions and their formalisation on the ground, provided they had any information 
on the location and sizes of the land that had been transferred. 
 
The frequency with which similar types of experiences were reported to us across villages in 
Satrokala lends credibility to this overall picture of exclusion from both information and 
decisions. However, it also matters to try and understand the extent to which villagers’ 
narratives of the consultation process were also processes of internal village negotiations. 
The next section describes how the outcome of the land deal generated not only concern, but 
also indignation and shame, and looks at how these emotions led to some discursive 
reconstructions. 
 
Gone with the wind 
The next section looks at how the outcome of the land deal was received in Antranohazo, 
highlighting how it clashed with several crucial expectations pertaining to villagers’ moral 
economies, reflecting the themes outlined in Chapter 3. I point to the widespread anger that 
the one-sided deal was generating within the village and to how the resent and shame felt by 
those who had been involved to a certain degree in the discussions, but whose voices seemed 
to have been totally disregarded can help to make sense of the contradictions and 
inconsistencies found in the accounts of the negotiation process. 
Breach of faith and duty 
Both the process and the outcome of the land deal confounded villagers’ moral economies. 
For those who had participated in the meeting in Satrokala or who knew about it (but did not 
know that some backdoor bargaining had happened between Tozzi Green and villagers from 
                                               
123 Nini, Antranohazo Tsivory, 20/02/2014 
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Tsivory), anger was expressed at the fact that the only choice “the village” had been able to 
make had been totally disregarded. As explained above, they had agreed to give a tract 
located on the west side of the village land, close to the dirt road that separates their village 
from the neighbouring village of Ankarana.  The land deal procedures that shortly followed 
from these discussions respected the choice made then and allowed for villagers’ control: ‘I 
have to say that at the time, they only ploughed the land we had offered them. […] Yes, it 
was us who showed them lines that the tractor had to follow’.124 However, shortly after 
having developed that tract, ploughing and plantation work was extended to other parts of 
the village, which authorities from Voroka claimed the village had had no say on: 
But after that they started ploughing those tracts, they started planting on 
the land to the north-east of the village. And they also started working in 
the south. It’s really a lot of land that has gone to Tozzi Green now.125 
One of the critical points that came out of the discussions with those villagers who did not 
know about the talks that had happened between the company and the hamlet of Tsivory was 
that grievance was caused as much, if not more, by the lack of prior notice and of consultation 
with the community, as by the land appropriation itself. This was a critical right whose denial 
represented an unacceptable lack of respect for them and their authorities. Ceding some land 
was tolerable, but the act of taking those extra tracts without their permission was highly 
problematic. The assumed lack of direct consultation was compounded with an exclusion 
from the rituals of blessing to the ancestors that had been performed in other villages: 
That's what surprises us: all the neighbouring villages were consulted 
before they offered their land. Why are we the only ones who weren't 
consulted? For the others, cattle were killed. But for us, no rituals were 
held before our land was cultivated and no zebus were killed. We are really 
sad.126  
In the Malagasy cosmogony, failing to organise these rituals in such circumstances represents 
a major offence to ancestral authority. Ancestors are the ultimate owners of the lineage land, 
called tanindrazana-- the ‘land of the ancestors’--. Their blessing is required in many 
circumstances, and in particular before any new work can be undertaken on land. Considering 
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the power they hold over the fortunes of their descendants, failing to ask for their blessing 
therefore represents a direct threat to health and wealth. As the beneficiaries of the land 
transfer, wealthy investors are expected to show their gratitude and respect by contributing 
materially to these rituals (Bloch 1971, Feeley-Harnik 1991, Keller 2008, Middleton 1999, 
Evers and Seagle 2012). In Antranohazo, responsibility for this failing was mainly blamed 
on the mayor, whose role was to ensure the company showed due deference to everyone’s 
authority: 
The mayor didn’t call the lonaky. We only saw when the tractors came and 
started ploughing our land. It’s the mayor, he’s a bad person […] The 
mayor of Satrokala, at least he assembled people before giving land; there 
is a little discussion where they give some advantages, some cattle are 
killed etc. But here there was nothing.127  
As the mayor of Satrokala was an agropastoralist himself, there was also a sense of betrayal 
from within. Villagers said that, on many occasions, they had asked him why he had not 
given his own land instead (although the mayor did actually contribute some tracts as well).128  
The interactions villagers had witnessed between Tozzi Green field managers and the mayor 
were feeding suspicions that he had been bribed, and even accusations that he had gone as 
far as faking villagers’ consent by counterfeiting their signature since a copy of their 
signature is kept at the town hall.129 
 
The extent to which the responsibility for these “undiscussed” land transfers (black tracks on 
the map) was put on the mayor varied slightly across interviewed villagers. The one who 
expressed the most forgiving judgement was Narindra, who actually explained that the mayor 
was also opposed to the Tozzi Green project but did not really have the means to do anything. 
The others generally held much more denunciative views, including Nathan and Jimmy, two 
of his sons, with whom we had repeated, extensive discussions: 
The villagers don't want Tozzi Green even in Satrokala but the mayors did 
not make the decision in dialogue with the people here. […] The mayor is 
the first responsible. No one in Andiolava accepts having the foreigners 
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here. If the mayor had refused, there wouldn’t be any jatropha.130 
These expressions of disapproval reflect moral economic expectations weighing on state and 
corporate actors regarding land transactions. In one of our conversations, Manina made it 
clear that there was some land for which cession could be tolerated, as long as the local 
population was given notice though, and other land for which consultation and approval by 
the local community was indispensable: 
Before we saw them ploughing our land, we already knew that they were 
going to farm to the west because the mayor was saying ‘We’re going to 
give land close to the road’. That was not a problem for us because this was 
already a national road of the state but inside our village land, it’s us going 
to decide over the limit.131 
The mayor’s breach of duty would be sanctioned in the ballot boxes; Jonah added that ‘the 
mayor has to respond to people’s needs. But this mayor didn’t do that, so he won’t be re-
elected. It’s like for the deputee’.132  
 
The exclusion from decision-making had not only generated resent, it had also deprived them 
of the possibility of setting out their needs clearly to ensure the least impact possible on their 
livelihoods. Talking about one of the tracts that had been transferred to the agribusiness 
project without consent, Narindra made it clear that compromises could have been reached 
had this been discussed better: ‘For us, the west of this tract, it’s still OK but the one to the 
east, we really need it to reach our rice paddies’.133 Although much of the anger was 
addressed at the mayor, the sense of indignation was therefore also directed at the corporate 
managers themselves: 
One day I saw one of the foreigners, so I told them, ‘How can we have a 
good relationship when we’ve asked you to keep a part of the land and you 
don’t do it? It doesn’t work like that’.134 
The next pages describe how these feelings of power abuses and disrespect were aggravated 
by the quasi-absence of compensation and the short-term and low paid nature of the jobs that 
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had been offered. 
Threat to subsistence rights, without compensation 
The Tozzi Green project was reported to have dire consequences on the livelihoods of both 
poor and less poor villagers.  As mentioned above, the quality of pastures was already 
suffering from the effects of climate change and demographic pressures, leading to cattle 
looked after by poorer villagers being claimed back by their owners. The corporate land 
acquisition was compounding these stresses further in a critical way: 
In the hamlet of Manalobe, several zebus died during the dry season, so 
their owners took most of them back. They have very little pasture left 
because of the jatropha. Before, they used to graze to the west of their 
hamlet but now, there is jatropha on both sides of the road, so they can’t 
go through.135  
At the time, cattle owners from the hamlet of Voroka were explaining, the village livestock 
themselves were at risk. ‘It’s not only that our cattle have become thinner’, explained Marcel, 
‘but they’re actually dying now’.136 These dire consequences were nourishing deep doubts 
as to the compatibility of extensive pastoralism with the large-scale nature of agribusiness 
projects: 
It’s not only land that cattle need, but it’s air. They need to feel free and 
the way they are constrained at the moment, they don’t feel good. During 
the dry season, some of them have even died.137 
Very little or no compensation had been received to make up for that threat and show 
gratitude. In the focus group discussion held at the village in 2013, villagers reported that 
they could not even benefit from the infrastructure built by the company in the main village 
of Satrokala. ‘One of us tried to go to their health centre and got rejected because he wasn't 
from [the municipality of] Satrokala'.138 Reportedly, only the hamlet of Tsivory had received 
important, but short-term, help in the form of a visit by Tozzi Green’s veterinary officer.  
Without his intervention, Gozy explained, their cattle would surely have died, showing the 
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potential the company has to make a difference.139  However, none of the other pledges of 
help that had been made, the livelihood projects mentioned above as well as a school, had 
been honoured: 
People from Tozzi Green came to us to encourage us to talk about our 
problems and then they agreed to help us by building a school, forming 
associations for new projects and other things. But it was only lies.140  
The mayor was again associated with this failure of the company to honour commitments. 
His role, people across hamlets made clear, was to look out for his people by negotiating fair 
compensation. His inability to uphold expectations seemed all the more intolerable as he had 
been a fervent vehicle of the win-win narratives of the corporate land acquisition and as such, 
had vouched for the company.141 
 
As far as the jobs offered by the company were concerned, they were short-lived, ‘very hard 
work’142 and low-paid, even according to local standards: 
The salary wasn’t satisfactory. Even those boys over there weren’t satisfied 
[pointing to 12-13-year-old boys] but we didn’t have the choice. The tasks 
took us at least a full day. Some men managed to finish everything in one 
day but for us, it took longer and we were only paid 3,000 Ar [1€] for it.143 
The fact that work was paid per task as opposed to per day was problematic, as Tozzi Green 
seemed to have underestimated the amount of work required. Tozzi Green’s salary grid did 
not even ensure the basic wage of 1€ per day that was given by villagers to their seasonal 
labourers.  Nonetheless, that villagers from the hamlets of Tsivory and Analamary had 
decided to accept the job opportunities, however little paid, and whereas those from Voroka 
had not, again stresses the inequalities inside the village. There was shame in Jonah’s voice 
when, after speaking forcefully against Tozzi Green, he admitted that in their hamlet, 
necessity had forced them to take up the job offers: ‘We decided to let our children work 
there’, he explained, ‘because if it’s not our kids, it’s other people’s kids who are going to 
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benefit’.144  
  
Tozzi Green did make some compromises around land use. However, most gestures made 
were so limited that they appeared more as tokenism than genuine consideration for villagers’ 
subsistence needs: ‘I asked them not to plough further than 100 metres from the road but they 
went up to our rice paddies! I only saved two to three metres’.145 The sense of being 
misunderstood, mentioned above, was widespread and people pointed to the gross breach of 
their subsistence rights: 
Cattle breeding is our life. The problem is that today, Tozzi Green has 
extended up to our village. And in Sariaka, they made people pay damages 
because their cattle trod on their fields. But if they do that to us, they will 
kill us.146  
The outcome of the land deal felt like a betrayal for all of those who had been consulted at 
some point. For the authorities from Voroka who said they did not want to give any land in 
the first place, their decision over the choice of land to transfer was not respected and more 
land was transferred. For the poorer villagers of Tsivory, however much land they had agreed 
to give and under which conditions, they had very little left to uphold their previous 
livelihoods, whilst having received hardly any compensation in exchange. This bleak picture 
encouraged villagers from both groups to look to hide their intervention from the other 
villagers. 
Voice as a source of shame 
According to local rules, no transfer of the village grassland could be made without the 
approval of the lonaky, Access and withdrawal rights may have been distributed across 
hamlets; alienation rights had not: 
Yes, every hamlet has a special zone but all the land is still one. Even if we 
are using the land close to our village to do cassava or for the grazing, it 
doesn’t mean that this land belongs to us only. Actually, if one wants to 
sell the land without discussing with the lonaky, it’s like a theft. […] 
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Maybe for selling a rice paddy it’s fine, but for the pastures, no.147 
This explanation of the indivisible and collective character of village land outlines the 
sensitivity of decision-making regarding the village’s main resource. The fact that decisions 
had been taken without any of the four lonaky being consulted was a serious offense that, as 
explained above, was frequently blamed on the mayor. Whether those authorities from 
Voroka who did attend the meeting in Satrokala were given any notice to consult the lonaky 
before attending the meeting or not, this full blame on the mayor reflects some successful 
attempts on their part to decline any responsibility for this breach of rules. This is indeed how 
the komity summarised events in the presence of other authorities from the village when we 
talked to him the first time:  
The mayor and his comrades decided to give the land close to the dirt road 
and imposed it on us. They said that Tozzi Green would work with the 
population to make schools, health centres and so on and so forth.148 
The choice of this particular land may have indeed been made by the mayor, under pressure 
from the company who had previously targeted the specific tazoa, who then asked the village 
leaders from Voroka attending the meeting to endorse it. However, for all we know, there 
may have been more options open to the komity and the others who were there with him, and 
it is certainly interesting that the lonaky from the hamlet that was most affected by the choice 
(Manalobe) said he only heard about the meeting ‘by chance because I met the mayor and he 
told me the ploughing was going to happen’.149 The differentiated implications of this land 
transfer may have encouraged the authorities from Voroka to play their contribution down 
and report on full coercion on the part of the mayor instead. 
 
In Tsivory especially, authorities were unmistakably anxious to conceal their secret 
bargaining with the company. After the informal discussion with the group of young people 
from the hamlet, we met with Tsilavo, the de facto hamlet leader. He skirted any discussion 
about their interactions with Tahiny from Tozzi Green and insisted no land transfer had ever 
been agreed upon by them, shifting the full blame on the mayor as well. Only at the meeting 
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in Andiolava had villagers from Antranohazo expressed their voices: 
The mayor sensitised us and then we accepted to give the tract to the west 
by the road. But then the tractors came up to here, whereas there hadn’t 
been any discussion between the mayor and us about it. […] It’s the mayor 
who gave our land and he didn’t even ask our permission for it! […] He 
was always there with the vazahas before and after the ploughing. We saw 
him pass by in a car with them and then during the ploughing he was here 
again […] We had accepted giving the tracts to the west but these tracts [to 
the east], there it’s the mayor on his own who accepted giving them.150  
An official source within the municipal team said that Tsilavo had confessed to him that he 
had signed a paper with Tahiny, and that he had not been given a copy of it. If that was true, 
one could wonder whether what was signed on that day was what had verbally been agreed 
on, when Tsilavo himself is illiterate and whether villagers’ request for retribution had been 
written down or not. In any case, whether anything was signed or even officially agreed 
between Tozzi Green and the hamlets’ authorities, the secret of these discussions seemed to 
be fairly well kept from other villagers. 
 
In those hamlets that had little information on both these instances of negotiation, there was 
little room for doubt as to who was to blame for the “illegal transfers”: ‘No one asked our 
permission, so for me, I think it’s the mayor who favoured this land acquisition’.151 The same 
story was given in Andranovory and Manasoa as well: 
Was there any discussion between you and Tozzi Green? 
-No nothing. Only we saw the tractors ploughing our land and the mayor 
was there but he said, ‘It’s not me, it’s the general state’. 
-Did the mayor not call the lonaky at any time? 
-No, he didn’t. I think he is corrupt; otherwise, why would he have given 
our land?152 
These comments point again to the moral contract that exists between local elected officials 
and their constituency. As mentioned above, anger was also expressed at the company, 
however. Across all hamlets, the Tozzi Green project was associated with power abuse, 
breach of faith and/or disrespect for their right to subsistence. The next section discusses 
villagers’ attempts to protest this outcome, showing that while there were efforts at resistance, 
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these were defeated by internal and external power dynamics. 
 
Internalised powerlessness? 
In an illustration of third dimensional power dynamics, local people’s imaginations of 
resistance were undoubtedly imprinted by the patterns of domination that they had 
historically been embedded in. Protest was first clearly discouraged by the fear-filled 
anticipations conjured up by the racial identity of the investor. Those villagers who explained 
they ‘wished they could protest’ added that they were ‘scared [to] because they were vazahas’ 
(foreigners).153 Seen as the symbols of the indestructible strength of superiorly-endowed 
foreigners, tractors personified the inanity of village-level struggles: ‘No there was nothing 
we could say. […] we can’t oppose tractors’.154 The sole acknowledgment of this power 
imbalance seemed sufficient to shut voices down: ‘Us as small farmers and them as vazahas 
[foreigners]’, asserted Rota, for instance, ‘there was nothing we could do’.155  
 
The scrutiny of negotiations, responses and outcomes shows that the apparent lack of 
combativeness shown by Antranahazo’s villagers to try and assert their voices was 
nevertheless not the ineluctable result of a historically-internalised powerlessness, nor the 
sheer effect of third dimensional power dynamics. The sense of anticipated odds was also 
clearly fed by efforts by those brokering the land deal negotiations to intimidate and convince 
villagers of the uselessness of protest in a context of legal-institutional bias (second 
dimension of power). Moreover, as I discuss below, the understanding of unfavourable odds 
did not totally suppress action. Villagers from Antranohazo tried to oppose “undiscussed” 
land losses on quite a few instances, but the lack of material, cognitive and relational 
resources (first dimension of power) generally circumscribed these voices to non-decision-
making spaces of power. Finally, Antranahazo’s lack of influence on the land deal also needs 
to be understood in the light of the dynamics internal to the village. In a context of 
inequalities, ‘attribution of threat and opportunity’ (McAdam et al. 2001) was not consensual 
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and on the contrary, Tozzi Green land deal negotiations inspired conflicting struggles: for 
incorporation for some, against dispossession for others. With limited political and economic 
leverage on the rest of the community, de facto village leaders failed to prevent and even 
hear of the back-door bargaining in which Tozzi Green engaged with underprivileged 
members of the community.  
Non-decision-making spaces of protest 
Interestingly, it was from Antranohazo that one of the few outspoken voices of protest against 
the Tozzi Green land deal came out. Jimmy, the village komity, indeed participated and spoke 
out at the press conference that the civil society organised in November 2012 to support the 
grassroots resistance which started in Ambatolahy. He was the only representative from the 
municipality of Andiolava. The village was also kept relatively informed on the overall 
progress of the land deal and the resistance campaign due to their close ties with Hervé, the 
local mobiliser who initiated the connection between the civil society and the villagers. 
 
Simultaneously, villagers also engaged in everyday resistance acts. Nearly every operation 
of Tozzi Green was met by an attempt to mitigate land loss or delay the course of the land 
deal. Villager authorities from Voroka explained about having tried to stop Tozzi Green from 
ploughing the tracts to the east to which they had not agreed, having asked the surveyors to 
spare them a tazoa when they came to mark the land and asked for some space to be left 
around the tree which they gather around for some of their ritual celebrations. In 
Andranovory, tractors started ploughing very close to their tombs and so villagers asked the 
drivers to distance themselves from them. In Manalobe, they were asked for a reasonable 
distance to be left between the company fields and theirs.  
 
However, most of these requests were addressed at technicians who lacked power to effect 
change (tractor drivers, surveyors and so on) and, as such, failed to bring any significant 
result. Only the people in Andranovory believed they may have been heard since the land 
close to their tombs was never planted (cf tract in dark grey on Figure 7). However, the 
unpredictable way Tozzi Green used the land it had been granted under the first lease ruled 
out any automatic correlation between the villagers’ intervention and the absence of 
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plantations there. It may well be that the company had simply lost interest in this land.  For 
the other cases, the land was ploughed or marked out albeit with protests, with surveyors and 
drivers explaining that they were only executing orders. As far as the Voroka ritual site and 
Manalobe crop fields were concerned, the concessions made were so marginal that they 
simply fuelled more frustration and anger. 
 
On the one hand, villagers saw this as utter disregard for their pleas for indulgence. On the 
other, corporate managers reported that no one ever filed complaints.156 A fear of foreigners 
does not exhaust the reasons as to why no one may have tried to intervene at a higher level. 
Utterly unaware of their rights to be consulted and to contest operations on their land under 
the presumption of untitled private property, villagers thought they had no legal grounds to 
protest against the land deal. They also mistook tractor work for a formalisation of the deal 
on the ground when, in all likelihood, these operations corresponded to the ‘reconnaissance 
works’, mentioned in Tozzi Green’s file, a legal stage of the procedure in which the local 
population should have had a say. Not only did villagers not know of their rights during these 
operations, they had not been officially notified of them either (or only at the very last minute 
as explained above), nor invited to voice their opinion on the ‘availability of the land’, as 
required by law. 
 
Short of feeling able to influence decision-making, villagers were nevertheless keen not to 
endorse the unwanted land dispossession by signing documents they could not read: 
Three-four days before they put the boundary stones, I was summoned by 
the mayor to put a signature. But I refused. Even if it costs me my life, I 
refuse to sign anything that has to do with our land.157 
This reluctance to sign anything in this context reflected the broader suspicions villagers had 
towards written agreements, which tended to be perceived as instruments the powerful could 
use to fool the illiterate, rather than as a tool that may have later supported demands for 
accountability. When I asked Jonah if the promises of compensation that he had allegedly 
obtained from the corporate managers had been written down in an official paper, he replied: 
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‘No. We don’t want to sign anything and everything, because all they want is to keep our 
land’.158 While this may have protected them from any risk of their signatures being 
instrumentalised, it also left them with no written record of deals that may have been verbally 
agreed on. 
 
The next section describes how legal-institutional bias informed and reinforced these 
cognitive and informational exclusions, discussing the important role political brokerage 
played in feeding expectations of anticipated defeat and in reducing disgruntled villagers to 
silence. 
Legal institutional bias in practice 
None of Antranohazo’s leaders were officially recognised by the state since the village did 
not have the administrative status of a fokontany. The village therefore relied on “outside” 
local officials to defend their interests and represent them at higher levels of decision-making.  
 
Instead of enabling the expression and echoing of villagers’ voices at higher levels of 
decision-making, the mayor was perceived as an obstacle to being heard through his 
withholding of information and buffering of protest. On several occasions, he had reportedly 
tried to convince the disgruntled villagers that any expression of opposition or attempts at 
protest were doomed to failure. On the day that the komity tried to oppose the marking of 
those eastern tracts ‘they had never agreed to give’, the mayor reportedly told him that the 
surveyors were only executing orders and reminded him that it was a decision of the national 
state.159 The mayor was reported to have pre-empted the voicing of protest on another 
occasion, by saying that one of the disputed tract (to the north-cf figure 8) belonged to the 
neighbouring municipality which meant the villagers of Antranohazo had no say on it. As he 
was conveying these messages, the mayor was simultaneously denying any responsibility on 
the land transfers, by blaming decisions on his hierarchy and by denying any personal power 
to contest orders or have any influence on the land deal: 
We told him [the mayor], ‘So why are you giving our land, whereas these 
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are the lands of our ancestors?’ And he replied, ‘It’s not me. It’s the general 
state’. And then the people said, ‘But why did you not tell us before?’ And 
the mayor replied: ‘How could we have faced that? Even if I had told you 
before, there’s nothing I can do’.160  
A few villagers expressed regret that another path of action would have been possible had he 
informed them early and helped them, instead of defending the interests of the investor: ‘If 
the mayor had refused’, explained Nathan, ‘there would not be any jatropha now’.161 
Following the same logic, some predicted outcomes would have been better if the foreigners 
had had direct discussions with them.162  
 
Within the local state apparatus, the institutional bias was not as solid as it may have seemed. 
Over the three municipalities, several officials privately expressed their opposition to Tozzi 
Green, generally relating it to disappointments with regards to the outcomes of the project 
both in terms of compensation and job creation. Their ability to influence decisions and 
provide a platform for villagers’ voices, however, was limited by this very institutional bias 
against which they were standing, they explained. In the case of Antranohazo, a key elected 
official within the municipality claimed that his determined hostility to the Tozzi Green 
project caused him to be systematically sidelined from communication lines and decision 
channels.  Talking of the state in general, he explained: 
We want to let them know of our grievances but we don’t trust them. For 
example, the [officials from the] topography asked us if we had titles on 
the land. This is the land of the state etc., they said. So, we don’t know 
where to address our grievances.163  
He also explained that he had not been invited to any of the recognition missions for the tracts 
in the areas under his jurisdiction, whereas his signature was required by law:  
They know that I’m opposed to them, so they don’t invite me. […] No, 
they’re not worried about me. They only need one lonaky and the mayor to 
sign and it’s done. They can get the tracts.164 
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In this context, the villagers explained they did not know where to turn. The lack of 
knowledgeable contacts and support to create these important connections further 
compounded feelings of anticipated defeat: 
-There are people who have education, who know the laws and know how 
to write. Like the mayor of Ambatolahy, he looked for intellectuals who 
could help. But in our case, if our mayor had been honest, we could have 
looked together. 
-Is there anyone you think who could have helped you? 
-No, we don’t have any close family in Ihosy or in Antananarivo. 
Otherwise, why wouldn’t we have gone to them?165  
Whereas, in the first place, Hervé had appeared as a potential critical ally, contact with him 
seemed to have become sporadic and confidence in his potential to improve land deal 
outcomes for them rather limited.  Jimmy and Narindra knew and had met the associations 
helping villagers fight against “land grabbing” in Antananarivo, but again, these contacts had 
not been renewed and no one else in the village had heard of them. In sum, potential allies 
were either too far (civil society) or defeated by the lack of available channels for voicing 
their opinion in a context of legal-institutional bias (local officials).  
 
Power dynamics, related to the lack of informational, relational and educational resources 
and to political brokerage, were in that way shielding corporate managers from having to 
listen to villagers’ expressions of protest. Muffled by intimidation but not totally muted, these 
voices were getting lost in interstitial non-decision-making spaces. 
Internal tensions 
There also seemed to be a tacit understanding of the limited potential for collective action 
that existed in a village where there were different views on the struggles to be fought.  Unlike 
in other villages we had visited, no open accusations were made that the land taken by Tozzi 
Green “without permission” may, in fact, have been secretly given by other villagers. A few 
observations, here and there, pointed to the existence of suspicions, however. As I asked 
Jimmy about the procedures to cede land, for instance, he explained: 
It’s the lonaky who should decide. No one can give the land away without 
asking permission of the lonaky. 
-And has that ever happened here? 
                                               
165 Jonah, Antranohazo Analamary, 14/02/2014 
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- No, no.  But for the case of Tozzi Green, we still need to see if it’s a 
member of the family who has lent the land to Tozzi Green or not.166  
Jonah conveyed his suspicions in a more forceful manner. Without specifying whether I was 
talking about Antranohazo or the other villages in general, I asked him if he thought the other 
villagers who had accepted giving land had done so to get jobs. He replied: ‘I have no idea 
because the people who have done that do not talk to us but they hide’.167 No more 
information was gained on the nature and potential target of these suspicions and Jonah added 
that, in their view, the mayor remained the main suspect. In iBara, family divisions are a 
sensitive issue that villagers in Antranohazo were clearly not willing to discuss. As 
mentioned above, discussions held with the different hamlets, however, did betray tensions 
and a lack of information sharing on the land deal. Jonah’s comment made it clear that the 
rest of the village may have been more aware of the private discussions that had happened 
between Tozzi Green and villagers from the hamlet of Tsivory than most were willing to 
admit. 
 
Interestingly, the struggle against dispossession led by the leaders also seemed to have been 
kept under the radar.  Indeed, few villagers seemed to know that their komity had participated 
in a press conference to publicly oppose the land deal. Rota’s reply to the question of whether 
he had heard about it or not highlighted, once more, the socioeconomic stratification and its 
effects on influence within the local society: ‘No, I have no idea. I’ve never heard about this. 
Maybe it’s the olobe [the important people] who went there with the lonaky but us, we are 
just small’.168 Without the village’s collective backing or any follow-up, and in the absence 
of support from state authorities, this initiative did not bring any concrete result for the village 
and any idea of confronting the company publicly quickly waned. 
 
This lack of dialogue and context of tensions within the village may have made it easier for 
those pushing for the corporate land acquisition to target the most vulnerable, economically 
speaking, thereby excluding village power-holders in the consultation.  Although far from 
                                               
166 Jimmy, Antranohazo Voroka 13/02/2014. 
167 Jonah, Antranohazo Analamary, 15/02/2014. 
168 Rota, Antranohazo Andranovory, 19/02/2014. 
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being a sufficient condition for being heard in a context of strong power asymmetries, the 
case study of Soatanana village will highlight the difference firm leadership and a tighter knit 
community can make in terms of influencing land deal negotiations. 
 
Conclusion 
The case of Antranohazo provides a compelling example of the disconnect that can exist 
between the reality of agribusiness projects on the ground and their implications for local 
land users.  The suspension of grazing activities on the land planted but manifestly abandoned 
by Tozzi Green highlights the performative power of anticipated coercion in shaping 
outcomes of land deals for villagers. In a context where land resources are already strained, 
the uncertainty weighs heavily. In that respect, the case of Antranohazo village calls for 
further research on those numerous agribusiness projects that are being left in limbo (Mc 
Carthy et al. 2012) and on their implications on local livelihoods and social cohesion. 
 
The accounts given of the official negotiation process in Antranohazo also offered textbook 
illustrations of how first and second dimensional power dynamics could exclude agrarian 
populations from decision-making. Most of the decisions concerning Antranohazo’s land had 
been taken in ‘closed spaces’ (Gaventa and Pettit 2010). The agenda on which they could 
express themselves was very limited and the few other opportunities to influence decisions 
or control their enforcement on the ground had been given randomly without any delay of 
reflection or information to allow for informed consent. Consultation was also characterised 
by the interference of local state agents, spreading misinformation about local land rights, 
speaking on behalf of villagers and dissuading them from trying to oppose. The company did 
not enjoy consensual support from within the local administration in charge of the village, 
but those few who did voice objections were soon sidelined from channels of communication 
and decision-making. The absence of impartial control of the process as well as of 
educational and informational resources increased the risk of deceit and manipulation. 
 
Only the de facto village leaders/cattle owners seem to have had a chance to express 
themselves in the official consultation and, whether an actual choice or the endorsement of a 
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prior decision under pressure, the decision that came out of this meeting was made without 
them consulting or informing the hamlet whose land would be most affected. Fieldwork also 
unveiled a case of back-door bargaining by another group of underprivileged villagers. Those 
had direct interactions with one of the senior local corporate managers, which were kept 
hidden from the rest of the village, during which they may have agreed to give (some of) the 
land that the company is accused of having taken without villagers’ permission to the east of 
the village. It was hard, however, to gain an idea of what they had exactly agreed to with the 
company, since these discussions were supposed to be kept secret and the focus of narratives 
was now on the disappointment and concern with the current situation. This situation 
highlighted that the narratives of the consultation were also processes of internal negotiations 
within villages. Nevertheless, the discussions during which these secret interactions were 
revealed highlighted the interest that certain dependent segments of the village population 
originally found in the deal, offered by the agribusiness company.  As such, the case of 
Antranohazo highlights the importance of social positioning in explaining some of the 
contrasted perceptions that members of agrarian populations can develop with regards to land 
deals. It also points to the outcome of a failure to generate unity around a common ‘attribution 
of opportunity and threat’ and around village institutions and leaders (social appropriation). 
 
The fractured response of the village, from the village leaders publicly opposing the land deal 
in press conferences to underprivileged villagers secretly bargaining with the company, also 
makes sense in light of the limited interdependency, and palpable tension, that existed 
between poor and less poor villagers. This context can be assumed to have made it less costly 
to risk antagonising other villagers by going against the moral economy of shared decision-
making on issues of land, although the efforts at keeping these negotiations under-the-radar 
demonstrated that risk was not null. 
 
Two years later, the outcome of the land deal was the cause of grief and resentment across 
the whole village, from those who were stressing that the company had taken land without 
their permission, to those who had been hoping for better compensation for potentially less 
land loss. Their specific complaints over the way land had been appropriated in disrespect 
for their voices also highlighted the implications of moral economic violations on more 
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intangible issues. Denying village leaders any control over the operation of land alienation 
was not only an offence to their authority, it also meant depriving them of the possibility of 
honouring their own social and spiritual duties. To be perceived as fair and right, a transaction 
around land could not be conducted without having been endorsed by ancestors first. The 
appropriation of their land outside the rituals necessary to avoid antagonising their all-
powerful ancestors therefore constituted another source of concern.  
 
Moral economic duties had been transgressed by both those brokering the land deal and those 
benefiting from it, with little consideration shown for villagers’ voices and their subsistence 
right. Both of those struggling against dispossession and struggling for incorporation had 
therefore been equally unsuccessful in influencing the land deal. In the context of a fait 
accompli, compounded by a lack of relational, cognitive and material means to stand up to 
powerful interests (first dimension of power), responses to these adverse outcomes were 
confined to non-decision-making spaces, where voices were lost under the stronger rumours 
of tractors executing decisions. Resistance was also hindered by a sense of anticipated failure, 
fed by misinformation and understanding of the legal-institutional bias they were standing 
against (second dimension of power). Critically, efforts to gain influence within the land deal 
were defeated by the contradictions of responses that were given within the village, as well 
as by the context of dissimulation and lack of trust which seems to have prevented any 
collective strategy of mobilisation. The failures to speak with one voice and mobilise their 
networks made their chance to resist vertical power relationships and protest efficiently 
against violations of basic moral economic expectations even more fragile. 
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CHAPTER 7 
REFUSING ACQUIESCENCE AND PREVENTING DISSENT 
THE CASE OF SOATANANA 
 
Introduction 
In Soatanana (municipality of Satrokala), Tozzi Green’s requests for land were politely 
rejected and to date, this decision has been respected by the company. The village remained 
firm in its position, despite pressures to comply but was not left unscathed by the project, 
however: its land was encroached upon following the development of the project in the 
neighbouring village. After Soatanana villagers protested against the situation, a settlement 
was discussed and agreed with Tozzi Green, limiting loss to land that was used, but not 
owned, by the village.   
 
This chapter explores the dynamics that shaped Soatanana’s resistance to political pressures 
to acquiesce land alienation and discusses the successful, yet precarious outcomes of the 
village’s struggles against dispossession. It highlights how villagers’ own material and 
relational resources and capacities to develop ‘legitimating power’ (Hall et al. 2011: 171) can 
decrease their vulnerabilities to vertical power dynamics and compel decision-makers to 
listen to their voices, while stressing the importance of galvanising unity around moral 
economies to avoid that alternative responses are brought from within the village.  
 
First, I describe the successive instances in which villagers from Soatanana intervened and 
managed to influence the negotiation process and then the political and power dynamics that 
played out during the negotiations, outlining the pressures that were put on villagers to 
comply with the land requests. The chapter then explores how these power pressures were 
challenged thanks to the mobilisation of relational networks within the state and how 
mechanisms of attribution of opportunity and threat, and social appropriation were used to 
suppress internal temptations to comply with the company’s land requests,  closing with a 
discussion of the mixed outcomes of the land deal in the village, highlighting the power 
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dynamics and moral economies, observable in both the concessions made and in expressed 
anxieties and resentment about current and foreseeable impacts of the agribusiness project 
on their livelihoods. 
 
Outspoken refusal of land alienation 
In 2012, Soatanana villagers received a visit from Tozzi Green’s social mobiliser, who asked 
them if they would be willing to contribute land. After discussing the proposition among 
themselves, the decision was made to decline the requests. Of all the villages consulted within 
the municipality of Satrokala, only two expressed a similar refusal. The company ended up 
respecting their position, not without having tried to convince them to change their mind, 
villagers explain. 
 
This unusual rejection of Tozzi Green’s land requests did not leave Soatanana totally 
unaffected by the project, however.  A few months after the consultation, the villagers 
realised some of their grassland to the east of the village had been ploughed and planted by 
the company. They quickly linked this to the development of the project in the neighbouring 
village of Manalobe, where Tozzi Green had found some of its most fertile patches for their 
jatropha trees.  The tazoa on which Tozzi Green had planted was used in common by the two 
villages but had recently been demarcated between the two villages to clarify the distribution 
of collective-choice property rights (management, exclusion and alienation rights).  Most of 
the land appropriated by Tozzi Green was Manalobe’s property but a part of it belonged to 
Soatanana (cf. Figure 10). 
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Figure 10: Map of the land deal in Soatanana (2014) 
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It took Soatanana villagers a few days to notice the encroachment as they were not grazing 
on that land during that season. At this stage, the company had already planted on a fairly big 
area. 'In the space of a month, they had already planted all of these trees. If we had waited a 
few extra months, they would have had planted the whole thing'.169 
  
Soatanana villagers reacted quickly to the encroachment. Versions vary as to who they went 
to talk to first (Tozzi Green workers, the mayor, village leaders of Mangidy) but, as in 
Antranohazo, no complaint was addressed directly to the corporate managers themselves. 
Interestingly, however, their protests quickly reached the Tozzi Green base in Satroakala. A 
few days later, one of their managers came down to the village and had a discussion with 
some representatives of the fokonolona. A month later, an official meeting was organised 
with Tozzi Green’s community relation manager, a member of the municipal council, 
authorities from the three surrounding villages and the Region Head himself.  A compromise 
was found for that parcel which belonged to Soatanana: Tozzi Green would keep the land on 
which they had already planted 
but return the one they had so far 
only ploughed. 
This line of compromise agreed 
with Tozzi Green roughly 
respected the previous line of 
delimitation between the 
villages of Soatanana and of 
Mangidy. Soatanana’s swift 
reaction to the encroachment 
and the informal negotiation that 
followed therefore allowed them 
to regain most of the land on 
which they owned collective-
choice property rights. 
                                               
169 Victor, komity Soatanana, Soatanana Iakora, 11/03/2014. 
Figure 11: Jatropha fields to the east of Soatanana, 
11/03/2014. 
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Before analysing the resources and dynamics on which these acts of resistance were built, I 
emphasise the specificities of the negotiation context with regards to the socio-economic, 
political and ecological assets of the village, while stressing that villagers were subjected to 
similar power pressures as those observed in Antranohazo (Chapter 6). 
A relative wealth at risk 
In the municipality of Satrokala, the village of Soatanana has the reputation of doing well for 
itself. As we were approaching the place for the first time (April 2013), Nestine, our young 
female local guide, declared: ‘People are not hungry here. They don’t need [to eat] 
cassava’.170 The same picture of wealth had come out of a previous conversation with the 
mayor, who explained that Soatanana counted among the richest cattle owners of 
Satrokala.171 
 
For a first encounter, the welcome was generally more serene than in other places. People 
talked freely and rather proudly about their agricultural yields and the local vigilante groups 
they claimed fended off cattle thefts. When asked about their land endowments, they 
answered that they had ‘a lot of rice paddies’.172 Information garnered the following year 
confirmed that their land resources were fairly abundant compared to the local average. First, 
their rice paddies were fairly remote from the village. In the Bara agropastoral system, the 
further the rice paddies are from the village, the better it is as it limits the risk of the fields 
being damaged by cattle. As land rarefies, rice paddies are built more closely to the village. 
Villagers from the hamlet of Ivahona were saying that their rice paddies were an hour away 
from their houses, for example. A second indicator was that, in contrast to Antranohazo, the 
land had not been divided among the hamlets. ‘We still have a lot of land available here, so 
we haven’t had the need to distribute it yet,’ their komity explained, adding later that ‘anyone 
willing to farm a new tract of land is free to do so as long as it is approved by the head of the 
                                               
170 Nestine, Soatanana, 04/04/2013. 
171 Mayor Satrokala, Satrokala village, 28/02/2013. 
172 Focus group discussion, Soatanana, 04/04/2013. 
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lineage’.173  
 
As most villages in the region, Soatanana was growing rice, beans (voanjo), vondro (natural 
weed used as a construction material), cassava and blé (a species of sweet potato). What 
distinguished them from most villages was that their land endowments allowed them to do 
three rice harvests per year: on top of the vary tonontaona (or ‘seasonal rice’) grown by all 
during the rainy season, they were able to grow vary aloha (‘early rice’ harvested in January), 
since the village land had tany oraky, wet patches of soil which can sustain rice growth 
without relying on rain.  They also had parcels on their highlands that were suitable for the 
growth of vary afara, ‘late rice’, usually transplanted in April. This later production is also 
referred to as the vary tanety (highland rice), a reminder that highlands are not only used 
locally for pastures but also for crop farming, including for rice. On average, the whole 
village declared an average production of 130 oxcarts a year for an approximate population 
of 400 inhabitants.174 Each oxcart having a capacity of five to seven bags of 60 to 70kg of 
rice each, it amounted to a yearly average production of 50,000 kg of rice per year. They 
stated that they generally kept half the production for themselves and sold the other half. 
 
The village also enjoyed a large cattle stock, with estimates fluctuating between 718 and 
900.175 This wealth allowed them to maintain a certain independence, as no one needed to 
borrow cattle from outside. They were also breeding chickens and in the past, they used to 
have ducks, turkeys and pigs.176  
 
Soatanana’s relative wealth was reflected in their everyday life: in Soatanana drinking coffee 
was relatively common, a luxury hardly any of the other visited villages enjoyed. People 
could also afford to buy locally-produced mofo gasy (bread doughnut) on a daily basis. 
Women had earrings and hats that they would wear to go to the markets. 
                                               
173 Victor, komity Soatanana Iakora, 14/03/2014. 
174 Victor, komity Soatanana Iakora, 14/03/2014. Number based on projections based on the 2009 census. 
175 The first number comes from official reports given to me by a confidential source and the second is the estimate that was given to us 
by the villagers when we visited them in April 2013. 
176 Pork is usually fady (taboo) in the Bara culture. This lenience may be explained that main ancestral figures of Soatanana village are 
non-Bara. 
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Despite this slightly more comfortable situation than average, villagers’ discourses on their 
reason for refusing to cede land to Tozzi Green reflected feelings of vulnerability and 
concerns for the future. This was the first thing Mara, the lonaky, told us when we asked him 
to tell us about his experience with Tozzi Green: ‘Tozzi Green asked for land to borrow here. 
But I refused because we don’t have much land and we need it’.177 Their high production 
yields relied on robust livestock, which required good pastures, both quality and quantity-
wise. No land therefore lay idle as they were already explaining in 2013:  
Yes, we use all of our land: some for farming, other for grazing. During 
the farming season, we use our cattle from February to August. So, they 
need good grass; otherwise, they'll become skinny.178  
As in Antranohazo, demographic pressure was forcing changes in land use, with grassland 
being converted to farmland. When asked whether they had sufficient rangeland, Hary 
replied: ‘No it’s already quite small because the population is increasing and now we need 
the highlands for the cassava’.179  
 
Pressure on land was also compounded by rain shortages and vulnerability to natural hazards. 
No help or support seemed to ever come from the state, even in dire circumstances such as 
insect invasions or droughts, and there is a lack of necessary infrastructure to address the 
vagaries of the climate. Villagers said the local representative of the Centre for Agricultural 
Services (CSA)180 had recently inquired about their most urgent needs, but this visit had never 
been followed up with any help.181 Soatanana had a dam but it was damaged and the villagers 
said a professional intervention was needed for it to be fixed.  In 2013, they told us rain had 
not been sufficient for the vary aloha (early rice) and that they had suffered from the locust 
invasion. The following year was no better. When we asked how the farming season was 
going so far, Eugène replied: 'All the rice is dry. We haven't had rain in over a month’,182  
                                               
177 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 07/03/2014. 
178 Focus group discussion, Soatanana, 04/04/2013. 
179 Hary, Soatanana Ivahona, 18/03/2014. 
180 CSAs are support structures for subsistence farming available at the level of rural municipalities. 
181 Victor, komity Soatanana Iakora, 14/03/2014. 
182 Eugène, Soatanana Analavoka, 12/03/2014. 
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and Ketaka added that so far, they had only harvested five bags for the vary tonon-taona: 
‘Really not much at all’, she commented.183  Faltering food crop production in a context of 
population growth had forced them to move from rice-only feeding to rice complemented 
with more modest staple foods ‘Today, because the rice paddies are suffering and the families 
are growing, we have some shortages [of rice] sometimes’.184 
 
Soatanana’s wealth was also affected by issues of cattle theft, particularly rife in the 1970s. 
Sitra, the hamlet leader of Soatanana Voalohany, explained that in the 1950s, his uncle had 
some 200-300 head and his father some 200, but because most had been stolen, he was only 
left with 10 himself. In an acknowledgement of the problem, the village was named after a 
cattle thief who was killed in the village as he was trying to run away with some of their 
cattle in the 1970s.185 The story of the lonaky’s grandfather, an Antemoro migrant who 
founded the village, was one of quick cattle enrichment through fruitful crop farming but this 
upward trajectory was interrupted by this context of insecurity. Cattle theft had declined in 
the past decades but had been taking up again in the context of the country’s political 
instability and economic distress that had followed Andry Rajoelina’s illegal seizing of 
power in 2009 (Razafindrakoto et al. 2014; Randrianja et al. 2012). A number of recent cases 
were reported to me across all three municipalities, some involving significant violence. This 
situation of insecurity was causing significant concern in the area. Soatanana had not suffered 
any cattle thefts for a few years but petty theft from inside the village was on the rise. ‘It has 
become a real problem here,’ stressed the lonaky’s wife.  ‘Actually, we don’t really have any 
chickens left because of that’.186  
The next pages describe the way Tozzi Green’s land requests resonated within that context 
and how they were pushed by local state agents, using the same pressured means as that 
described in Antranohazo (Chapter 6). 
Pressure, false pretence and lack of state-legal resources 
                                               
183 Ketaka, Soatanana Analavoka, 12/03/2014. 
184 Sitra, hamlet leader, Soatanana Voalohany, 20/03/2014. 
185 Sitra, hamlet leader, Soatanana Voalohany, 20/03/2014. 
186 Yolande, Soatanana Analavoka, 02/04/2014. 
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When questioned on the village’s response to the consultation process, the lonaky of 
Soatanana explained that the uncertain, unsustainable alternative offered by the agribusiness 
company had made for an easy choice, without realising that the perception of having had a 
‘choice’ in itself was singular. As highlighted by the comparative study and confirmed by 
the Antranohazo case (Chapter 6), there is nothing obvious about disenfranchised agrarian 
populations feeling free to speak their mind in consultation processes. After describing the 
power pressures that pervaded the negotiations in Soatanana, I explain how the village’s 
internal resources allowed for these pressures to be both qualified and countered. 
 
As in Antranohazo, attempts to make Soatanana villagers comply were predicated on the use 
of false pretence, with Tozzi Green’s ‘social team’ having allegedly told them that their land 
belonged to the general state anyway.187 The corporate representatives were also deliberately 
remaining elusive about the terms and the process of the land transfer, insisting land would 
be rented and not purchased, but not saying this loan would be contracted with the state, after 
the land was titled.188 There as well, the pressure put on the villagers to change their mind 
and give land came as much from the local authorities as from the company. The mayor of 
Satrokala accompanied Tozzi Green managers on their first visit to Soatanana: ‘He was 
repeating that the other villages had already given so we also had to give’.189 Villagers were 
reporting that he came back several times, narrowing the perceived field of opportunities by 
trying to instil a sense of anticipated defeat: ‘The mayor tried to pressure us and to scare us 
by saying, “Give some land; it’s difficult to fight against vazahas”’.190 
 
These intimidation techniques were combined with softer persuasion techniques, appealing 
to villagers’ needs for basic social services: 
At first, the local authorities did some propaganda like, you’ll have schools 
and hospitals and the land it’s only to borrow it from you, not to buy it. But 
we decided to wait and see the results in the other villages and maybe if 
                                               
187 Victor, komity, Soatanana Iakora, 11/03/2014 ; Hary, Soatanana Ivahona, 18/03/2014. 
188 Sitra, hamlet leader, Soatanana Voalohany, 20/03/2014. 
189 Village elder, Soatanana Ivahona, 01/04/2014. 
190 Hary, Soatanana Ivahona, 18/03/2014. 
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there are advantages, we would give land.191 
Those discursive strategies did not go without having an impact and the previous village 
leader came close to yielding to the pressure: ‘No we haven’t given anything. But Mara’s 
elder brother [who was then lonaky and had passed away since], accepted giving because all 
the others had already given. But M. Mara refused and he had to follow […] He was thinking 
of giving 7ha’.192 The process through which the lonaky’s temptation to give land was quelled 
by his charismatic younger brother is described below. Confirmed by other sources, this 
episode is interesting in showing that decisions of the lonaky can be challenged and even 
overturned. 
 
However, there was a sense of anticipated defeat in case a conflict arose with the company. 
‘What if they forced their way in anyways?’ I asked. ‘Well then, as I told you, we won’t be 
able to do anything. We can’t fight against vazahas’.193 In the absence of access to legal 
channels to defend their rights, only the peaceful opportunities provided by a fair consultation 
process seemed to provide room for manoeuvre. As in Antranohazo (Chapter 6), one 
important impediment to expressing grievances and claiming rights was related to the fact 
that their own authorities were not recognised by the state. Soatanana’s closest official 
representative was the head of fokontany of Satrokala since the village legally belonged to 
the fokontany of Satrokala. There was therefore very little state-legal action that the village 
could undertake directly, which increased their vulnerability to the whims of higher 
authorities: 
If we had a fokontany of our own, we could go up to the district or the 
regional government directly if we wanted to ask for help, for example. 
Whereas if I go to the district now, they will say: ‘Who are you?’ As a 
komity, who will listen to me? […] For all our papers, we need to go 
through the fokontany to buy land, for [everything that is related to] cattle, 
to declare births, for all the papers. Even to go to the tribunal.194  
Soatanana’s komity explained that they had asked for a fokontany of their own but that local 
authorities were asking for money to officially file their request. ‘They told us, “We can’t 
                                               
191 Victor, komity, Soatanana Iakora, 28/03/2014. 
192 Sitra, hamlet leader, Soatanana Voalohany, 20/03/2014. 
193 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 24/03/2014. 
194 Victor, komity, Soatanana Iakora, 09/03/2014. 
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sign anything without money,”’ he reported, adding that the district deputy had asked for 
500,000 Fmg (35€).195  This administrative dependency makes it difficult for most villagers 
to voice their grievances officially, even at the local level. 
 
This prompted the questions that follow: How did Soatanana, despite a negotiation context 
in many aspects very similar to the one experienced in Antranohazo (Chapter 6), manage to 
resist pressures to comply with the consultation process and challenge traditional power 
dynamics? What resources did they mobilise and which dynamics were activated to make 
withstanding pressure from state authorities and corporate managers sound that 
straightforward? How did they succeed in seizing the consultation opportunities that, in the 
same context, have remained so theoretical in other places? 
 
Withstanding pressure 
Food security first 
In Soatanana, a forceful argument was built and spread by the man who was soon to become 
the village’s main leader. To Mara, matters were clear: the “land against job/compensation” 
offer made by Tozzi Green represented a risk to subsistence livelihoods without offering any 
sustainable alternative; their agrarian livelihoods were sustainable, the compensation offered 
by the agribusiness company were not. For him, the equation was easily solved; 
With the rice, we earn 5 to 10 million [Fmg] per year [between 350 to 700 
€]. Whereas if we work for the company, we only earn 25,000 Fmg (4 €) 
etc. which can only serve to buy tomatoes and stuff like that. These 25,000 
Fmg don’t last long.196 
Whether slightly mythologised or not, the story of their ancestor who only had five head of 
cattle when he settled in Soatanana and died with 800, thanks to his agricultural yields, stood 
as compelling evidence of the potential of subsistence farming.197 The insecurity of wage-
working for an outside operator producing commercial crops instead of relying on well-tried 
family farming was highlighted: 
                                               
195 Victor, komity, Soatanana Iakora, 09/03/2014. 
196 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 11/03/2014. 
197 Imanoela, Soatanana Analavoka, 26/03/2014. 
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And this jatropha, it’s not producing anything. In 3 years, it still hasn’t 
given any seeds, whereas us here, we farm three times a year […] The 
cattle are the basis of wealth here. When we go to the market, we sell a 
zebu and then we share the money […] When a zebu's good, we can sell it 
for a million Ariary [400 €], so we make benefits, even with the costs of 
the vaccines and the taxes. If we have 10 cattle, maybe later we can have 
30. That's why we need a lot of land.198  
In a formulation that nicely encapsulated the safety-first principle behind his reasoning, the 
lonaky added: ‘We can’t win millions [with rice] but after a while it can become dollars’.199 
 
The lonaky’s position within the land deal negotiations was also galvanised by the view that 
land belonged to those who used and cared for it and that it should primarily be used to grow 
food: 
The company told us: these are not your lands, they belong to the general 
state but personally I told them ‘If these lands belonged to the state, then 
the state should be the one to pay the damages in case of cattle theft. So, 
this belongs to me and I’m not giving anything.200 
As the lonaky’s explanations stress here, ignorance of legal rights certainly does not equate 
with a belief that peasants have no rights on their land. There was also a clear sense that cattle 
raising and agribusiness were mutually exclusive activities, and therefore that Tozzi Green’s 
commitment not to use farmland was beside the point. With extensive pastoralism, no sharing 
of space could be envisaged: 
We had to refuse [giving land] because we raise cattle and because the 
fields of jatropha are forbidden to cattle. Now cattle here, it's like a 
company, it's our economy […] Cattle need to walk 20 km to be big, not 
just 1 km. Otherwise they become unhappy and skinny. But if they have a 
large area for grazing, then they are happy and they become fat. It’s like 
humans; the flesh disappears if we’re not happy, if our brains are not 
happy.201 
The company’s recent change in agronomic strategies further compounded the risks of the 
two activities coexisting since the new commercial crops planted by Tozzi Green were a treat 
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for cattle.202  Concern for the future was compounded by the length of the lease assumed to 
have been given to Tozzi Green: 
I told the mayor: ‘You say that they are going to borrow land for 90 years. 
But myself, I was born in 1943 and I’m not even 90 yet! So, a kid who is 
born now, he won’t even see the end of the contract’.203 
Suspicions were also rooted in historical experiences between villagers and private 
companies.  Deals offered to rural populations had proved to be generally grossly imbalanced 
and the financial compensation meagre: ‘I’ve already encountered cases like Tozzi Green. 
Often the companies give a bit of money but it’s not enough to share between the whole 
family even for a single day. And after that, what do we eat?’204.When I asked for more 
details on these experiences, he explained: 
For example, there's this man we call Kop, who came here to look for 
precious stones. We haven't seen him in a long time. Maybe he's dead even 
now and then recently, a vazaha came on these lands and he's Kop's 
grandson! So, you see, once the land is marked out, even the grandchildren 
still own that land!205 
Beyond the understanding of land titling and its implications, and all interviewed villagers 
fully understood what boundary stones meant, these experiences seemed to have made 
Soatanana’s leader suspicious towards private projects of natural resource exploitation or 
production and the short-term nature of the compensation packages they would provide local 
land users. These previous experiences had taught him not to take promises at face value and 
to remain cautious in a context of a lack of information. 
Peaceful silencing of alternative views 
As in Antranohazo, the contemporary perspectives on the land deal seemed to have been 
encouraging reconstructions of the narratives of the negotiations, making it difficult to grasp 
the degree of contention that may have existed at the moment of the consultation. Two years 
after the consultation, everyone we talked to seemed convinced of the merits of having 
refused to collaborate with the agribusiness company: 
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-Would you personally be interested in collaborating with Tozzi Green if 
you had the choice? 
-[Laughing] No, well seriously, I’m really not seeing any advantages to it! 
I talked to the others who have given and I saw that they haven’t gained 
anything. No one here will want to give them land.206  
The recollections of Tozzi Green’s first visit present refusal as an obvious position that only 
few may have questioned temporarily: 
-Were some people interested initially at the prospect of having a job and 
earning money? I asked. 
-No, not really. Or were they? added the komity, turning to the deputy 
komity. Yes, maybe there were people who were interested in that. But 
most people here weren’t.207 
However, some of the details that emerged from conversations suggest that there had been 
some hesitation at the beginning and that what was now presented as a “consensual no” had 
required more effort than people were willing to recall.  As noted above, the previous lonaky 
himself originally considered consenting to the land requests. Soatanana’s firm, common 
position, therefore, stemmed less from an implicit harmony of views within the village as 
successful efforts to streamline positions before engaging into any kind of transactions with 
the foreigners. A meeting was held with all the hamlets from the village, during which it was 
decided Tozzi Green’s land requests would be rejected. The fact that the decision taken was 
not the one initially envisaged by the main figure of authority of the village highlights the 
importance of these discussions and of the persuasive endeavours undertaken by those who 
contested the proposition to concede land: 
After Tozzi Green’s request, we held a meeting here. There were people 
who wanted to give land but it was a minority. But I explained the 
importance of land, the profit made thanks to the rice paddies etc. And the 
minority had to follow the majority.208 
Were it only a minority indeed; it was not any minority since it included the voice of the 
incumbent lonaky at the time. Moreover, in places such as Antranohazo (Chapter 6) and 
Mangidy (Chapter 8), minorities proved able to undermine, through backdoor discussions, 
decisions of the more powerful. In Soatanana, no one seems to have engaged with the 
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company secretly nor tried to openly express alternative positions and offers to the one 
expressed by authorised voices.  The hamlet of Ivahona was approached first, and as such 
was given an opportunity to make a decision outside the control of the lonaky, but the hamlet 
leader said they refused to make any decision without consulting the rest of the village. ‘Yes, 
actually, they came to our hamlet first, but we didn’t give anything. Then the whole family 
got together, all the Soatanana and we decided not to give’.209 
 
An informal discussion with a group of young women and men in their twenties/early thirties 
one afternoon highlighted that Tozzi Green was not necessarily seen as a threat by everyone 
and that some of its job offers generated interest within the village. In a conversation about 
knowledge and learning, Jonya, who seemed slightly more educated than the others, 
explained that he would have had liked to continue school so that he ‘could have worked for 
people like Tozzi Green’.210 As the young man was drunk at the time of the discussion, my 
attempts to make him elaborate more on this proved fruitless and the conversation quickly 
moved in other directions.  His comment was important in outlining the hopes for an 
alternative livelihood and potential path to socio-economic promotion that the foreign project 
may have been embodying for the younger generation.  However, it is important to note that 
Jonya was not lamenting the fact that Tozzi Green had not been allowed to operate in his 
village, but rather the fact that because of insufficient educational skills, he could not access 
the more senior jobs the company was offering. 
 
It is difficult to assess how widespread this vision may have been among the less privileged 
in the village. Although no other comment of such a nature was made by anyone in the month 
spent in Soatanana, much more time would have been needed to assert with certainty that 
Jonya was the one and only person who showed some interest in the project. It is worth noting 
that none of the other young people who were there with us on that day protested Jonya’s 
wishes to be working for the agribusiness company. As noted for the case of Antranohazo 
(Chapter 6), however, possession of one feature of domination (female gender, young age 
group) did not seem to automatically translate into support for the project. Throughout the 
                                               
209 Hamlet leader, Soatanana Ivahona, 18/03/2014. 
210 Jonya, Soatanana Analavoka, 02/04/14. 
159 
 
 
weeks, I developed a closeness with an outspoken, jovial young woman called Ketaka. She 
was very curious and happy to engage in all kind of topics and did not seem to be afraid to 
express her opinions and when I asked her what her views were on the Tozzi Green project, 
her reply was uncompromising: ‘I really don’t like these vazahas there because they take our 
land’.211 
 
Whether persuaded or silently compelled by internalised power dynamics within the village, 
those who might have thought differently did not come forward in any case. The next pages 
explain that the lack of dissent should also be looked at in the light of the strong patterns of 
interdependence and effort at maintaining a sense of community within the village. 
Maintaining a sense of community 
Generally speaking, Soatanana gave the sense of being a closer-knit community than the 
majority of villages visited. First and foremost, the village only had one lonaky. The influence 
of Mara under the previous lonaky’s rule showed that influence was not necessarily neatly 
tied to distribution of power according to customary rules and that there was space for other 
figures of authority to make their voices heard. However, there was only one official leader 
and feelings of belonging did not seem to be dispersed along separate branches of the family. 
 
Patterns of livestock possession and exchange also encouraged a stronger interdependence 
within the village.  There were important inequalities, from Soatanana Voalohany and 
Soatanana Iakora who only owned a couple of heads of cattle to Soatanana Analavoka who 
had some 600 through to Ivahona who had 100, but the richest would lend to the poorest, 
keeping duties of obligations within the village. This pooling of resources was a source of 
pride: ‘No, here we don’t borrow from other villages but we help each other out. We don’t 
borrow’.212 The same willingness to display cohesion was conveyed during discussions 
touching on land issues: ‘Here we can go everywhere. Even if there’s an area you like, you 
can’t make it only your own. It’s all in common’.213 Likewise, when we went to talk to them 
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in 2013, they prided themselves on the fact that there was no cattle theft in the village thanks 
to their internal cohesion. ‘No, we don’t have any problems of cattle theft because there are 
no accomplices to be found in the village’.214 
 
The fieldwork carried out the next year revealed that the village was actually suffering regular 
episodes of internal thefts, thereby belying the images of a cohesive, trouble-free community. 
Two months before, a man from the village had tried to steal five cattle from someone. The 
incident was evidence that tacit tensions and jealousies may have been simmering below the 
surface. It was hard to gain more information on the context and identity of the thief, the 
shame these internal tensions fill people with, as well as the importance of keeping an 
appearance of cohesion making people reluctant to discuss these issues.  
 
I did gain a better understanding of internal dynamics of identity and community-building 
through the observation of the way the leadership tackled these issues. In reaction to that 
latest episode of theft, serious in comparison to the usual chicken thefts Yolande said they 
regularly suffered from, a decision was made to organise a ritual ceremony called titsiky, 
with the objective of ‘trying to re-establish order’. Ahead of the ceremony, the men of the 
village assembled to discuss the issues and agree on the measures with which to address 
them. Each had to contribute 5,000Ar (2 €) towards the cattle to be sacrificed. They waited 
another few hours for the mayor to arrive, as he had been invited to co-chair the ceremony 
with the lonaky. Concern was also expressed towards the fact that the author of the theft 
himself had not shown up in the village for the past two weeks and was not there on that 
important day, although he had been informed of it. Ultimately, it was decided to organise 
the ceremony without him. Once the mayor had arrived, they all assembled at the back of the 
village. Again, only men were allowed. Only Yolande, the wife of the lonaky, was invited to 
join the opening of the ceremony, confirming the different statutes enjoyed by women, 
depending on age and position within the village. I was allowed as well. After the opening 
speech by the lonaky, when listeners were reminded of the importance of community 
cohesion and of the wrongness of stealing from one’s own family, each man was asked to 
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take an official oath in front of the rest of the villagers and their ancestors, expressing their 
commitment to the general interest of the community. The ritual expression used to open the 
oath stressed how the sense of belonging was rooted both in the worship of ancestors and in 
the common possession of land: 
I call on you Zanahary (God), on you tany masina (holy earth), on you 
fahasivy (ancestors), said one of the first man to take an oath in front of the 
cattle about to be sacrificed. If I steal cattle from Soatanana, if I steal rice 
from Soatanana, if I steal chicken from Soatanana, if I hurt this foreign 
woman, may I be dead tonight […]. 
I call on you Zanahary, on you tany masina, on you fahasivy, said another. 
If I don't steal, if I don't hurt; may you be witness […]. 
I call on you …, said a few. If I am tracked by the police [for cattle theft], 
may you be witness […]. 
I call on you … If someone steals my rice, my chicken and even my wife, 
said another man eliciting a roar of laughter, if someone helps someone 
else steal cattle from me, may this bring evil upon them […]. 
I call on you …, declared a man who had recently migrated to the village, 
I came here to work, not to steal […]. 
Far from likening itself to biblical commandments not to steal in any circumstance, the 
ceremony was there to remind people of where they belonged and where their sense of duty 
should be directed. Indeed, not only were some thefts not banned, they were actually publicly 
acknowledged and their future perpetrators were asking for blessing. All that was asked was 
to not steal or harm anyone from the village: ‘I call on you Zanahary, tany masina and 
fahasivy,’ two or three villagers swore.  ‘If I steal cattle from other villages, may you give 
me strength’.215 The titsiky also outlined that even within the village, some thefts were 
acceptable, as long as these were petty theft committed by younger members of the 
community with a purpose of immediate feeding as opposed to accumulation. Again, the 
importance of the common good of the community was stressed: 
I call on you Zanahary, tany masina and fahasivy: If children steal a bit of 
cassava from my fields, may it do them good. Because it is kids we are 
looking for here. 
I call on you …: If cow herders [generally children and young teenagers] 
steal cassava from my fields, may good come upon them. But if they bring 
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it back to their place, may you be witness. 
This last quotation is interesting in revealing where the common good ends and where 
individual property starts. Young cow herders were allowed to take a few crops from 
someone else’s fields for purpose of feeding while on duty but they were not allowed to bring 
them back home to feed the rest of their family.  Goods were only shared up to a certain 
extent.  Ritual ceremonies, such as the titsiky, are one means of formalising moral economic 
rules and norms under the witness of ancestors, in this context asserting the obligation of ‘no 
harm’ villagers should have towards each another. The time and resources it required from 
villagers who are already overstretched also showed a real commitment, on the part of the 
village leader, to do what it took to revitalise the sense of duty and belonging to the village 
community. 
 
This ceremony also highlighted the practical face of legal pluralism in rural Madagascar.  
While deeply rooted in customary rituals and institutions, this ceremony of the titsiky as 
performed on that day in Soatanana made space for state authorities. The mayor of Satrokala 
was not only invited to the ceremony, he co-chaired it with the lonaky and pronounced one 
of the final speeches. It was his authority as a state official that was intended to operate here 
and add to the solemnity of the event. The other indication of Soatanana’s willingness to get 
a backing from the state was the recording of most the decisions that were taken on that day 
in a dina, a customary convention that would subsequently be submitted to state authorities 
for validation. Some of the clauses provided for financial sanctions, such as the one stating 
that: ‘Anyone whose cattle encroaches on someone else’s field has to compensate 500,000 
Fmg (Malagasy Francs-Madagascar’s currency before the Ariary)’.216 These can be assumed 
to have been endorsed by the state. Those authorising extra-judicial killings, as in ‘Anyone 
caught stealing from the cattle pen can be killed without pursuit’, however, would 
undoubtedly be censored.  What matters here is to stress the willingness to involve state 
authorities in this process. The mayor being there for such an important village event indeed 
provided a powerful illustration of the good working cooperation between the two leaders 
and a mutual respect for their respective authority. 
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The nature of their relationship helps to understand the fact that the lonaky felt comfortable 
enough to defy the mayor’s interest and instructions in their response to the consultation 
process. The next section discusses the grounds for and implications of this position of 
strength. 
A strong position within the local field 
One of the most striking features of Mara’s recollections of the land deal negotiations was 
the confidence he boasted in his challenging of local state officials. ‘When the mayor said 
we had to give because all the others had already given, I told him [that] it’s none of my 
business if the others have already given; I’m keeping my land.217 According to his own 
account, he not only stood up to the mayor’s pressure, but actually challenged and threatened 
him: 
It’s in this very house that I had this discussion with him [the mayor]. I told 
him, Come on tell me the truth now, you are selling these lands, aren’t you? 
I’m telling you, if you do sell these lands, you’ll hear from me.218  
At an even more surprising level, the lonaky said he had no fear in speaking his mind directly 
to the Region Head either. 
When the Region Head came here, I showed him the 20 cattle that we had 
just bought. And I told him: 'There you are, Sir Region Head, the cattle that 
our village has obtained, thanks to the rice. Do you think that with the 
jatropha, we'll be able to earn as much?’219 
This boldness could be understood in the context of the special relationship that the village 
enjoyed with the official: the Region Head had some 50 head of cattle which needed looking 
after and of all villages, Soatanana had been chosen to fulfil this high responsibility.  Proving 
the level of respectability and influence the Soatanana family enjoyed locally, a bailiff based 
in Ihosy, another highly respected figure of the regional state apparatus, had also entrusted 
Soatanana with his cattle. This special arrangement differed from those encountered before, 
by which poor villagers would ask wealthier villagers, generally relatives, to lend them cattle. 
As explained above, the village did not need cattle. It was a favour the village was doing to 
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these notorious regional authorities, to build social and political capital. 
This “special relationship” with local state authorities is how many explain Soatanana’s 
ability to have resisted pressure to cooperate and give land. Inside Soatanana, however, 
versions varied as to whether these figures provided meaningful help or not. When I asked 
Ketaka whether anyone from their family was affected by the project, she said: ‘Nearly all 
of our family is affected except our village because there were 2 people that helped us: le 
Maître (the bailiff) and someone at the Region’.220 Likewise, when I asked the young Brice 
if the Region Head had helped them hold head to Tozzi Green, he replied enthusiastically: 
‘Yes definitely. He even went up to Antananarivo’.221 The official was believed to have 
spoken up in their favour, which he clearly related to the moral debt that the Region Head 
owed them, although the key to their successful outcome, in his opinion, had been to refuse 
Tozzi Green’s land request from the start. When I asked him if the Region Head had gone to 
Antananarivo ‘to oppose the whole project or just to help them specifically’, he explained: 
‘No, for the villages who had already accepted, there’s nothing he could do about it, but for 
us, because his cattle are here…’.222 
 
Soatanana village leaders, for their part, insisted that these contacts had not made any 
difference, either because these people only had limited leverage, or a limited desire to help 
them.  Their explanations conveyed a feeling of hopelessness with leaders who did not 
provide the level of support they should be offering: 
-Other villages said you were protected by the authorities here… 
-That’s because Maitre Roger and the Region Head have their cattle kept 
here that people think that. But they never protect us. Actually, they 
haven’t even been able to cover us during that dispute with the others [the 
land dispute with Manalobe].223 
Even those who believed that the Region head had taken action in their favour were quite 
pessimistic as to what these leaders could actually achieve in a context of centralised power 
and clientelism. 
But you know everyone has a boss, explained Brice. For the head of 
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fokontany, it’s the mayor. For the mayor, it’s the head of district and so on 
and so forth. And so maybe the Region head can say something but he can’t 
block everything. Maybe there are managers who decide something else.224 
It was a matter of pride to argue that their singular position of resistance had nothing to do 
with networks or contacts, no more than other villagers’ compliance was the result of a lack 
of political support.  The reason the others had acquiesced to the land requests, they 
explained, could be attributed to their greater susceptibility to intimidation practices and their 
interest in the financial pay-offs offered by the company, and in their opinion, this had 
nothing to do with contacts, but with capacity to reason and think.  As Tsiory was urging the 
villagers from Ivahona not be worried by our research mission, acknowledging that the 
presence of white foreigners such as Tozzi Green or myself could generate fear in rural 
populations, Hary from Ivahona interrupted: 
-No, it’s people who have a low intellect who think like that. People are 
scared of the jatropha, whereas they are not forced to accept. You don’t 
give and that’s it.’ […] 
-Some say it’s because you have lamosina [contacts, support] that you 
managed to say no to Tozzi Green. 
-No, it’s not that. It’s the intelligence that counts. They didn’t think enough 
before giving their land. 
-But it looks like the others are a bit scared of the mayor, whereas you’re 
not. How do you explain that? 
-Yes, maybe some people are scared but we’re not. Also, some people 
accepted [taking] the money that the vazaha offered. But we didn’t. 
-Did they offer you money as well? 
-Yes, they offered like 500,000 Fmg to the raïamandreny (35 €), so then 
the raïamandreny started trying to persuade their descendants. Here there 
was a woman who came. But the lonaky refused. And for the other tracts, 
it’s the mayor who offered them and then he puts pressure on people.225 
While seeking to convince of their moral superiority over others, this account hints at a 
number of specificities of the negotiation context in Soatanana. First, it seems to suggest that 
the mayor may have taken more liberties with certain villages than others. In some villages, 
he would have decided on the tracts to offer in advance (prompted by Tozzi Green, 
presumably) and then put pressure on the villagers to accept. This echoes the accounts of the 
negotiations in Antranohazo (Chapter 6), where the “option” of the tract close to the road 
was said to have been put forward by the mayor.  Despite the attempts to convince through 
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the power dynamics discussed above, no such pressure was reported in Soatanana. 
This account also suggests that the financial offers made by the company did not find the 
same purchase as in other villages.  The relatively secure livelihoods enabled by the village’s 
land and cattle wealth may, here again, help to make sense of this position of strength. The 
strong interdependence links, related to the patterns of livestock loans, may also have acted 
as an inhibitor to backdoor bargaining from those who were more in need and who may have 
been interested in the offers made by Tozzi Green. 
 
Finally, Brice’s insistence that villagers’ destiny was in their own hands contrasted with the 
sense of resignation that was found in many other places. This determination that they had 
the power to change things was upheld and spread by figures such as the current lonaky and 
the komity, who reported initiatives to try and get help from the state and to encourage 
children to go to school, for instance. During our discussion in 2013, the villagers were 
priding themselves on being the ones who came up with the idea of the kalony, the local 
vigilantes group set up to address cattle theft in Satrokala and to have put it forth to the state 
authorities. 
Why should it not be us taking care of these problems of cattle theft rather 
than others? And now they’ve taken up the idea in other places […] Since 
the kalony have been set up, we haven’t had any cases of cattle theft. Cattle 
can even be left to sleep outside of the village. […] Policemen don’t do the 
same thing as the kalony. All the police does is chase the thieves and 
penalise people who are fighting and take advantage of them. They come 
and then they ask people ‘So, where is you ID card? Where is your 
fokontany book?’ etc. But the kalony, they always manage to solve the 
problems because they know very well the problems that exist between 
villages. Because the villages that fight each other, they are the ones 
creating the problems of cattle theft, so these conflicts need to be solved 
very quickly. And it’s important to stay calm so it doesn’t get worse. Only 
the kalony can solve problems between villages.226 
Although that version of the origins of kalonys in the area has not been established, in other 
villages, we were told that it was the préfet who had initiated it, this discussion reflects a 
willingness to take matters into their own hands in a context of distrust of state authorities 
and the military. The success of these initiatives reinforced confidence in their own problem-
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solving capacities and the conviction that they were generally better off without the state. 
 
Soatanana’s unified, determined voice and the echo it found with corporate and state 
managers was, therefore, premised on a relative position of power within the local field, on 
a firm belief in villagers’ right to land, and on cohesion building efforts within a village tied 
together by a charismatic leader and interdependent livelihoods. However, these internal 
strengths did not make Soatanana villagers all powerful either. Their forfeiting of the land 
shared with Mangidy and their pessimistic predictions of the future reflected a certain 
vulnerability to power pressures and beliefs that only so much could be resisted and 
contested. 
Concessions and resignation 
Showing a certain resignation of the rules of the game in which these negotiations were 
embedded, Soatanana villagers made a number of concessions to the company and were 
admitting that the outcome of the land deal was ultimately dependent on the good faith of the 
company. 
 
First and foremost, the village did not seek to challenge the transfer of the land on which they 
used to enjoy use rights. This loss, however, was causing significant grief within the village, 
as shall be outlined below.  Ultimately, it was seen as Manalobe’s right to decide on this tract 
and therefore not their place to contest it.  The situation in which the agribusiness company 
was putting the agrarian population, by constraining room for the decision to one village at a 
time, disregarding the complexities of local land tenure, was not contested in itself. It was 
also a sign of respect for the alienation right of its neighbour and of the agreement reached 
with them. 
 
Concessions were also made for the tract that was theirs to be decided on. Since plantations 
had already been made, it was also thought to not be legitimate to ask the company to hand 
it all back: 
The head of region came and we told him: we won’t accept the single bag 
of rice as damage. Now we can’t do anything against these fields that have 
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already been planted but we ask you not to plant any further.227 
As mentioned above, villagers were also saying that if Tozzi Green did not respect their 
commitments to leave the rest of their land untouched, then there was nothing else they could 
do since they could ‘not fight against vazahas’.228 Some further thoughts shared by the lonaky 
showed that this claim did not simply derive from the understanding of the power 
asymmetries they stood in, but also from their conception of Westerners. His strong claims 
about the rights of agrarian populations coexisted with a duty of gratitude and of respect 
towards the foreigners: ‘If the cattle started eating the maize planted by the company, then 
we would risk fighting with the vazaha. So, we have to refuse [giving land] to avoid a war. 
We can’t fight against the vazahas because they’ve created all we have here: hoes, carts, 
medicine…so to avoid that, the best thing is to refuse from the start’.229 
 
These concessions and feelings of anticipated defeat reflected how power mechanisms, 
operating at the intersection between empirically-informed realism and historically-
constructed imaginaries, could restrict the responses of the boldest and most supported of 
villagers. The next section discusses the mixed outcome of the land deal in the village, 
stressing that damage has been limited but not totally avoided and that the future remained 
uncertain. 
 
A moderate success 
The impact of the Tozzi Green project was much more limited than in the village of 
Antranohazo, discussed in Chapter 6. The fields farmed by the company were located to the 
east, while most of Soatanana’s crop fields were located to the west. Farming was therefore 
not affected in any way. The loss of the critical pastures they used to share with their 
neighbours was a source of concern, however. 
                                               
227 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 07/03/2014. 
228 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 24/03/2014. 
229 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 19/03/2014. 
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Dispossessed of its most fertile grassland 
In Manalobe, Tozzi Green had not only found strong enthusiasm, but also some of its most 
fertile soil. When we first came to visit them in February 2013, the village was boasting some 
of the company’s best attempts at jatropha culture. A year later, the trees were roughly one-
metre high and had branches and they were obviously well looked after. It was actually one 
of the only parcels that Tozzi Green had not switched to other crops. As explained above, 
on part of this fertile land, Soatanana used to share grazing rights with Manalobe. This tract 
was crucial to Soatanana for several reasons.  First and foremost, the area was one of the rare 
places to still have good pastures during afosa, the hot season that precedes the rainy season 
(September to November). Only there could they find akata horo, a weed that is green all 
year even in the context of rain shortage, which is particularly appreciated by the cattle. ‘Yes, 
we still have pastures,’ commented Mara’s son, ‘but not enough now’.230 The loss of these 
pastures had allegedly reduced the farming work capacities of their cattle. Thanks to this 
fertile tract of land, explained Eugène from Analavoka, they used to be able to have the cattle 
plough their fields before the rainy season. In the absence of this nutritional fodder, he 
explained, such hard work could not be extracted from them anymore.231  Finally, with this 
tract turning to jatropha plantations, Soatanana lost a potential land reserve since the tract 
included some tany oraky (wet patches) that were favourable to rice growth. 
 
This land transfer to Tozzi Green had also contributed to compounding work hardship. 
Before the development of the Tozzi Green project, the cattle used to be sent there in the 
morning and would return to the village on their own in the evening.232 On hot days, their 
owners could go and fetch them at midday to make them drink but then they would bring 
them back there and so most of the day was free for work on their fields: 
Before, we used to leave the cattle graze there on their own. But now it’s 
not possible anymore. If we want to graze there, we have to make sure that 
the cattle don’t go on the jatropha. […] So, we have to take umbrellas 
because there’s no trees there and it’s so hot.233 
                                               
230 Brice, Soatanana Analavoka, 03/04/2014. 
231 Eugène, Soatanana Analavoka, 12/03/2014. 
232 Imanoela, Soatanana Analavoka, 09/03/2014. 
233 Imanoela, Soatanana Analavoka, 09/03/2014. 
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I did see several cattle pass on these fields during our stay there. The komity explained that 
they were lost cattle looking for the rest of the herd. He explained that Tozzi Green had not 
said whether it was forbidden for them to graze there or not. There was, in any case, not much 
for them to graze on since the plantations were well looked after and there were no weeds 
between the lines of trees.  
 
The lack of compensation given to Manalobe for the generous amount of land they offered 
was also a source of criticism: ‘At least they should have built schools, given ploughs to the 
village or built a small medicine store rather than have people having to walk 12km to reach 
Satrokala’.234  
 
Finally, Soatanana villagers were suffering from the closure of Satrokala’s cattle market 
related to the development of the Tozzi Green project. The five-km walk to sell their cattle 
was replaced by a 60-km trip to the provincial capital:   
For us, the market of Satrokala was better because Ihosy, it’s a lot of 
expenses. It takes three days to go there and then there are expenses; you 
have to pay the bus to come back etc. How can one person ruin the work 
of so many people?235 
While rejoicing on their decision not to give land, the villagers were nonetheless concerned. 
They worried about the impact of the dwindling pastures on their agricultural yield and 
economic capital and about increasing costs to practise the essential business of selling and 
buying cattle. They also feared for an uncertain future, following experiences of deceitful 
pledges on the part of the company and the state and indications that verbal commitments 
made by the company may not always be honoured. 
Breach of trust and concern for the future 
Some of Soatanana’s villagers were blaming their neighbours rather than the company for 
the encroachment against which they had to intervene. A few years before, Soatanana and 
Manalobe had agreed on a clear demarcation between their respective village lands, after 
                                               
234 Victor, komity, Soatanana Iakora, 28/03/2014. 
235 Mara, lonaky,  Soatanana Analavoka 24/03/2014. 
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some 70 cattle had been lost in the vicinity, and a need to clarify respective responsibilities 
for damage payments (and related collective-choice property rights) had emerged. The 
delineation was marked physically: in certain places, a furrow was dug; in others, the area 
was weeded. As explained above, Tozzi Green’s initial work encroached on some of the land 
that had been demarcated in favour of Soatanana. Accounts suggested that the demarcation 
was not very clearly visible anymore. Brice said they were doing maintenance work on them 
every two years ‘since weed was growing very fast’236 but the komity seemed to say that it 
was not very well looked after since cattle theft was rare.  The lonaky stressed that this was 
no excuse on their neighbours’ part, since they knew the demarcation very well anyway. ‘We 
know it’s not the vazaha’s fault,’ he added. ‘It’s not their fault but that of those who gave the 
land’.237 However, the importance of staying on good terms in a context of interdependence 
and matrimonial alliances had forced forgiveness: 
It's useless to keep grudges. The Region Head asked us to find an 
arrangement. Not far from here, there are two villages who fought so hard 
that one man got killed [...]. It's not good to keep grudges, so we had to let 
go, especially as we have relationships through marriages. But if they did 
that again, then it could provoke conflicts.238  
For others, the company was to blame for the encroachment. In the komity’s opinion, for 
instance, Soatanana’s land had not been given by Manalobe. What had happened was that by 
failing to include Manalobe during their prospective work on the land, Tozzi Green had gone 
further than had been agreed.  Pointing to the limits of one-off consultation processes, he 
explained: 'Tozzi Green didn't talk to the people before working the land, that's why they 
encroached on our land. The people from Manalobe weren't there on the ground'.239 
 Whatever the take on this incident, there was widespread resentment and distrust 
towards the company that had asked to borrow land and ended up marking it out: 
At the beginning, Tozzi Green was asking without forcing: we’re only 
asking for a small plot and saying we could refuse. But when Tozzi Green 
marked out the land, then people were surprised: Is that still just a loan or 
is it their property now? So, they went to talk to the regional authorities 
and the Region said it’s the general state that puts these boundary stones, 
                                               
236 Brice, Soatanana Analavoka, 13/04/2014. 
237 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 23/03/2014. 
238 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 23/03/2014. 
239 Victor, komity, Soatanana Iakora, 28/03/2014. 
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not the vazahas. And now there is nothing they can do but just sit and 
watch. And they don’t want to talk about Tozzi Green anymore. As far as 
those who have given are concerned, they simply won’t give ever now.240 
Their suspicion was aggravated following signs of a breach of trust on the part of Tozzi Green 
regarding the agreement reached on the meeting with the Region Head. Upon the suggestion 
of the latter, two large stones had been brought to mark the limit of the area agreed on. Such 
a strategy of “informally formalising” land deals is frequent in Madagascar, as it is 
throughout Africa (Lavigne-Delville 1998). Indeed, very few rural Malagasies can afford the 
costly and timely procedure of titling (Teyssier et al. 2009; Teyssier et al. 2007; Rochegude 
2004) and until now, access to the certification procedures that were introduced by the 2005 
land reform remains unequal (Andriamanalina et al. 2014; Andrianirina-Ratsialonana and 
Legendre 2011). This difficulty of officially formalising land operations is problematic in a 
context where feelings of tenure insecurity is rife (Burnod et al. 2014 b.). It has been 
compensated by the practice of petits papiers, widespread across Madagascar, by which 
transactions such as land sales, divisions and inheritances are written on papers that are then 
signed off by authorities at different levels (depending on the means available), but not 
submitted to official land registries (Colin and Boué 2015; Pelerin and Ramboarison 2006). 
As with the petits papiers, the act of laying down stones borrowed from state-legal repertoires 
was endorsed by state authorities, but was organised outside legal procedures. 
On the very spot where the two informal stones were laid, Tozzi Green abandoned the tract 
ploughed but not planted, as agreed. Some 500m south, however, the marking out and 
planting derived from the agreed delimitation, with the boundary stones gradually moving 
towards the west, further inside Soatanana’s land.  In width (west-east), this encroachment 
was fairly small (some 500m) but in length, it represented more than a kilometre. This area 
of alleged encroachment is marked by red crossed lines in figure 12.  
  
                                               
240 Village elder, Soatanana Ivahona, 01/04/2014. 
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 Figure 12: Map of the land deal in Soatanana (2014-zoom) 
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Whether the result of a misunderstanding or a violation of the agreement passed, this situation 
was feeding suspicion and uncertainty: 
See this boundary stone, they shouldn’t have put that here. They should 
have stopped where they had stopped planting, as agreed. Maybe they’re 
actually going to take this land. They didn’t only stop at the farmed land, 
so in my opinion, these were only tricks.241  
Besides this formalised 
encroachment, there were 
pockets of uncertainty. South of 
the jatropha plantations, Tozzi 
Green had ploughed a tazoa that 
partly belonged to Soatanana 
(area in dark grey on map). The 
tract has not been planted or 
marked out yet but, in the 
absence of information, villagers 
were worried that this possibly 
signalled another encroachment. Like in Antranohazo (Chapter 6), there were enough signs 
of appropriation by the company for the villagers to want to avoid using the land too much. 
When questioned about this, the head of Tozzi Green operations in Satrokala was not sure 
which tract we were referring to. However, in an explanation outlining the transient nature 
of their land appropriation in a context of agronomic failures and experimentation, he 
explained: ‘In Mangidy, we are farming 240 ha and we have abandoned a tract of 80 ha at 
the back because it was not interesting. [...] No, it’s in the lease and it’s still ours but we have 
abandoned it for technical reasons’.242 Whether Soatanana’s or Mangidy’s, this ‘abandoned 
tract’ is legally no longer the villagers’ property: although Tozzi Green had decided they no 
longer needed it, it had now been titled in the name of the state. 
 
Indignation was also directed towards state leaders, in particular towards the mayor. As 
mentioned above, he had contributed by reproducing the essential lie that the land would be 
                                               
241 Victor, komity, Tozzi Green’s jatropha fields east of Soatanana, 15/03/2014. 
242 Stefano, Satrokala village, 05/04/2014. 
Figure 13: Photo komity of Soatanana standing above 
boundary stone  
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borrowed, not titled. Whether he had done this consciously or not, there was a clear 
understanding of the vested interest he had in the formalisation of the land deal. ‘The mayor 
tried to push us to give land but actually he is the one gaining at every hectare given’.243 The 
sense of betrayal was exacerbated by the inversely proportionate relationship between his 
enrichment through the land deal and the villagers’ dispossession. ‘We went to the mayor 
and asked him, “What are you doing with these fields because we don’t have any land left. 
Because while you’re lining your pockets, the population is getting poorer”’.244 The same 
moral economic judgement as the one encountered in Antranohazo is expressed here: if they 
jeopardise people’s subsistence rights, extraversion strategies are not acceptable and a price 
will be paid for that power abuse. ‘You know a lot of people voted for this mayor. But maybe 
next time, we will elect another candidate!’245 Because of their strong involvement in the 
land deal negotiations, local officials are also held responsible for power abuses and threats 
to subsistence rights that corporate projects may represent. Mara’s assertion confirms that 
the ballot box is seen as a valued means to regain some control and sanction the contempt 
towards the interests of constituents. 
 
Despite the important influence Soatanana had had on the land deal compared with most 
villages, outcomes were nonetheless not as bright as initially foreseen.  Some critical land 
had had to be abandoned to the project; there seemed to have been some infraction of informal 
agreements passed with the company; and although not planted yet, another tract had been 
ploughed outside all consultation. 
 
Conclusion 
Through its resistance to pressures to give land and its successful attempt at renegotiating 
some of the land deal before it was sealed, Soatanana offers an illustration of the potential of 
local voices to influence land deals through civil resistance, provided several important 
conditions are met. 
                                               
243 Hary, Soatanana Ivahona, 18/03/2014. 
244 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 19/03/2014. 
245 Mara, lonaky, Soatanana Analavoka, 19/03/2014. 
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The village was formally asked to give land and after the villagers discussed the issue among 
themselves, the decision was to say ‘no’. As mentioned in Chapter 5, only two other villages 
out of the 20 consulted took the same decision.  There was then a case of encroachment, 
following the development of the project in the neighbouring village, against which 
Soatanana villagers reacted swiftly.  A meeting was then organised with some of Tozzi 
Green’s local managers and senior local authorities and a compromise was found. There 
remained uncertainties regarding certain tracts on which Tozzi Green’s intentions were not 
clear, and some of the boundary marking seemed to have gone beyond what the villagers had 
understood was the agreed demarcation. Overall, however, Soatanana villagers had managed 
to regain most of the land on which they claimed alienation rights. Their response to the land 
deal negotiations was singular in two respects: first, because they resisted pressures to give 
land and second, because the village spoke with one voice.  
 
Consultation had indeed been pervaded by the same power dynamics as the one observed in 
Antranohazo (Chapter 6). Lack of information and of legal means to access state institutions 
(first dimension of power) was compounded by attempts, by corporate and state brokers with 
a vested interest in the land deal, to constrain the agenda open to villagers through 
misinformation and intimidation (second dimension of power). 
 
Soatanana villagers nevertheless demonstrated a singular capacity to offset some of these 
constraints and pressures. Their lesser vulnerability to vertical power pressures (compared to 
the villagers of Antranohazo, Chapter 6) seemed to be related to their position of strength in 
the local field, which allowed them to confront insistent state agents and to mobilise 
influential allies to support them in their struggles against dispossession. Confidence about 
the right and necessity to preserve their land also thrived on past experiences and on the 
relatively good situation the village enjoyed in terms of food security.  Previous experiences 
with foreigners operating on their land further encouraged caution towards the type of 
changes offered by Tozzi Green, in a context where endogenous forces were trusted to be 
much more reliable in ensuring (food and general) security than state or foreign forces were. 
Resisting political pressures to acquiesce land requests also consisted of resisting dominant 
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narratives over villagers’ lack of rights over land. To the assertions that untitled land 
belonged to the state, Soatanana’s lonaky was opposing an agrarian-centred conception of 
local land rights which echoed discourses of advocates of food and land sovereignty.246  
 
Struggles against dispossession also relied on a perceptive understanding of the importance 
of preventing the development and, more critically, the expression of alternative voices.  
There were indeed voices, within the village, thinking it might be wise (or interesting) to 
comply with the instructions from the top.  In a compelling illustration of what McAdam, 
Tarrow and Tilly (2001) have called ‘collective attribution of threat and opportunity’, efforts 
were made to align views within the village regarding what to see as an opportunity (their 
current livelihoods as a safe pathway with potential for enrichment) and what to view as risk 
(Tozzi Green, causing a threat of uncompensated, long-term dispossession).  Aspirations of 
dissent were also repelled, thanks to the appropriation of social spaces and collective 
identities (social appropriation) to reassert moral economic rules, with villagers being 
actively reminded of their moral obligation to prioritise the village common good over 
personal interests and of their risks of being excluded from the community for failing to do 
so.  
 
However unique and bold, Soatanana’s refusal to comply with the consultation process and 
reaction to the encroachment proved insufficient in preserving all the village land 
endowments.  As many other villages visited, Soatanana ended up being both included and 
excluded from the decision-making process over its land. As such, Soatanana’s case study 
also draws attention to the shortcomings of the consultation process in terms of participation 
and sensitivity to the complexities of local land tenure, since even free, prior and informed 
refusal does not protect from the risk of unwanted land losses. Here again, the issue of ‘who 
can talk on what’ is decided elsewhere (second dimension of power) and generally, use rights 
do not warrant a position at the negotiating table. Soatanana’s forfeiting of the grassland 
                                               
246 Arguing that alternative food systems cannot be achieved without a simultaneous move towards democratic land control, some engaged 
researchers have recently launched a discussion over ‘land sovereignty’ as a potential land framework for the food sovereignty campaign. 
Land sovereignty is presented as both an alternative analytical framework (going beyond calls for land reform) and a political project whose 
core principle lies in  ‘the right of the working people to have effective access to, control over and use of land, and live on it as a resource, 
space and territory’ (Borras et al. 2014: 11). 
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given by Manalobe and the defeatism shown should the company not respect its commitment 
and encroach on their land regardless betrayed a vulnerability to feelings of anticipated defeat 
(second and third dimensional power) and the fragility of their resistance. 
 
Soatanana’s case study highlights some of the conditions under which local voices can be 
heard in the context of land deal negotiations despite a context of institutional bias.  On the 
one hand, it requires a certain capacity on the part of the villagers to: (i) resist political 
pressures to passively comply with land requests: in this case, villagers resisted efforts at 
intimidation and persuasion by wielding a counter-power, which was galvanised by 
experience, material and relational resources and boosted by the construction of counter-
narratives. Soatanana villagers, however, were not invincible to potential power abuses; (ii) 
galvanise unity around moral economies to avoid alternative responses being brought from 
within the village. On the other, state and corporate decision-makers need to be permeable to 
these voices which, in this case, was helped by the villagers’ leverage of the state through 
key contacts, on a certain corporate ethics to listen to protests and on a national political 
context encouraging caution around accusations of land grabbing. The following case study 
highlights how efforts to express a strong voice of protest can be defeated by a failure to unite 
the community and highlights how permeability to local voices can stop where corporate 
interests are at risk.  
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CHAPTER 8 
INSTRUMENTALISED CONTESTATION 
THE CASE OF MANGIDY 
 
Introduction  
Despite Mangidy belonging to the municipality of Ambatolahy, some of their grassland was 
included in the first lease given to Tozzi Green. The village elites, who had been active 
members of the resistance front that had coalesced around the mayor of Ambatolahy, had 
formally and proactively opposed that appropriation made without any of their villagers 
being consulted. Their complaint was discarded on the grounds that the concerned tract, 
whose transfer had been endorsed by a neighbouring village, was not located on the 
administrative territory of Ambatolahy. At the time of the last fieldwork, Tozzi Green had 
recently been prospecting further into the village territory, with the involvement of villagers 
from Mangidy this time, who had less to lose and more to gain from the deal offered by the 
company than their wealthier next of kin. These cooperative villagers however were showing 
signs of increasing disappointment with a company that was showing little will to deliver on 
its promises. The convergence of indignations within the village was not enough to ease the 
tensions generated by their affront to the authority of village leaders. Although the outcome 
of the land deal threatened to be detrimental for all, the fractured village community failed 
to unite struggles, while the mayor, who had provided those struggling against dispossession 
with a critical support within the state, was suspiciously more and more distant. 
 
The chapter first describes the stages of Tozzi Green’s development on the plain of Berevo 
where Mangidy village is based. It then discusses the conflicting responses brought by the 
village to the land deal negotiations: the compliance of some villagers to Tozzi Green’s recent 
attempt to develop on the village land, revealing that the vocal resistance that had been heard 
from the village should not be mistaken for consensual outright opposition to the land deal. 
I then move on to explain the elites’ failure to acknowledge the complexity of the rationale 
behind other villagers’ compliance with Tozzi Green’s land requests, in contexts where the 
180 
 
 
capacities to resist vertical power pressures were not equally shared across the village. 
Suspicion and resentment over their backdoor discussions with the company, understood at 
best as selfish struggles for incorporation, at worst as sheer acts of sabotage of their own 
wealth and authority, prevented them from seeing the convergence of indignation that was 
growing as Tozzi Green was failing to honour expectations of gratitude and support. The 
concluding section describes how brokers of the land deal successively informed and built 
on these tensions and how dissonant voices were silenced by selective legalism and versatile 
politics.   
  
Tozzi Green on the plain of Berevo 
The village of Mangidy is located on a wide plateau, locally referred to as the plateau of 
Berevo, which stretches over two municipalities.247 The agribusiness company had found 
strong assets in this fertile, vast space and had therefore developed there quite extensively.  
In the southern part of the plateau, represented in Figure 14, a total of five tracts had been 
either appropriated or delineated by Tozzi Green.248 
 
Until 2014, all Tozzi Green’s work in Berevo was carried out on the side of the plateau that 
belonged to municipality X only. After a brief attempt at jatropha, they switched to maize 
and sunflower. They moved from west to east, planting in Isorana first (2011), next in 
Ankazoabo (2012) and finally, in Bekata (2013). These three tracts were delineated by 
boundary stones and an informed employee at the land registry confirmed they were part of 
the first lease granted to Tozzi Green: 2,045 ha had been granted in Isorana, and 543 ha for 
Ankazoabo and Bekata combined. 
 
At the time of the last fieldwork (early 2014), fresh furrows that had been drawn by tractor a 
few days before were visible in two new locations further south (tract A and B in Figure 14). 
Unlike the three tracts mentioned above, these were clearly inside Ambatolahy municipal 
territory, which suggested that the company intended to develop there despite the mayor’s 
                                               
247 The name of the neighbouring municipality is not specified for confidentiality reasons. 
248 Tozzi Green also had plantations north of the plateau but only those to the south are of interest for this discussion. 
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official opposition to their project and the fact that no official procedure had been open for 
land transfers there.249 The speed at which this prospective work had been carried out and the 
little information available meant there was great uncertainty as to how much would 
ultimately be appropriated, when and how. 
  
                                               
249 Manitra, head of the regional topographic department, Land registry, Ihosy, 16/05/2014. 
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 Figure 14: Map of past and ongoing land deals in Mangidy (April 2014) 
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Out of these five tracts mentioned here, four were used or used to be used by the villagers of 
Mangidy.  There was a critical difference in terms of the land deal negotiation process, 
however: whereas no one from the village had been consulted for the first two tracts 
(Ankazoabo and Bekata), for the last two some villagers had participated in the discussions. 
In the next pages, I discuss the conflicting responses that were brought to these successive 
(attempts at) land acquisitions within the village.  
Resistance of the elite, revenge of the poor? 
Before getting to Mangidy for the first time in 2014, we met three village authorities from 
Ambatolahy. This meeting had been arranged for us in Ihosy, by someone who was keen for 
me to hear the problems that Tozzi Green was causing in Ambatolahy.250  Among the men 
met on that day was Gaston, a hamlet leader from Mangidy.  He explained that Tozzi Green 
had developed on their village land a few years before and that they were now trying to 
extend further.251 Upon our arrival in the village a few days later, he guided us to the small 
hamlet of Mangidy Alakamisy, where Fabrice, his 25-year old eldest son and recently 
designated head of fokontany, would host us for the rest of our stay there.  It took some effort, 
following that initial meeting in Ihosy, to make it clear that we were not there to support them 
in their resistance against the company, but soon enough, the two men were giving us 
guarantees that they would not interfere with our ambitions to get a fair picture of people’s 
varied feelings within the village. ‘No, you are right,’ Fabrice ended up acknowledging, ‘us, 
we are opposed, but there are actually some in the village who support the vazaha’.252  
 
It only took a few days to work out who those ‘we’ and ‘they’ referred to. On the one hand, 
there was Gaston, his sons and his elder brother, the lonaky and main cattle owner based in 
the hamlet of Ankerana: they shall hereafter be imperfectly referred to as the ‘village 
elites’,253 out of reference to the political powers (lonaky, head of fokontany) and to their 
                                               
250 Focus group discussion with village leaders from the municipality of Ambatolahy, 02/02/2014, Ihosy.  For confidentiality reasons, no 
details are given on his identity and occupation of the person who convened this meeting. 
251 Gaston, head of hamlet Mangidy, Ihosy, 02/04/2014. 
252 Fabrice, head  of fokontany, Mangidy Alakamisy, 14/04/2014. 
253 This designation of ‘village elites’, as the one of the less wealthy that will sometimes be used to describe the second group, is very 
imperfect in that it obscures the internal heterogeneity of this group across gender, age group and so on and the potential silencing of voices 
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cattle wealth concentrated within their branch of the family. They lived in the hamlets of 
Alakamisy and Ankerana. This group had been opposed to the project from the start and had 
voiced their opposition in different forums. As their resistance showed, these people were 
generally more educated, mobile and networked than other villagers. The ‘they’ referred to 
villagers from the hamlets of Maroteza and Vohiposa who had recently been in talks with 
Tozzi Green. The hamlet of Tanamarina, for its part, did not seem to belong to any of these 
groups.  
  
                                               
that may have taken place within it as well. For instance, Fabrice explained that despite his official position of head of fokotany, he had 
little effective powers because of his young age. ‘The only reason they chose me,‘ he explained, ‘is because I know how to  read and write’. 
(Fabrice, Mangidy Alakamisy, 14/04/2014). Despite this internal diversity, obligations of respect towards the position of the leaders of 
their respective sub-groups seemed to have been internalised enough to have prevented dissent. 
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 Figure 15: Map of past and ongoing land deals in Mangidy (April 2014-zoom) 
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In the next pages, I describe the different initiatives that were taken by this first group to 
protest Tozzi Green’s development on their land and how these were countered by conflicting 
responses from neighbours and fellow villagers, whose perspective on the opportunity-threat 
balance represented by Tozzi Green were slightly different from theirs. 
Outspoken, supported opposition to the land deal 
Mangidy experienced a first loss of grassland following discussions between Tozzi Green 
and the neighbouring village of Zazafotsy, in municipality X. We had visited Zazafotsy in 
2013 and the authorised voices of the village had shown strong enthusiasm towards the 
agribusiness project.254 They had offered the company quite a significant amount of land: the 
Ankazoabo and the Bekata tracts to the south of their village (cf. Figure 14) and tracts to the 
north (not on map). The transfers of the first two were contested by the authorities of three 
villages from Ambatolahy municipality (Mangidy, Antsoha and Andalanotsy) who stressed 
not only that they used to use these pastures as well, but also that Zazafotsy did not own any 
alienation rights to them since they were not the ones paying in case of cattle theft. In their 
opinion, it was malicious intent based on tense relationships that had driven Zazafotsy to give 
this land away: 
Zazafotsy gave land because there were disagreements between them and 
us but they should have thought about it a little bit more because then they 
too could still be grazing here.255 
The leaders of the three villages reacted immediately to this alleged usurpation of land rights. 
To try and prevent land loss, they communicated extensively on their opposition to the land 
transfer and mobilised strategic alliances with state officials and national activists. 
 
As explained in Chapter 2, an essential ingredient to the (partial) success of those struggling 
against dispossession in Ambatolahy was the mayor’s decision to publicly oppose the 
development of Tozzi Green on his municipal land. Village elites from Mangidy and their 
                                               
254 Focus group discussion, Zazafotsy village, Municipality X, date 2013. 
255 Ikala, lonaky Antsoha, Antosha, 13/05/2014. 
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counterparts from Antsoha and Andalanotsy played a role in convincing him to go against 
the institutional bias and support them instead. They were indeed among the first on a list of 
wealthy cattle owners who publicly called him to act against the corporate acquisition of their 
land. The day after Tozzi Green managers had met with Zazafotsy., they sent him a letter to 
formalise their opposition and forwarded it to the most influential figures of the regional state 
apparatus (the Region Head, the Head of District and the Head of Ihosy Supreme Court), 
asking them to help them defend their land. On the same day, the village elites of Mangidy 
and Antsoha also raised their concern and opposition in a written ‘announcement’ that was 
sent to most of the regional state authorities, and communicated to radio AVEC, the local 
branch of radio Don Bosco, a Catholic radio with a wide reach in rural areas of Madagascar.  
When Tozzi Green started extending towards Ankazoabo (September 2013), another letter 
was sent on behalf of the whole fokontany of Morafeno and the village of Andalanotsy to the 
Vice Prime Minister himself.  The argument was of a slightly different nature to those made 
in previous letters. Instead of insisting on the illegitimacy of the land transfer by their 
neighbour, they were grounding their rights to the lost land on claims to ancestrality: ‘We are 
the descendants of the first people who settled here. The land has been developed since our 
ancestors. Clear frontiers exist’. Interestingly, their arguments also connected their distress 
to the unavailability of state services. The implicit message was that they were not resisting 
state-bureaucratic efforts to rationalise land uses and inventory land property but that in the 
absence of state support, they did not have the financial and practical means to formalise their 
land rights nor any livelihood alternative to extensive cattle farming: ‘There are no [state or 
donor-supported] project[s] here. We need cattle farming to survive’. They also warned of 
the risks of having more people dependent on the state benefit system by stressing the 
negative impacts the agribusiness project already had and could have further on their 
livelihoods and social cohesion, talking of a shortage of pastures, a decrease in cattle wealth, 
famine, lack of jobs and social tensions. They also pointed to the tenure insecurity the 
marginalisation was putting on them: ‘We would like to register our land, but the state has 
not set up any BIF (local land office licensed to issue land certificate) in our locality’. The 
letter closed on two concrete requests: one for all contracts of land rental to be brought to an 
end and the second for the use of GPS and vehicles by Tozzi Green on their land to be 
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stopped.256  
 
The formal-legal and rationalist twist of their advocacy points to the influence of civil society. 
Some of these villagers’ authorities had indeed been in close contact with national activists 
in the past years. The head of the fokontany of Andalanotsy, who had co-written that second 
letter, was, for instance, well-known by the anti-land grab activists based in Antananarivo. 
The solidarity organisation that had helped to organise the press conference in November 
2012 confirmed being supportive of the resistance efforts of these very villagers. Their 
general director, a legal practitioner, had already been to the fokontany several times.257  ‘He 
really helped us,’ explained Gaston, who had taken part in the press conference himself.258 
At the time of the last fieldwork, their organisation was organising a meeting in Fort-
Dauphin, in the south of the country, to bring together all those village leaders who were 
currently trying to resist corporate land acquisitions across the island. 
 
Mangidy’s elite resistance efforts also gained from the presence of wealthy and influential 
individuals within their fokontany. As in Soatanana, these boasted determination in fighting 
for what they saw as their legitimate right to land and food. The elder son of Ambatolahy’s 
wealthiest cattle owner, Tovo from Andalanotsy, was one of them. ‘The state thinks there are 
no landowners but of course there are landowners. There’s no land without land owners,’259 
he observed as he discussed the political support enjoyed by the Tozzi Green project. The 
village also benefited from a head of fokontany who could read and write, although his young 
age caused him to be excluded from high-level village authority discussions.  
 
Strategies of resistance were regularly discussed in local meetings, which were organised 
either at the level of the municipality or of the fokontany.  A meeting with all the fokontany 
of the municipality had just been held by the mayor in Ambatolahy main village, after village 
authorities from Mangidy had reported on the new delineation work recently started by Tozzi 
                                               
256 Letter signed by the fokontany of Morafeno and Andalanotsy, 14/09/2013 and addressed to the Vice-Prime Minister in Charge of Land 
and Country Planning. 
257 Hoby, General Director, solidarity organisation, Antananarivo, 21/05/2014. 
258 Gaston, head of hamlet, Mangidy Alakamisy, 17/04/2014. 
259 Tovo, fields close to tract A, 16/04/2014. 
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Green. At the meeting, the official was reported to have sensitised the villagers on their land 
rights and to have reminded them that no land could be given away without his permission. 
Finally, the authorities of Mangidy had recently called some 15 people from the whole 
fokontany to come for a meeting in their village to discuss the issue and decide on the way 
forward. 
 
This alliance between Mangidy’s village authorities, the mayor and connected activists was 
a critical piece of the broader movement of resistance, described in Chapter 2. As explained 
there, this bottom-up protest gained some critical victories, with (most of) Ambatolahy’s 
territory being left out of the lease granted to Tozzi Green in 2012. However, the case of 
Mangidy highlights the limits of this elite-based contentious politics. First, it did not protect 
from the loss of village land outside the borders of the municipality. Second, as the next 
pages describe, this mobilisation process did not have purchase in a divided, unequal local 
setting. 
Struggles for incorporation 
Behind this façade of determination and unity, resistance had quite a fragile support structure 
within Mangidy.  As aptly summarised by Tilahy, when we asked how villagers from 
Mangidy viewed Tozzi Green: ‘Some are totally opposed to the vazaha, yes, but others are 
scared and others actually want them to work here’.260  Fieldwork inside the village revealed 
that the authorities’ vocal resistance against land loss was indeed obscuring (i) a differential 
vulnerability to power pressures and (ii) different interests as to whether to struggle against 
dispossession or struggle for incorporation.   
 
Compared with Antranohazo (Chapter 6) where dissent was slightly suspected but not 
avowed and not discussed, in Mangidy everyone knew that there were differences of opinion 
towards Tozzi Green and that these divergences had been expressed within the land deal 
negotiations.  Out of the village’s five hamlets, two had received visits from Tozzi Green and 
had been asked to give land: Maroteza and Vohiposa. The consulted villagers confirmed 
                                               
260 Tilahy, villager working as a guard for Tozzi Green, Mangidy Maroteza, 22/04/2014. 
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having formally approved land being transferred to Tozzi Green and having been involved 
in the choice of the area to offer.  Versions vary as to who, between Tozzi Green and the 
villagers, took the initiative in creating contact, however, and as discussed below, compliance 
seemed to have been more “voluntary” in one case than in another. In any case, it is certainly 
meaningful that these interlocutors came from two of the most deprived hamlets of the 
village, while all the senior village authorities who had previously expressed their opposition 
to Tozzi Green had been excluded from the discussions. The next section discusses how 
inequalities underpin these conflicts of perceptions, highlighting the differentiated risks and 
opportunities the project was understood to represent for these two groups.  
Differential needs, differential threats 
According to the latest official numbers, there were some 900 cattle in Mangidy,261 although 
my own assessments suggest this figure may have been strongly overstated (from 350).262 In 
any case, distribution of this capital across the village was certainly unequal, with the hamlets 
of Ankerana and Alakamisy concentrating most of it (a minimum of 200 head for the former 
and 150 for the latter). Among the other three hamlets, only Vohiposa had a few head of its 
own (10). His hamlet leader explained that their wealth had significantly shrunk in the past 
thirty to forty years because of demographic pressure and frequent extortion by the police.263  
There were inequalities in terms of land distribution as well. Critically, the hamlet of 
Tanamarina did not have any tany oraky (fertile, wet patches of land), whereas all the others 
had. In the absence of dams, it meant they could only grow rice on the highlands.264 The 
village was hosting the female branch of the lineage, whose current head had married a 
migrant from the highlands. The localisation of this hamlet on less fertile land might not have 
been a coincidence. Agricultural growth was further stunted by a lack of financial means: 
                                               
261 Confidential source within the regional administration, Ihosy, 31/01/2014. 
262 There are a few reasons why cattle-owners may want to over- and under-declare their livestock possession. A confidential source 
mentioned some potential collusion with the veterinary department in these manipulations of numbers (confidential source, land 
administration, Antananarivo, private communication, Feb 2017). I do not claim that my own numbers are more reliable either however,  
being based themselves on visual observation (which cannot account for the cattle which is lent outside of the village) and on the aggregation 
of the numbers given to me by each of the hamlets (again subject to caution). 
263 Hamlet leader, Mangidy Vohiposa,  20/04/2014. 
264 Vany, Mangidy Tanamarina, 17/04/2014. 
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they explained having land prone to maize that they could not develop because they could 
not afford the necessary help of an outside workforce.  
 
These inequalities were leading to contrasting assessments of the threat/opportunity potential 
represented by the agribusiness project and these underpinned fairly different explanations 
of the causes of vulnerabilities within the village. On the one hand, village authorities (the 
lonaky, the head of the fokontany and the head of the hamlet of Alakamisy) and cattle owners 
were insisting on issues of resource shortages. According to the lonaky, rice paddies were 
insufficient to cover all their needs and they did not have any sakasaka (flooded parcels) on 
which to develop new ones.265 They had the financial means to compensate for it, however, 
by purchasing land in other villages. The young head of fokontany, for instance, had recently 
bought some rice paddies in the neighbouring villages of Andalanotsy and Feoandala, for 
instance. In the hamlet of Vohiposa and Maroteza which had recently contracted with Tozzi 
Green, however, a different picture emerged, initially anyway.  They confirmed that all 
farmland had been divided between hamlets but insisted that the village did not suffer from 
land shortages. On the one hand, villagers from Maroteza were stressing how fertile their 
land was. On the other, those from Vohiposa were saying not only that they had enough rice 
paddies, but that they even had land reserves: ‘Actually we can’t even develop all of our land. 
There’s some land that’s favourable to rice paddies that we haven’t even developed yet’.266 
Whilst those struggling against dispossession were complaining of land shortages, villagers 
from Maroteza and Tanamarina both raised problems related to the lack of material and 
technology to exploit the land properly.  
 
These contradictory emphases again remind us of how these discussions of natural 
endowments are part and parcel of the discursive processes of legitimation of their respective 
responses to the land deal negotiations.  For cattle owners, Tozzi Green was adding pressure 
on already stretched natural resources, putting their fragile livelihoods at risks. Their 
narratives revolved around the impossibility to have large-scale farming coexist with 
extensive pastoralism on the same territory. They expressed a fear of losing their livelihoods 
                                               
265 Lonaky Mangidy, Mangidy Ankerana, 16/04/2014. 
266 Villager, Mangidy Vohiposa, 17/04/2014. 
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entirely, a threat they argued did not belong to a distant hypothetical future since the Tozzi 
Green project had allegedly already had quite severe adverse effects on them: ‘Sixty-three 
cattle died last year in Soatanimbary because of the jatropha. The cattle, we can’t keep it at 
home. All of our food is going to disappear’.267  
Villagers from Vohiposa, on the contrary, explained that they would not suffer from the loss 
of land they had recently contributed to delineating with Tozzi Green since they ‘didn’t have 
a lot of cattle’.268 In Maroteza, they argued some land transfers could actually be a boon for 
those who, like them, did not need it as it meant less responsibility and thereby less financial 
burden.  
When cattle tracks get lost here, we are asked to pay damages and because 
we don’t have cattle, it means we have to sell our rice paddies for that. So, 
I told the mayor: “If you pay the damages for the cattle lost in this field, I 
will immediately dismiss Tozzi Green. But if we’re the ones paying the 
damages, let me collaborate with Tozzi Green so we can ask for our benefit 
with them”. That’s why the mayor didn’t manage to convince us.269  
Interviewed villagers from Vohiposa also pointed to a sense of compromise on the part of 
the company, explaining that no sanctions had yet been imposed despite frequent cases of 
cattle stomping on to Tozzi Green’s fields.270 For her part, Vany, the female head of 
Tanamarina hamlet, insisted on the generosity of the support provided by the company across 
the municipality: ‘If someone falls ill, whether day or night, they come and fetch him and 
bring him to the hospital in Ihosy or Satrokala’.271  Although no one from their hamlet had 
been consulted by Tozzi Green, she  made it clear that she supported the struggles for 
incorporation that others had engaged in and still hoped it could bring results: ‘We asked for 
a hospital [a health centre] and tractors to plough our land but until now, they haven’t done 
anything. Maybe one day they will’.272  
 
Explanations heard in these three more deprived hamlets outlined once more how relative 
                                               
267 Samuel, son of the lonaky, Mangidy Ankerana, 23/04/2014. 
268 Eugene, Mangidy Vohiposa, 17/04/2014. 
269 Dax, Mangidy Maroteza, 21/04/2014. 
270 Villager, Mangidy Vohiposa, Ambatolahy, 17/04/2014. 
271 Vany, hamlet leader, Mangidy Tanamarina, 25/04/2014. 
272 Vany, hamlet leader, Mangidy Tanamarina, 25/04/2014. 
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wealth and autonomy could underpin contrasted assessments of the risks and opportunities 
represented by an agribusiness project. As in Antranohazo (Chapter 6) and compared with 
Soatanana however (Chapter 7), these contrasted perceptions both found some kind of 
expression within the land deal negotiations.  However, explanations varied from one hamlet 
to the next as to how much the compliance with the company’s land requests was deliberate 
or not. The next pages explain how the nuances found in the accounts of the land deal 
negotiation process between Vohiposa and Maroteza could be traced to their respective 
dependence situation on the village elites.  
Differentiated risks of expressing subversive voices 
The village economy was not devoid of intra-community exchanges and mechanisms of 
solidarity support between the differently-endowed hamlets. I saw villagers from the hamlet 
of Alakamisy make a detour through Vohiposa to load up the latter’s crop yields on their cart 
and carry them to the market for them, for instance. More critically, wealthier villagers were 
lending cattle to those who did not have any. However, cattle-poor hamlets seemed to be 
offered different treatment: whereas Vohiposa had been given the care of 100 zebus, 
Maroteza and Tanamarina were only lent livestock for the ploughing work (and did not tend 
anyone else’s cattle either). To Maroteza, the village of the lonaky had lent 20 head for a few 
years but had ended up retrieving them. As explained in Chapter 2, tending cattle provides 
some degree of security as in the event of hardship, some requests for help can be made to 
those whose cattle are taken care of.  This unequal sharing of capital across the village 
reflected varying degrees of trust: the lonaky explained that they had taken the cattle back 
from Maroteza because ‘they didn’t know how to take care of the cattle so they were 
becoming skinny’.273  As far as Tanamarina was concerned, it proved difficult to gain 
significant information as to why no cattle was lent to them and whether they suffered from 
it. At any rate, these arrangements meant that hamlets were tied together by different levels 
of mutual obligations. 
 
With regards to these different degrees of dependencies towards the village wealthy, 
challenging the elite’s struggles against dispossession could be assumed to have been less 
                                               
273 Lonaky Mangidy, Mangidy Ankerana, 08/05/2014. 
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risky for some than for others. This could partly explain the very different tones encountered 
in Maroteza and in Vohisa. In the former, we found an energetic enthusiasm for the deal that 
had initially been offered by Tozzi Green. Dax, a thirty-year old man and unofficial hamlet 
leader, was very proud to recall how proactive he had been in bringing the company to their 
village. For him, while limiting the financial risks related to cattle theft, transactions with the 
project offered them perspectives of unique socio-economic opportunities.274 Villagers from 
Vohiposa, who had a much stronger economic dependency on the village elites, described 
their engagement with the land deal negotiations in a very different manner. They 
downplayed any possible hopes they may have had and made it quite clear that their 
compliance was mostly the result of intimidation. The similarity of the power dynamics to 
those reported in the other two case studies (Chapter 6 and 7) gives credibility to these 
narratives, which shall be discussed below. However, the emphasis on those constraints also 
needs to be looked at in the light of their relationship of dependency towards the cattle owners 
from their village and the potential suspicions that we might repeat their testimonies to our 
hosts. 
 
There was certainly no ignorance of the adverse consequences the land transfer which they 
had contributed to delineating (tract A) could have on their wealthier next of kin, however.  
-Would you still have enough pastures if Tozzi Green appropriated all of 
that land? I asked.  
 -For us who don’t have a lot of cattle, it’s enough. But for the others, it 
could be a problem […] Yes, there are people who have a lot of cattle here. 
The richest have more than 100 heads. To them, it’s going to cause 
problems, yes.275 
Village elites felt betrayed and took it as a personal settlement against them because of 
jealousies. I argue below that the animosities that developed in this fractured context ended 
up obscuring some of the vertical power dynamics that were pressuring both groups, and the 
increasing convergence of feelings towards the company that were taking over their initial 
disagreements.   
 
                                               
274 Dax, Mangidy Maroteza, 21/04/2014. 
275 Eugène, Mangidy Vohiposa, 20/04/2014. 
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Fractured confrontation of power pressures and moral economic violations 
The next pages point to the village’s failure to acknowledge and act on the growing 
convergence of indignations across groups. By the time of the last fieldwork, village elites 
had developed acute resentment against a company which was showing total disregard for 
their needs by appropriating some of their most critical pastures and for their basic rights by 
ignoring their opposition to the land transfers. Simultaneously, those who had seen struggles 
for incorporation as a better option were starting to wonder whether their compliance with 
the negotiation process, and associated risks, would ever be compensated. While moral 
economic expectations were breached on both sides, the different groups were themselves 
too divided to be able to come up with a common strategy to negotiate for better terms and/or 
limit the extent of land loss.  
Converging indignations 
Respective indignations were correlated with the moral economic expectations that had 
underpinned the group’s respective responses to the negotiations. For village elites, both their 
needs and rights were being trampled. The Bekata and Ankazoabo tracts represented highly 
critical pastures whose quantity and quality seemed hard to make up for, especially as the 
loss also affected Antsoha and Andalanotsy where cattle were particularly numerous as well 
(900 for former and more than 5,000 head for Andalanotsy). Competition for alternative 
pastures was therefore particularly acute, whereas options were limited: 
There’s grassland to the south-east but there already are other villages from 
the fokontany grazing there […]   
-Yes, and these pastures are not as good as the ones to the north. These 
were our main pastures. There’s really good fodder for the cattle there.276 
In that context, the appropriation of the tracts recently delineated by tractor would be 
particularly concerning. Tract A was all they had left of their previous pastures north of the 
village and tract B was one of the only ones that could still be grazed at the end of the dry 
season (September to November) and, for this reason, was used by all of the villages of the 
fokontany of Morafeno.277 It was also dangerously close to some of the village’s hamlets and 
                                               
276 Samuel, son of the lonaky, Mangidy Ankerana, 23/04/2014. 
277 Fabrice, head of fokontany, Mangidy Alakamisy, 17/04/2014. 
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rice paddies. From Mangidy Alakamisy, less than a kilometre separated the furrows from the 
houses (GPS collected data). This proximity showed the insubstantial case Tozzi Green was 
making of ancestral rights and people’s livelihoods:  
This tazoa [Ankazoabo and Bekata] was our grassland since our grandma. 
All our villages used to graze there. And today Tozzi Green is trying to 
extend very close to our village. There’s only a few metres left between 
our village and their plantations.278  
As in Antranohazo (Chapter 6) and Soatanana (Chapter 7), the agribusiness plantations were 
compounding the daily workload that had already increased as a result of demographic 
pressure and shifting land uses. These challenges were not only those of the elites, but also 
of the younger generations or less privileged villagers in charge of tending their cattle such 
as that 30-year old man from Vohiposa: 
Before, we didn’t have to look after the cattle. We would leave them out in 
the fields, and then come back to the village and fetch them in the 
afternoon. But today the population is multiplying and people are growing 
lots of different crops, cassava, maize etc., so we always have to check on 
the cattle from close. And now on top of that, there’s Tozzi Green who’s 
arrived, so we really have to check in the cattle.279   
The need for close surveillance was made even more critical since ‘the cattle were used to 
going there [on the tracts appropriated by Tozzi Green]’, which made it ‘hard for their owners 
to prevent them from getting there. Especially during the rainy season, the cattle always try 
to get escape their pens during the night’.280 A recent incident of a cattle damaging some of 
Tozzi Green’s plantations (discussed in further detail below) had confirmed the threat was 
real, and villagers working as guards for the company were adamant it would inevitably 
happen again, especially because of the cattle’s fondness for maize. ‘We are really worried,’ 
confirmed the lonaky, ‘because one zebu only can eat a lot of maize just in one go’.281   
 
Tozzi Green’s intention to develop on tracts A and B also raised fears of the adverse impact 
on crop farming because of water issues. The lonaky explained that because of the geography 
                                               
278 Lonaky Mangidy, Mangidy Ankerana, 16/04/2014. 
279 Eugène, Mangidy Vohiposa, 20/04/2014. 
280 Tilahy, Mangidy Maroteza, 22/04/2014. 
281 Lonaky Mangidy, Mangidy Ankerana, 08/05/2014. 
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of the place, maize plantations to the north of their fields could cut the natural paths of the 
rain trickling down to the village rice paddies. For all these reasons, the pressure on already 
stretched pastures, the threat of financial sanction in case of encroachment and potential 
impact on their farming as well, Tozzi Green was experienced as a direct threat to their 
livelihoods. 
 
While Vohiposa and Maroteza had less to lose than their neighbours, their cooperation could 
have a real cost, that of alienating their kin and the solidarity network they represented. In 
this context, it was imperative for Tozzi Green to deliver on its promises, not only to access 
much-needed basic socio-economic services, but also to legitimise their rationale for 
allowing the “foreigner” in. The difficult position that the current lack of compensation was 
putting on those who had put their necks on the line was embodied by Dax from Maroteza. 
While complaining against the corporate betrayal, he was trying to stand up to his initial 
decision to welcome the company all-heartedly: 
People really want to give land, but the problem is that Tozzi Green does 
not deliver on its promises, so now people are starting to be opposed [to 
it]. In the other villages, it’s the same. They haven’t delivered on any of 
their promises either, so my conclusion is that these were all tricks.282 
After having actively cooperated with the company, he was now promising he was ready to 
put an end to it, if the company did not promptly deliver on their side of the deal. ‘When 
Gomez came here, I told him: if you don’t keep your promises, you should leave,’ he boasted. 
‘And yesterday I wrote to Francesco, the big boss, and I told him “Stop what you’re doing 
before you’ve used all your petrol because we don’t accept that anymore”’. He added that as 
a security staff member for the company, he knew how to get the land back. ‘I’m going to 
make all the villagers sign and they’re going to leave’.283 It is unclear what promises had 
been made to the two cooperating hamlets in Mangidy. Dax explained he had requested a 
dam and a wood processing machine, to which Tozzi Green had shown reluctance, retorting 
that the use of these machines required a generator and some training, although Dax assured 
he knew how to use them.284 What made no doubt was that their continued cooperation was 
                                               
282 Dax, Mangidy Maroteza, 22/04/2014. 
283 Dax, Mangidy Maroteza, 22/04/2014. 
284 Dax, Mangidy Maroteza, 22/04/2014. 
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not unconditional and that their hopes were tied to strong moral economic expectations.  
 
Besides, choices towards the struggle for incorporation can be believed to have been more 
constrained than individuals such as Dax liked to make it sound. Other collaborating villagers 
preferred insistence on power dynamics to explain their choices to comply with the company. 
Their explanations were debunking the elites’ simple narratives of fully deliberate acts of 
sabotage on the part of the poorer villagers of Mangidy. Whilst the village elites proved 
slightly more shielded than those with no relational resources, some of their responses to 
successive violations of moral economic expectations demonstrated that they were 
themselves far from being immune to vertical power pressures.  
Enthusiasm or constrained hope 
Quick discussions with Maroteza and Vohiposa would have had one believe that the land 
gifts to Tozzi Green were fully deliberate. ‘Tozzi Green came here to ask us for farmland. 
They didn’t force people. They only asked for what we could offer,’285 villagers from 
Vohiposa explained at the beginning of our first discussion. As suggested above, Dax from 
Maroteza also conveyed a sense of full control over the initial dealings, making it clear that 
people from his hamlet were keen on having a foreign company settle in their village.  
 
As noted in Chapter 5, villagers saying they were given the ‘choice’ in the context of land 
deal negotiations could reflect a constrained understanding of what their rights were in the 
first place. While both hamlets ended up complaining about the company, this initial stress 
on free consent also needs to be looked at in the light of the context in which the data were 
collected, and more precisely, in the light of the assumptions that could have been made in 
terms of my identity and intentions. Indicators might have seemed confusing: on the one 
hand, my identity as a white foreigner might have fed suspicions that I was somehow related 
to the company; on the other, the fact that Tsiory and I were being hosted by the head of 
fokontany could have brought them to assume that we shared his opposition towards Tozzi 
Green and might report on them. There certainly was a certain unease in Vohiposa and 
                                               
285 Villager, Mangidy Vohiposa, 17/04/2014. 
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unspoken questions as to what my exact intentions were. The diametrical change of tone over 
Tozzi Green from one discussion to the next, from pledges that consent had been given freely 
to more critical discourses insisting on political pressures, might have been explained either 
by a growing trust towards us or by changes of interpretation as to what my intentions may 
have been. 
 
As far as Dax from Maroteza was concerned, there was a manifest intention to boast 
leadership and independence in front of his fellow villagers, both when talking about how he 
had been a front player in the discussions with the vazaha and when he was vigorously 
promising retribution and recapture of land should Tozzi Green delay any longer on 
delivering its promises, as mentioned above. These declared promises of revenge may also 
have been a strategy to try and redeem himself towards the village authorities whom he 
expected we would repeat his confidences to. It certainly was interesting to find a villager so 
confident in asserting that he could easily change the turn of events. Again, one can wonder 
to what extent he was seeking to convince the others as opposed to being genuinely convinced 
himself.  
 
In Vohiposa, initial accounts of the land transfer as being the product of their free consent 
were soon replaced by resigned statements about the lack of choice they had been left with 
and confidences over fear for the future. Information on the circumstances and nature of their  
interactions with the company revealed the same power dynamics as the one observed in 
Chapter 6 and 7. Once more, villagers had been told that the land deal had already been 
approved at higher levels and that they had no right to speak on land that ‘belonged to the 
state’.286 Misinformation also seemed to have been spread regarding the duration of the lease, 
with villagers thinking Tozzi Green was only planning to stay for five years, for instance.  
 
The village elites, who had appeared so determined in their letters, shared their fear of a direct 
confrontation with foreigners, and behind the display of determination on paper and in spaces 
supported by the civil society, they had remained passive to the latter stages of land 
                                               
286 Focus group discussion, Mangidy Vohiposa, 17/04/2014. 
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appropriation: ‘We did see them doing these demarcations but we couldn’t do anything. 
We’re scared of the vazahas’.287 As in the case of Antranohazo (Chapter 6) however, that 
fear stemmed less from an internalised “irrational” fear of foreigners than from an 
understanding of the institutional bias that existed in favour of corporate interests and was 
further exacerbated by anticipated coercion in case any actions were taken against the project.   
 
Two recent incidents were feeding the fears. One day, one of the boundary stones marking 
Tozzi Green fields was reportedly damaged by some cattle, whose owner was then 
summoned by the police. Commenting on the event, Tovo from Andanalotsy concluded: ‘In 
little time, us and our descendants will be imprisoned in Tsiafahy’.288 Briefly mentioned in 
Chapter 6, the other incident was related to some of Tozzi Green’s maize in Ankazoabo being 
eaten by cattle. The owner was summoned to a high-level meeting with the mayor, the region 
head and the regional head of the police, where he received a formal call to order. While the 
mayor of municipality X explained that the sanction stopped there,289 the owner of the cattle 
himself reported having been summoned by the police a few days later and been asked to pay 
400,000 Ar (some 150 Euro) at Tozzi Green’s basecamp in Satrokala.290 Supported by the 
head of the veterinary department in Ihosy, these allegations were denied by Tozzi Green and 
other villagers from villages in Vohiposa were also sceptical:  
Until now, they haven’t made anyone pay damages. They’ve only sent 
warnings. […] Yes, we heard of a case in Andalanotsy where they had to 
pay but I don’t know…Normally if someone pays damages, they have to 
assemble the whole fokonolona and the whole fokonolona knows the 
reason.291  
When asked whether some financial sanction had indeed been imposed on the guilty cattle 
owner, the lonaky of Mangidy equivocated by saying that he knew ‘some people had already 
had to pay’ and added that he had heard that any damage to the company’s crops would be 
sanctioned by fines and the confiscation of cattle.292 Whether the financial sanction was 
                                               
287 Samuel, son of the lonaky, Mangidy Ankerana, 23/04/2014.  
288 Laza, Antosha, 13/05/2014. Tsiafahy is an infamous prison in Antananarivo.  
289 Mayor of Andiolava, Andiolava, 04/03/2014. 
290 Jean, Mangidy Alakamisy, 14/04/2014. 
291 Nary, Mangidy Vohiposa 20/04/2014. 
292 Lonaky Mangidy, Mangidy Ankerana, 08/05/2014. 
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actually imposed or not, the incident was patently feeding rumours and fears, as were the 
guards’ accounts of the extortionate fines that people could be asked to pay.293  Those were 
adamant that these encroachments had not been deliberate acts of sabotage against Tozzi 
Green but involuntary accidents, and that villagers were instead very careful since ‘they were 
really scared of  sanctions’.294  
 
The feeling of vulnerability was compounded by the lack of educational resources. Even the 
son of one of the wealthiest and most influential cattle owners in the area felt powerless: 
-Yes, we’re really afraid of the vazahas here. 
- Don’t be afraid. You’re only asking. 
-Yes, but we’re not at their level. We don’t even know how to read or 
write.295  
As in Antranohazo (Chapter 6), the anticipated defeat this literacy gap was feeding 
discouraged action: ‘They are intellectuals; we can’t do anything even if we are totally 
opposed to them’.296  
 
Institutional bias towards wealthy foreigners was also seen as a major obstacle. There were 
little hopes that local authorities would take any decisions that may jeopardise their chances 
of generating rent from the project. The outcome of the dispute with Zazafotsy came as a 
confirmation of the little consideration that would be given to local land rules and arbitration 
mechanisms if these could hinder corporate interests:   
Even the villagers of Zazafotsy and all the population accepted that this 
land [Ankazoabo] belonged to Ambatolahy. But the problem is the 
authoririties and the vazahas and those who profit don’t want to accept 
that.297 
Aware of the fragility of their own land tenure arrangements, villagers of the area were 
striving to formalise their land transactions through ‘small papers’ submitted to local 
                                               
293 Tilahy, the local guard, was talking of a very severe rule set by Tozzi Green according to which for every leaf of maize eaten by a 
zebu, there would be a fine of 60 000Ar (20 Euros). However, he denied that a fine had had to be paid after the incident in Ankazoabo and 
added that the guard on duty that day had not been dismissed. 
294 Tilahy, Mangidy Maroteza, 22/04/2014. 
295 Tovo, fields close to tract A, 16/04/2014. 
296 Samuel, son of the lonaky, Mangidy Ankerana, 08/05/2014. 
297 Ikala, lonaky Antsoha, 13/05/14. 
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authorities for endorsement (cf. Chapter 7). They were also conscious of the little value of 
these papers in these contexts. ‘These are worth nothing,’298 Tovo commented. As in other 
villages, people complained of regular power abuses by the police and talked of the sense of 
insecurity these filled them with.299 Generally speaking, state agents were seen as unreliable 
agents of predation as opposed to agents of protection. As discussed below, even the mayor 
of Ambatolahy, seen the year before as an essential support in their opposition to Tozzi Green 
(Chapter 2), now seemed hesitant.  
 
It was this detrimental power balance that was at the heart of the rationale for consenting to 
Tozzi Green’s land requests. In this lost battle, consulted villagers explained, their best bet 
was to cooperate so that they would at least have a say in the choice of the land to be given 
away: 
-But if you had the choice: would you have preferred to keep your land or 
to give some of it and enjoy some of the benefits they offer? 
-No, we would prefer to keep our land but Tozzi Green said that it was the 
ministry who had given the permission because they had leased the land to 
the ministry. The general state hasn’t refused, so how could we refuse? 
And you know, here we’re scared of the vazahas, so at least we were lucky 
enough to delineate the land.300 
The same resigned thinking was displayed by a group of villagers from the neighbouring 
village of Feoandala that we encountered during a field visit. They explained that they would 
have preferred to keep their land but since there was no choice, they ‘might as well try and 
have a new school’.301 
Blinded by mutual suspicion 
Essential village rules, such as the duty to prioritise the village’s needs over individual ones 
and to respect the lonaky’s authority especially on issues as critical as alienation of the village 
land, had been violated, however, and that betrayal seemed to monopolise analysis of the 
land deal negotiations. The conflicting responses to the land deal negotiations had generated 
such tensions that some feared it would end up sparking violent clashes: 
                                               
298 Tovo, fields close to tract A, 16/04/2014. 
299 Focus group, Mangidy Vohiposoa, 17/04/2014. 
300 Joann, Mangidy Vohiposa, 20/04/2014. 
301 Informal discussion with villagers from Feoandala, fields close to tract B, 22/04/2014. 
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There’s going to be an explosion, I’m sure […] There was a meeting the 
other day and there were people in favour of Tozzi Green and people 
against and it finished in a big argument and one even wanted to use his 
weapon.302 
Between these arguments, genuine discussions seemed rare. Members of the “other” group 
were assumed to be at best unable to help, at worst allegedly diametrically opposed to their 
own views. It was therefore at best useless, at worst risky to try and open their deliberations 
to the rest of the village.  As in Antranohazo (Chapter 6), those who did speak up against the 
land deal did not tell the others much about their resistance. Very few in the village seemed 
to know Gaston had taken part in the press conference organised in Antananarivo, for 
instance. Likewise, not all knew about the letters that had been written to protest Zazafotsy’s 
land transfers. In Tanamarina, they said they had ‘heard’ about them but were not sure at all 
that their fokontany (Morafeno) had written one. They thought only Andalanotsy had done 
so. More critically, they had remained passive in front of Tozzi Green’s attempt to gain 
consent from the rest of the village. It is hard to believe that the presence of the corporate 
staff and their 4/4 could have gone completely unnoticed at the time visits were held. Yet no 
one from the hamlets of the elites tried to join, nor did they go to ask the involved villagers 
what they had talked about or agreed.  ‘We knew very well what they had done,’ observed 
another one of Cyril’s sons. ‘And then if we go and criticise them, it can create arguments 
within the family’.303 On the other hand, people from Vohiposa and Maroteza kept a low 
profile and did not consult any of the village authorities before engaging with the company.  
 
These fractures were condemning mutual efforts to influence the land deal by enhancing 
exposure to vertical power pressures and allowing for the instrumentalisation of divisions. 
As far as those struggling against dispossession were concerned, bitterness was clouding their 
potential to apprehend, and potentially help to address, the complex power dynamics that 
contributed to making others think that incorporation was probably the only path available. 
For village elites, there was a clear and simple explanation to Tozzi Green’s progress on their 
village land: ‘It is the poor villagers who are giving land to Tozzi Green because they are 
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jealous of the rich’.304 It was not clear why they had not initially included the rest of the 
village in the discussions with the civil society, whether it was because they assumed the less 
wealthy would be reluctant to back their resistance to the land deal or because they did not 
deem their involvement necessary. In any case, this exclusion certainly did not help to win 
the others over to their own understandings of the risks related to the project and to dissuade 
them from expressing conflicting voices. 
 
As far as the latter was concerned, the knowledge that they were going against fundamental 
village norms encouraged discretion and discourses of resignation. For village elites, this 
secrecy was proof of the malevolence that had guided them and the disrespect they had shown 
to their authorities was inexcusable: ‘They always hide by saying “We can’t do anything”,’ 
commented the head of fokontany. ‘But why did they not inform people here and the mayor 
or the lonaky about this?’305 Yet, as explained above however, they were not making any 
effort to engage with them either. There was the reported fear of unleashing a conflict within 
the village community. Silence was also a means to express their disapproval and their 
detachment for what were seen as selfish moves to gain benefits, and certainly not struggles 
that, if successful, could be beneficial to the whole community. ‘In my opinion, they won’t 
obtain any benefit. It was just a sabotage strategy so that rich people don’t have any 
pastures’.306 
 
On the one hand, therefore, the compliance of Feoandala and Vohiposa had harmed the elites’ 
struggles against dispossession by providing some legitimacy to corporate land access. On 
the other, the elites’ bitterness for that act of betrayal did not dispose them to consider the 
complex rationales behind the others’ compliance with the land requests and support their 
fights for incorporation as compensation for land loss. The next section discusses the other 
political and power dynamics that further hampered the ability to influence the land deal. 
 
                                               
304 Lonaky Mangidy, Mangidy Ankerana, 16/04/2014. 
305 Fabrice, head of fokontany, Mangidy Alakamisy, 07/05/2014. 
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Selective hearing and versatile politics 
By listening to compliant voices and excluding dissonant ones, state and corporate politics 
both informed and built on these tensions. The way the land dispute with Zazafotsy was 
settled stresses the selective use of legalism by state agents pushing for the land deal. The 
case of Mangidy also points to the top-down picking and choosing of legitimate 
spokespersons in the context of consultation, with the recent prospective work having 
conveniently been carried out by the company with those most willing to cooperate, in a 
deliberate ignoring of the voices formalised by the village authorities. Finally, it shows how 
villagers’ struggles in the context of land deals can suffer from the versatility of state agents.  
Selective legalism, selective hearing 
The outcome of the dispute over the transfer of the Bekata and Ankazoabo tracts illustrates 
how institutional bias towards corporate interests can translate into a biased application of 
law by state agents in the context of land deal negotiations (second dimension of power). 
Shortly after the land transfer was officially contested by letter, a meeting was organised by 
Tozzi Green and local officials to look into the issue. This meeting further exacerbated the 
bitterness of Mangidy’s and Antsoha’s leaders who claim that the contents of the discussion 
and agreements reached between villagers on that day ended up being fully ignored by 
decision-makers. Indeed, according to their accounts, villagers from Zazafotsy ended up 
admitting that they were not entitled to make decisions on that tract and ‘even the mayor 
could not challenge that’.307 Yet, the formalisation of the land transfer went ahead 
notwithstanding, with the official complaints being rejected on the grounds of inadmissibility 
since ‘villagers from the municipality Ambatolahy had no right to talk on land based in the 
administrative territory of  municipality X’.308  Rather than a fair chance to reintroduce some 
of their forgotten voices, the mediation meeting therefore served to entrench the land deal 
and dissuade villagers from further protest.  
 
This episode illustrates the selective application of law in the context of land deal 
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308 Mayor, municipality X, 04/03/2014. 
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negotiations: state maps were conveniently brought up to declare Andraoboaka’s villagers as 
legally incompetent to challenge the land transfer, while statutory land laws that recognise 
the ‘occupation, use or development of a tract as ‘untitled private property’ (article 34 of Law 
2005-019) were ignored. It also highlights the exclusionary implications of the mismatch 
between legally-defined spaces and those that govern local lives, or between ‘abstract and 
lived spaces’ (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995).  In that case, this situation was the result of a 
prior exclusion. Municipality X was recent; it had been created under twenty years 
previously. People from Mangidy explained not having been consulted on this administrative 
parcelling of their territory, which explains why some villages similar to theirs may have 
found themselves straddling two municipalities.309 Only then, however, were the 
consequences of these prior exclusions being felt. 
Legitimate and illegitimate struggles 
As far as the new explorations were concerned, they had so far been carried out outside legal 
procedures, with no prior approval from any of the necessary local authorities (head of 
fokontany and lonaky) and informal reconnaissance missions only including those villagers 
who showed a disposition to cooperate. At the land registry in Ihosy, they reported that no 
official procedure had yet been opened for land transfers in Ambatolahy since the mayor had 
not given his permission yet, although there were suspicions that he had unofficially, as 
discussed below.  Village authorities were also complaining of secret undertakings, such as 
furrows being dug overnight while everyone was sleeping, highlighting how this secrecy was 
depriving them of the opportunity to complain directly to the company.310  As in other case 
studies, there were accusations of Tozzi Green taking advantage of people’s illiteracy to fool 
them into signing land transfers.311  
 
Those struggling for incorporation seemed to have had less of a hard time to make contact 
with the company and make themselves heard. It was not a social justice operation, as Tozzi 
Green managers sometimes liked to make it sound, where attention was given to the voices 
of the poorer villagers interested in incorporation over the noises made by their oppressive 
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elites.312 As the case under observation here showed, village elites were happily listened to, 
provided they had the right views. Indeed, Tozzi Green’s land extensions in Ambatolahy 
were not only supported by the dependent segments of the village community. In the villages, 
south of Mangidy, they were found to have the backing of influential individuals who had 
roots in the area but whose wealth and power were not land-based as were those of the village 
elites opposing the land deal. Two individuals were regularly mentioned in discussions over 
Tozzi Green in the fokontany: an army person, ‘someone with a lot of authority here’313 and 
a man who belonged to an association connected with one of the mainstream churches and 
who was reported to be efficiently fighting police abuses in the villages. He ‘often manages 
to help people who are accused, whereas they are not guilty’.314 These two men were seen as 
obstacles to resistance by those struggling against dispossession who were accusing them of 
having reached out to Tozzi Green to gain credit for the socio-economic opportunities the 
project was promising to the people. The mediation of these influential figures who ‘could 
talk directly to Tozzi Green because they talked French’315 was, on the contrary, seen as a 
boon for those who were struggling for incorporation. In any case, these were certainly 
receiving a much more favourable hearing than the land-based elites opposing land transfers.  
 
Alternatively justified by legal or social justice arguments, the choices of listening to certain 
voices and ignoring others were blatantly guided by concerns for corporate interests. In this 
context, the mayor of Ambatolahy had allowed critical access to decision-making power to 
those struggling against dispossession. With his actions having become increasingly 
ambivalent however, Mangidy’s village elites were concerned that the only crack in the 
institutional bias was about to be closed down.  
 
Versatile politics in a context of growing dissent 
In the context of Tozzi Green’s fast-moving developments in Ambatolahy, the mayor was 
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indeed showing a suspicious lack of responsiveness.  As reported in a previous paper, he had 
so far been very quick to oppose attempts of secret bargaining between Tozzi Green and 
“cooperative” villagers, systematically reminding Tozzi Green that, invited by villagers or 
not, they were not allowed to develop in Ambatolahy without his support (Gingembre 2015). 
The distant attitude he was showing towards this manifest threat of encroachment on 
municipal land, therefore, contrasted with this activism of the first days. On paper, his 
opposition to Tozzi Green was unwavering.  Besides the large meeting he had recently 
organised to sensitise Ambatolahy’s villagers on their land rights, mentioned above, he had 
written a letter to the new Region Head to reiterate the opposition of the municipality to the 
land transfer316 as new Memorandums of Understanding were being negotiated between the 
company and the other two municipalities. However, Mangidy and their neighbours were 
wondering why he had never responded to their calls to come and observe the situation on 
the ground: 
Yes, the mayor has already heard of the new delineations but his eyes 
haven’t seen them yet. In the past, the mayor and the fokontany were 
managing to oppose the Tozzi Green project in Ambatolahy but now they 
are penetrating our territory and they don’t even come here to have a look. 
[…] They often say they are going to come and have a look. We called 
them several times but until now they haven’t come, whereas we’re in real 
danger here.317 
In this context, there were also growing suspicions that he had been corrupted or at best, 
would only put his neck on the line for the very wealthy patrons: 
-But you know the mayor is opposed to Tozzi Green working in 
Ambatolahy, right? 
[Ironic grin from Fabrice and Lala] 
- No, you know I don’t know if the mayor is really opposed to Tozzi Green. 
He is just trying to protect people from Andalanotsy.318 
As disenchantment grew, villagers were seeking alternative ways to resist Tozzi Green 
appropriating their land. Villagers from Antsoha said they were now trying their luck with 
the newly elected MP, a rice collector who had been working in the region for years and as 
such was a familiar figure to the villagers: ‘He recommended that we sent him our complaints 
by letter and to send them to him directly if we suspected the mayor of corruption’.319 While 
initiatives such as this one showed that the leading figures were not quite giving up, hopes 
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were slimming. They were running out of resources. Their formal and argued opposition to 
Tozzi Green, through letters, networking with the civil society and communication with the 
media, had failed to protect their land rights on the Ankazoabo tract. Now internal 
contestation and the potential loss of their most outspoken advocate of their struggle clearly 
seemed to open a way to Tozzi Green inside Ambatolahy itself.  
 
Conclusion  
The case of Mangidy offers another vivid illustration of the local contestation around 
corporate land deal negotiations and shows how internal dissent can be instrumentalised by 
decision-makers to circumvent an assertive bottom-up resistance. 
 
As in Antranohazo (Chapter 6), procedures of consultation were organised in a way that left 
little space for the participation and objection rights of land users and land owners.  From 
straightforward breaches of law such as the head of fokontany not being invited to 
reconnaissance missions and procedures being started without the official approval of the 
mayor (case of tract A and B) to biased state agents resorting to misinformation to accelerate 
villagers’ compliance with land requests and to selective legalism to outlaw protest, this case 
is a good illustration of how second-dimensional power dynamics contribute to constraining 
local voices in land deal negotiations in Madagascar. Villagers’ frequent mention of their 
‘fear of the foreigner’ to explain resignation or compliance points again to the effects of a 
history of oppression by state and foreign forces (third dimension of power). By revealing 
how these fears are deliberately revived through intimidation strategies and power abuses 
(second dimension of power), I contend that they should not be understood as the sole 
reflection of internalised reflexes of powerlessness. 
 
This case study has the specificity of highlighting the fact that villagers have different 
vulnerabilities towards these vertical power dynamics, and points to the unequal distribution 
of resources that it seems to be related to (first dimension of power). Whilst not immune to 
fear (of sanctions, of foreigners and so on) and whilst also prone to anticipating defeat in the 
context of institutional bias, Mangidy’s village elites have some educational, relational and 
material resources that allow them to mitigate power asymmetries.  Their contacts with the 
civil society contributed to enhancing their bargaining power by giving them means to 
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express themselves outside the official control channels of communication. Critically, their 
local wealth and influence provided them with tools to incentivise a pivotal state agent such 
as a mayor to go against institutional bias and resist the temptation of extraversion to support 
their struggles against dispossession, at least initially. Excluded from the discussions with 
connected, informed external actors, less senior villagers have less access to the information 
and support networks needed to see through false pretence, resist intimidation and try and 
negotiate actively for fair terms of incorporation.  
 
The case of Mangidy is also a reminder that the corporate need for territorial expansion sits 
uncomfortably with the flexibility and negotiability that characterises customary land tenure.  
The Mangidy case makes it clear that the exclusionary nature of popular consultation in the 
context of land deal negotiations, whereby only a limited number of land rights claimants are 
given voice, is not only a technical problem related to an ignorance of the complexity local 
land tenure; it also suits state and corporate concerns. Long, protracted discussions over 
rightful land users and land owners would not only delay business, but they may doom the 
deal to failure for there may always be people to oppose corporate land access. The 
exclusions of the villagers of Ambatolahy from discussions over the tracts of Bekata and 
Ankazoabo over which they had claims may not have originally been intentional; their protest 
over the ongoing land transfers was loud and clear. Going against what those pushing for the 
land deal wanted to hear however, they were swiftly silenced again.  Where corporate 
interests are high such as on the fertile plain of Berevo, consultation can run the risk of being 
reduced to tokenism, with contesting of land deals ignored and local authorities illegally 
circumvented.  
 
Work in Mangidy also confirmed the findings from Antranohazo (Chapter 6) regarding the 
importance of social positioning in informing perceptions of corporate land access. Villagers 
who lack cattle wealth either have fewer land needs (if they do not tend cattle) or are more 
likely to be willing to trade some of their land against perceived opportunities of increasing 
autonomy through diversification of livelihoods. 
 
In Antranohazo, there were those who insisted on the fact that they had complied with land 
211 
 
 
requests because there was no other choice, or others who explained they had originally 
hoped they might gain from the deal. The case of Mangidy shows that behind these clear-cut 
post-outcome narratives, these rationales often meet and that compliance can stem from a 
variously-balanced conjunction of hope and power pressures. When discussions with the 
company go against the opinion of village authorities, there is also an assumed element of 
risk. The violation of essential social rules (the duty to respect elders’ authority especially on 
the critical issue of village land and to prioritise the collective good over the individual one) 
carries a high risk of social condemnation. In this context, accounts of respective experiences 
with the consultation and discussions of the rationales for complying with the company 
against the authorities are a delicate exercise, which needed to be read as processes of internal 
negotiations. The case of Mangidy illustrates this very well. To downplay the moral 
economic sin, some opted for the strategy which consisted of justifying their choice to 
struggle for incorporation as a potentially beneficial choice for the whole village community 
(as for Dax in Maroteza), whilst those whose subversion to village authority was much 
riskier, sought to plead as victims of broader power dynamics (villagers of Vohiposa). 
 
Despite these reconstructions, indignations were converging. The company was failing in its 
duty of gratitude and reciprocity. Hopes were fading as Tozzi Green appeared to be much 
more proactive on the front of land appropriation than on that of corporate responsibility, and 
concern and bitterness grew as feelings of having been fooled were compounded by the 
weight of social sanctioning from the rest of the community. However, at this stage, fractures 
were too deep for elites to acknowledge the power pressures that may have pushed others to 
opt for strategies of incorporation or to either help them in their struggles or invite them to 
join theirs. The fear of unleashing a conflict within the village community was further 
inclining to silence. 
 
In this context, the villagers of Mangidy ultimately exercised very little, if any, influence on 
the terms and conditions of the land deal despite their support by civil society. Two main 
dynamics can make sense of this apparent contradiction: firstly, as discussed above, decision-
makers tend to arbitrate conflicting voices towards the interpretation that favours corporate 
interests and secondly, exclusive of a large section of the village community and with little 
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effort to generate consensus around a common attribution of opportunity and threat,  
contentious politics failed to prevent both the instrumentalising of dissent and to enhance the 
bargaining power of either fronts of struggles. As such, this case points to the weaknesses of 
the exemplary bottom-up resistance led against dispossession in Ambatolahy. It failed to have 
reach in an unequal, divided setting and suffered from its dependence on a single state agent 
(the mayor) whose jurisdiction was limited territorially and who, for different reasons, 
seemed tempted to back out on his support of villagers’ struggles against dispossession.  
  
  
213 
 
 
CHAPTER 9:  
BEING HEARD IN LAND DEALS  
LESSONS FROM THE TOZZI GREEN CASE STUDY 
 
The literature on the global land rush highlighted the need to gain a more complex, nuanced 
view of the diversity of ‘reactions from below’ (Borras and Franco 2013; Hall et al. 2015).  
The analysis of local responses to large-scale land deals, I added, should pay attention not 
only to visible reactions, but also to more invisible, potentially suppressed ones. I also 
observed that only some of the local voices that were expressed in the context of negotiations 
may exert influence on the terms and conditions of corporate land access. These observations 
led me to dedicate this doctoral research to the understanding of how the voices of local 
people could be ‘heard or suppressed in the context of land deal negotiations’.  
 
Building on the observation that land deals are context-specific and contingent processes, I 
opted for a case study approach, and chose a specific case from southern Madagascar to 
explore the research question mentioned above through the three core themes of 
‘negotiations’, ‘responses’ and ‘outcomes’.  Findings from the first phase of empirical 
research pointed to the relevance of Gaventa’s theory of power (1980), James Scott’s concept 
of moral economy (1976) and of McAdam et al.’s analysis of the dynamics of contention 
(2001) in exploring local variations in perceptions, engagement and outcomes.  These data 
and theoretical insights helped me structure the rest of the research work through three critical 
sub-research questions: (i)  How can power dynamics inform local responses to land deal 
negotiations and how and under which conditions can power relations be challenged by these 
responses?; (ii)  What moral economic considerations underpin compliance with or resistance 
to corporate land access and with which implications on the perceptions of the outcome of 
the land deal?; (iii) Which voices transform into influence and under which conditions? 
Drawing on this refined analytical structure, the second phase of empirical research, focused 
on three village case studies, brought out critical findings in the understanding of how local 
voices could be heard or suppressed in the context of land deal negotiations.  
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This conclusion provides a summarised discussion of these findings.  First it explains how 
they bring light on the first question raised in this thesis by illustrating how, in the process of 
expressing or enabling voice within land deal negotiations, power represents both a means to 
an end and an end in itself.  While the distribution of power within the agrarian population 
helps to explain some of the variation in local perceptions of the land deal, it also contributes 
to influencing whose views will be heard. In this context, special power is wielded by the 
state agents who derive ‘powers of exclusion’ from their intervention as brokers and ‘powers 
of compliance’ from the projections of verticality and cohesion that states can convey to their 
population. This research shows that top-down processes of exclusion and forced compliance 
(‘compliance as acquiescence’) can be resisted, however, and that compliance can in itself 
represent some resistance to the prevailing order (‘compliance as resistance’).  
 
The following pages explain how this research has answered the second question raised in 
this thesis. While contested and socially-situated, the moral economies behind the variegated 
responses to the land deal agree on several critical aspects, which are summarised. In 
considerations over the justice of land deals, local people argue over the question of who has 
the right to talk but meet on the essential obligations of those brokering or benefiting from 
corporate land access, collectively expressing a resistance to the demoralising of land deals. 
These considerations play a critical role in influencing both responses and perceptions of 
outcomes and can encourage attempts to challenge power relations and express subversive 
voices in the context of consultation. 
 
Finally, the conclusion closes on a discussion of the critical findings of this research on 
dynamics of influence, by summarising the dynamics and conditions that have been found to 
boost, or undermine, local people’s capacities to influence the outcomes of the negotiations. 
The argument that influence comes about as the intersection of power, moral economy and 
politics is substantiated in relation to the empirical research findings.  The discussion points 
again to the key role of state authorities in mediating influence, highlighting how their 
competing struggles for the authority and resources of patronage associated with the control 
of corporate land access and their vulnerability to social movements in an era of transnational 
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governmentality opens interstices for local influence. Madagascar’s legal regime is used as 
an opportunity for the state to reclaim control of untitled land officially instead of respecting 
local rights. However, by forcing a lengthy negotiation, it expands the time open for 
influence. Discussion of the politics of influence also highlights how inter and intra-class 
politics, underpinned by considerations of moral economy, informs chances of avoiding an 
instrumentalisation of division by state and corporate elites. 
  
The conclusion reviews the main arguments and findings of the thesis on the question of how 
the voices of local people are heard, or silenced, in the context of land deal negotiations. It 
closes with some comments on the contributions of this work on the theoretical debates in 
the land grab literature.  
 
Voicing power, resisting power 
This thesis demonstrates that local responses to land deal negotiations can partly be 
understood as means to either defend one’s power or to challenge others’ domination. In view 
of the socio-economic stakes represented by corporate land access, land deal negotiations 
indeed present significant opportunities for the challenging or reinforcing of power and 
authority.  
 
Power is also used to impose certain voices over others in the context of the negotiations. 
The ability and confidence to defend one’s views can be built upon local power resources. 
Conversely, certain local voices can be undermined by state power, either through outright 
exclusion from decision-making spaces or through the discursive construction of compliance.  
Domination and class in perceptions of land deals 
In the introduction to this work, I acknowledged the importance of paying attention to 
dynamics of inter- and intra-class politics and social differentiation in examining local 
responses from below (Hall et al. 2015). The comparative study and village case studies 
confirmed that socially-ascribed positions along gender, class, age and kin affected 
perspectives on the land deal, but in a complex intersection with factors related to the 
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geography, ecology and institutional character of the deal (Edelman et al. 2015) and to the 
(perceived) moral economy of the transaction and of village relationships.  
 
As noted by Hall et al. (2015), although different groups are related to land at the local level, 
their relationship to land vary: they may be landed elites, capitalist landowners, land brokers, 
or smallholders, share-croppers, tenants, hunter-gatherers, pastoralists and so on.  In the case 
of the Ihorombe plateau examined here, land concentration is modest, and most nuclear 
families who had lived in the area for a generation or longer were smallholders with some 
farmland in their possession. However, there were inequalities in the degrees of control over 
the means of production, which informed relations of domination. Cattle possession marked 
relations of domination between wealthy cattle owners (who could hold as many as 5,000 
head of cattle) and others who exchanged their labour (as cow herders) for the right to use 
the cattle owned by others for farming. As far as land was concerned, control of land and of 
its yields was determined along gender, age, kinship and ethnicity.  
 
What both the comparative analysis (Chapter 5) and the village case studies established was 
that those interested in trading land for jobs and socio-economic opportunities in the 
Ihorombe plateau came predominantly from those groups with little control over land or 
cattle and who were under the social and economic domination of others.  In their quality of 
semi-subsistence farmers and/or cow herders, women, young people and members of poorer 
kin groups also depended on land for their livelihoods. However, in their situation, 
opportunities for accumulation of capital were scarce and they were entirely dependent on 
dominant members of the local societies in cases of external shocks such as illnesses, bad 
yields and so on. The opportunities for jobs, livelihood diversification and access to basic 
social services that were being offered by the company in exchange for some grassland (that 
they may not need as much as their more privileged neighbours or next of kin) were therefore 
more likely to have a strong appeal among them. Beyond opportunities for enhanced 
wellbeing, what they saw, as put explicitly by both Nirina, a young female from Antranohazo 
(Chapter 6) and Dax, an underprivileged man from Mangidy (Chapter 8), was the prospect 
of increased autonomy. It was not only that they had less to lose from a land they did not 
control; they also saw potential for some emancipation from the local structures of 
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domination and determination.  
 
There were counterexamples however, proving Bernstein’s point that ‘class relations are [a] 
universal but not exclusive determination of social practices of capitalism’ (Bernstein 2010: 
115), with wealthy cattle owners holding positive views of Tozzi Green and conversely, 
females or poor villagers being opposed to it. Some of these cases pointed to the complexity 
of social identities at their articulation of multiple social divides.  Examples discussed in 
Chapters 6 and 7 showed, for instance, that women were not systematically enthusiastic about 
the deal offered by Tozzi Green. For some, as Narindra and Nathan’s wives in Antranohazo 
(Chapter 6), reluctance towards the agribusiness project could be explained by the fact that 
they had married into the lonaky’s family and as such, were also part of the dominant segment 
of the village. The other examples failing the broad pattern outlined above showed that some 
other important variables were at play in constructing perceptions of corporate land access.  
Ketaka, for instance, a modest female villager from Soatanana (Chapter 7) explained being 
opposed to the land deal because she had more trust in the safety mechanisms offered by her 
own village community than by those offered by the corporate actors. The lonaky of 
Betongolo, who owned more than 5,000 head of cattle and happily gave land to Tozzi Green, 
articulated an inverse logic, talking of trust towards a company who had respected the terms 
of the deal they had agreed on (Chapter 5). In addition to the compensation, the deal 
represented a boost, as opposed to a threat, to their local influence, since it had allowed them 
to build relations with the powerful foreigner.  
 
This research has established that to some extent, inter and intra-class patterns of domination 
within the local population could help to make sense of the uneven perceptions of corporate 
land access. However, as shown by the counter-examples discussed above, people’s views 
on land deals were also informed by other considerations hinted at here, and discussed below 
: (i)  inter and intra-class relationships, and (ii) the experiences with the negotiation process 
and the type of deals offered (geography of the land transfer according to respective 
ecological constraints, compensation, labour schemes and so on), both perceived through the 
lens of moral economies.  
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The findings of this research on dynamics of power are further drawn out below. Discussions 
of the powers of exclusion and compliance will highlight the critical role of state authorities 
in informing local people’s choice to express, or suppress, their own voices.  
State powers of exclusion and of compliance 
This thesis described how dynamics of voice were also embedded within state politics of land 
deals. In state politics, I included: (i) historical forms of governance, (ii) the nature of the 
political regime and (iii) laws in practice. This section summarises how, in Madagascar, 
historical practices of governance through extraversion, neopatrimonialism and bureaucratic 
authoritarianism play in favour of powers of exclusion and compliance, against the spirit of 
the 2005 land reform aimed at protecting the land rights of agrarian populations. It also 
highlights how the state’s projections of ‘verticality and encompassment’ (Ferguson and 
Gupta 2012) successfully conceal the contradictions and contentions that plague state 
interventions in land deals.  
Powers of exclusion 
In their special issue on the ‘state in the land grab’, Wolford et al. (2013) noted that ‘we still 
need a better framework for an understanding of how land deals are shaping-and being 
shaped by the modern nation state’ (190).  This case study highlights the ‘powers of 
exclusion’ and ‘powers of compliance’ through which host states and domestic elites 
influence voices and spaces for influence.  
 
The legal-institutional bias that has been observed towards corporate land access in 
Madagascar despite a legal reform protective of local land rights (Teyssier et al. 2010; 
Andrianirina Ratsialonana et al. 2011; Burnod et al. 2013b) is embedded within historical 
practices of governance, in which extraversion and neopatrimonialism feature prominently 
(Chapter 2). In a context of ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’, state administration and 
government officials have the power to close spaces of decision-making to those whose views 
may conflict with corporate land extension and as such, to bypass legal provisions protecting 
agrarian populations against dispossession. In contexts where local consultations are held, 
this thesis shows this is done by giving voice to villagers with a stronger disposition to 
cooperate. In both Antranohazo (Chapter 6) and Mangidy (Chapter 8) indeed, Tozzi Green 
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negotiated (some of) the land deal with the poorest members of the village who had some 
interest in the prospects offered by the company. 
 
The case of Mangidy (Chapter 8) illustrates how decision-makers can choose to ignore voices 
that are expressed in both invited and claimed spaces. Indeed, Mangidy’s leaders were first 
excluded from invited spaces: the land transfers to the north and to the south of the village 
were both decided on outside their consent, approved by the neighbouring village for the 
first, by some of their own family members for the other. Then their protest against that first 
land transfer through other channels of expression was discarded on the grounds that their 
village did not have any decision-making rights on lands that administratively belonged to 
the neighbouring municipality. As such, this case is a good illustration of how second-
dimensional power dynamics can contribute to suppressing local voices in land deal 
negotiations in Madagascar: between the choice of whom to invite to the consultation table 
and the use of selective legalism to outlaw protest, state agents in their quality of both brokers 
and decision-makers can help to target villagers with a disposition towards incorporation and 
ignore struggles against dispossession, even when these are formalised.  
 
Conversely, state power can be used to suppress the voices of those who may have been 
interested in cooperating with the company, as illustrated by the official decision made by 
the mayor of Ambatolahy to forbid all land transfers in the municipality.  
 
Choices over whom to include and exclude from the consultation represent an efficient means 
of either accelerating or stalling corporate land access. Another way state brokerage can 
influence responses to land deals is by delivering or obscuring certain pieces of information 
and by feeding people’s anticipations of defeat through different means related to the second 
and third dimensions of power, or what could be referred to as ‘powers of compliance’.  
Powers of compliance 
The thesis demonstrated how the power dynamics at work in state mediation of land deal 
negotiations contributed to constraining responses in the context of consultation.  It also 
showed that through projections of ‘verticality and encompassment’ (Ferguson and Gupta 
2012), discourses and practices of mediation successfully concealed the contradictions and 
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contentions that plague state interventions in land deals.  
  
In the multiple village study, a number of village leaders reported having felt that they had 
no choice but to comply with corporate land requests (Chapter 5). The explanations they gave 
as to why they had felt forced to comply were confirmed and substantiated in all three village 
case studies (Chapters 6, 7 and 8). Fears of both the foreigners and of the state were a 
recurrent theme, indicating that local responses to land deals unequivocally needed to be read 
in the light of colonial and postcolonial patterns of domination (third dimension of power). 
However, their explanations also made it clear that these fears were not the sole product of 
an internalised history of domination but were instead fed by everyday practices of 
governance. Decisions to avoid a confrontation with the state or the wealthy, foreign investor 
were based on the perceptive understanding of the legal-institutional bias against which they 
stood, and of which state brokers sent constant reminders. 
 
Accounts of the official negotiation process in Antranohazo (Chapter 6) provided the most 
thorough illustration of the various means through which villagers were pressured into 
compliance. First, the agenda on which they were consulted was tightly controlled and their 
choice was reduced to ‘where’, as opposed to ‘whether’, land should be given to the 
company. In addition, villagers were deprived of the delay and information needed to 
understand what was at stake. Most importantly, they were dissuaded to withhold cooperation 
through discursive reminders of the full support that “the state” had given to the company 
and through recourse to misinformation about people’s rights on lands falsely presented as 
the property of the state (second dimensional power dynamics). These discourses and 
practices contributed to the ‘perceptions of verticality and encompassment’ that Ferguson 
and Gupta identify as key variables in the production of state spatialisation (2002). Faced 
with these projections of a cohesive state power, most villagers felt they lacked the resources, 
information and support to carry out a struggle with any prospect of victory (first dimension 
of power). Similar processes were also reported in both Soatanana (Chapter 7) and Mangidy 
(Chapter 8). While pressuring villagers into compliance through these first and second 
dimensional power dynamics, state officials also tended to ignore grievances expressed in 
other spaces. Coming back to the ideal-types drawn in Chapter 3, compliance with corporate 
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land access is, in these contexts, less of a ‘naturalised compliance’ (or manipulated consent) 
than a manifestation of ‘acquiescence’ in a resignation to power asymmetries.  
The state as the site of legitimate theft?  
In their introduction to their special issue on the role of the state in large-scale land deals, 
Wolford et al. (2013) have observed that ‘in this process [of accumulation by dispossession], 
the state is implicated as not only the site of legitimate violence, but as the site of legitimate 
theft.’ (197).  
 
Drawing on the case of Madagascar, I argue that state authorities can actively facilitate 
compliance with dispossession without needing to mobilise the state monopoly (or threat) of 
force. The three-dimensional approach to power begs for closer attention to the more 
invisible processes of ‘extra-economic means’ of capital accumulation.  The scrutiny of the 
process of land deal negotiations illustrates indeed the performative strength of the state 
projections of verticality (state is above society), encompassment (the state encompasses its 
localities) and cohesion (Ferguson and Gupta 2002). Whereas state leaders adopt 
contradictory, changing positions within the course of the land deal negotiations, to villagers, 
the state is seen as a cohesive, powerful whole which lends unwavering support to the foreign 
capital. These projections play a decisive role in generating a sense of anticipated defeat, or 
in constructing acquiescence through what I have called ‘powers of compliance’.   
 
The exploration of the panoply of responses within the case of Tozzi Green revealed first that 
powers to comply could be confronted, second that compliance in invited spaces could also 
obscured, or be followed by, resistance through claimed spaces, and third that compliance 
could actually represent a challenge to power  
Powers of resistance 
The Tozzi Green case study showed that although dominant, cooperation with land requests 
was not necessarily the only response that was given to the consultation process across the 
local population and that, in certain villages, pressures to comply had been resisted. In 
addition, compliance did not mean outright renunciation of struggle either, but could instead 
represent a calculated performance’, or what Scott would call a ‘public transcript’ (1990), 
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aimed at concealing resistance through other means. Finally, when it is enacted by 
unauthorised voices, ‘compliance’ with the consultation process represents a challenge to 
(local) power relations. 
Resisting powers of compliance and powers of exclusion  
The negative responses given to the consultation by some villagers in the case of Tozzi Green 
demonstrated that vertical power dynamics could be challenged in invited spaces. The 
municipality of Benala, first, openly opposed the implementation of the project on their 
municipal territory (Chapter 2). Out of the 26 villages visited in 2013, three openly refused 
to give land to Tozzi Green, two of which did it against the advice of their mayors (Chapter 
5).  The exploration of the Soatanana case study (Chapter 7) showed that these acts of 
defiance were premised on a prior position of strength, shielding to a certain extent from 
power pressures and galvanised by the pro-active wielding of a counter-power.  
 
Field observations indicated that villagers could be subjected to slightly different levels of 
power pressures (extortions, intimidation), according to their positions in the local society. 
More decisively, it seems, however, villagers demonstrated differentiated capacities to resist 
those pressures. By constructing counter-narratives of land rights and accumulation 
strategies, and opposing the precarious, flimsy livelihood prospects offered by the company 
to their own material security, the village leaders of Soatanana successfully offset feelings of 
anticipated defeat, in a demonstration of how third dimensional power dynamics could be 
mobilised to local people’s advantage. The village leaders also had some educational, 
relational and material resources (first dimension of power) that were mobilised to confront 
power asymmetries. These power resources were also observed in the case of Mangidy 
(Chapter 8). Unequally distributed within the village, however, these assets did not prove 
sufficient for struggles against dispossession to prevail, with some villagers lacking the 
information and support networks needed to see through false pretence, resist intimidation 
and to try and negotiate actively for fair terms of incorporation.  
 
Powers of exclusion also faced resistance. Showing that letters to state authorities constituted 
a common repertoire of protest among agrarian populations of the Ihorombe plateau, the 
multi-village study (Chapter 5) illustrated how the silencing of voices in the consultation 
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process could be resisted in other spaces. In their protest of those land transfers that had been 
made without their approval, these letters also defied the prevailing narratives according to 
which villagers had no right over their land. Most made a case that the land may have legally 
belonged to the state (as they were made to believe), it was that of their ancestors and they 
had been depending on and caring for it for generations. As such, they were showing that 
their cosmology and systems of rights and norms provided them with a robust legitimising 
notion in refusing to be the passive victims of their own dispossession.  
 
This research therefore recalls that within local populations that share similar types of 
agrarian livelihoods and histories of marginalisation, different levels of resources and 
different abilities to develop mediating strategies in response to social change can translate 
into different vulnerabilities to power pressures. The thesis also shows that passive 
compliance in invited spaces can obscure, or be followed by, struggles in claimed spaces. 
Compliance as a performance 
Tozzi Green case study showed that, for different reasons, attitudes of cooperation with the 
consultation process should not be automatically discarded as ‘non-issues’, an expression 
used by Frey (1971: 1097) to refer to cases where blatant injustices are not fought against. 
First, compliance can obscure other types of (open or discreet) resistance.  Even those 
villagers who showed the strongest vulnerability to vertical power pressures and acquiesced 
to land requests reluctantly did not merely comply in a passive way. Village leaders of 
Antranohazo, for instance, tried to influence negotiations by bargaining with state technical 
staff and with Tozzi Green’s local staff and by actively participating in the protest campaign 
organised in Ambatolahy.  In a perceived context of skewed decision-making, compliance 
can be a performance which conceals, or is followed by, other forms of resistance.  
 
Counter-intuitively, responses of compliance with corporate land access can also represent a 
means to defy the prevailing order: when negotiated behind the back or against the opinion 
of authorised voices, land transfers can represent a strong challenge of power structures 
within the village community. 
Compliance as resistance 
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Whilst the unequal possession of power resources was shown to give an advantage to certain 
voices over others in the context of land deal negotiations (as discussed below), the context 
of change opened by the arrival of a powerful actor in the local field could also offer 
opportunities to destabilise that power distribution within the local population. Land deal 
negotiations can indeed open new spaces of expression, and new prospects, for subaltern 
villagers.  The appropriation of these new channels to gain a voice usually denied to them 
and to defend their own interests represents, in itself, a challenge to local authorities. 
Subversion will be especially severe when positions expressed in these spaces run counter to 
the interests or expressed voices of these dominant actors of the village community. 
 
In the case study explored here, this challenging of authority though subversive struggles for 
incorporation appeared more frequently as a means than as an end in itself. As reported in a 
number of cases observed in the 26-village study (Chapter 5), as well as in the poorest 
hamlets of Antranohazo (Chapter 6) and Mangidy (Chapter 8), cooperating with the company 
was seen as an opportunity to be eligible to the incorporation and compensation benefits 
promised to (or hoped for by) those contributing land to the project. It did not appear to be 
principally encouraged by a willingness to shake up power structures within the village 
community. 
 
In both cases, there certainly was an element of assumed risk in carrying these discussions 
behind the back or against the opinion of village authorities.  In that respect, decisions to 
express or silence subversive voices seemed to be partly related to perceptions of how much 
was at risk, with regards to how wealthy villagers performed in terms of their obligations to 
help and share. Trust and respect towards one’s elites and strength of kinship ties also 
factored in choices to defend, or suppress, one’s aspirations for incorporation. When village 
elites provide essential support and capital, antagonising them is a risk that subalterns may 
want to weigh carefully, as illustrated by the hesitations betrayed by villagers from the hamlet 
of Vohiposa in Mangidy (Chapter 8). Conversely, when support mechanisms are weaker (and 
potentially deemed to be insufficient), the risks of alienating one’s kin might be worth 
considering: this was reflected clearly in the freedom with which people from the hamlet of 
Maroteza (Mangidy) which had recently been deprived of the cattle they had previously been 
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entrusted with, described their negotiations with Tozzi Green (Chapter 8).  The limited 
interdependency, and palpable tension, that existed between poor and less poor villagers in 
Antranohazo (Chapter 6) may also explain why the hamlet of Tsivory may have been willing 
to consider transgressing local authority to bargain for incorporation.   
 
In all cases however, there was a marked effort to either fully conceal the expression of 
unauthorised, subversive voices as in the case of Tsivory or to present them as the result of 
top-down pressures as in the hamlet of Vohiposa in Mangidy.  While power relations were 
challenged, that was done in a discreet way, and the objective was to secure the benefits of 
the land deal, rather than to shake up local power structures per se.  
Power in the context of land deal negotiations: some lessons 
The observation of the varying perceptions, as well as the varying degrees of engagement 
that had characterised local responses to Tozzi Green land deal negotiations (Chapter 5) had 
hinted at the differing positions of power and vulnerability to power pressures that existed 
within local populations. From silence to outward resistance through (forced and less forced) 
compliance, certain voices were expressed while others were suppressed. This raised the 
question as to ‘how power dynamics could inform local responses to land deal negotiations 
and how and under which conditions power relations could be challenged by these 
responses’.  The answers the research brought to this question can be summarised as follows: 
• Powers of exclusion and powers of compliance can be wielded by state agents, who 
can influence whether local people will be able, and/or feel entitled, to express their 
voices (first and second dimensions of power). 
• Some responses to land deal negotiations can represent a resistance to vertical power 
relationships (when local people struggle against dispossession) which can be boosted 
by previous power resources (material and relational resources mainly) and others a 
challenge to horizontal relationships (when unauthorised voices struggle for 
incorporation). 
• Compliance can either be the product of first and second dimensional power (forced 
compliance) or the expression of a defiance to horizontal power relations (subversive 
compliance or compliance as resistance). 
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It is not only power that is at stake in large-scale land deal negotiations. It is also justice. This 
research revealed that whatever views were constructed and whatever responses were 
expressed in the context of local land deal negotiations, these were always underpinned by 
moral economic expectations, or a certain vision of what was fair and unfair, in economic 
transactions around land. All of those villagers who had complied with the land requests 
made it clear that their cooperation, or passive tolerance, was dependent on the company 
respecting a number of obligations. The enthusiasm of those who were showing interest in 
the opportunities of incorporation was conditioned on the company showing fair gratitude, 
while those who had complied against their will because of power pressures made it clear 
that those acquiring land had not been given carte blanche either. The lack of resistance may 
be suffered; it did not mean it is not underpinned by (expressed or silent) expectations. 
Resignation was given with conditions. Likewise, the explanations given by those who had 
decided to openly resist dispossession also revolved around ideas of justice and legitimacy. 
The next section elaborates on these matters, in an effort to explain how this research has 
answered the second question raised in this thesis, that is: ‘What moral economic 
considerations underpin expressed or unexpressed responses of compliance with or resistance 
to corporate land access and with which implications on the perceptions of the outcome of 
the land deal?’ 
 
The contested moral economies of land deals 
Exploring what moral economic considerations underpinned (conflicting) responses to land 
deal negotiations brought out some of the main lines of dissent and consensus that 
characterised local responses to corporate land access. 
 
Local populations are not only divided over the question of which struggles (against 
dispossession, or for incorporation) should be pursued in the context of the land deal as 
reminded above, but also over the issue of who has a right to talk. This raises issues of 
relational legitimacy and justice, particularly complex in a context where land tenure is 
characterised by flexibility and negotiability. However, beyond their varied perceptions and 
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varied engagements with the negotiations, local people agree on the critical question of what 
the essential obligations of both those brokering and those benefiting from the land deal 
should be. This section pulls together the findings of this research project on the moral 
economic expectations that underpin (variously-driven and variously-expressed) compliance 
on the one hand, and resistance on the other, pointing to the tensions and synergies behind 
the ‘legitimising notions’ of both types of response.  
The right to talk: one voice for multiple claimants 
The case study examined in this thesis draws attention to the potential shortcomings of 
consultation processes in terms of participation and sensitivity to the complexities of local 
land tenure.  When the local population is invited to consultation processes, generally, space 
is made for one entity only to make a decision on a specific tract of land. In the context of 
flexibility and negotiability that characterises community-based systems of natural resource 
management (Berry 1993), the inclusion of some local entities in a decision over a land 
transfer may de facto translate into the exclusion of others.  In its sole choice of interlocutor 
and for need of a decisive decision, such consultation processes therefore legitimise some 
claims over others (Peters 2004). This carries strong potential for tensions, as other studies 
on corporate land access in pastoral areas have already outlined (Catley et al. 2012).  
 
In the case of Tozzi Green, most expressions of protest against the ‘unfairness’ of the land 
deal were indeed related to situations where only one claimant was consulted for tracts on 
which rights were shared. The frequency of these reported grievances highlights the 
exclusion potential of consultation processes based on a definitive, exclusive model of 
property: out of the 26 villages visited in 2013, a total of eight were contesting land transfers 
made by neighbours or fellow villagers without their consent (Chapter 5); out of the three 
village case studies carried out in 2014, illegitimate land transfers were reported in two 
(Soatanana and Mangidy) and suspected in the other one (Antranohazo).  
 
The land disputes documented in Soatanana (Chapter 7) and Mangidy (Chapter 8) illustrate 
two different types of shortcomings. In both cases, some of the land on which they used to 
graze their cattle was given to Tozzi Green by their neighbours, without them being 
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consulted. Thanks to a negotiation initiative outside of invited spaces, Soatanana managed to 
recover some of the land that had been appropriated by Tozzi Green to the east of their village 
(the part on which they owned alienation rights) but they resigned themselves to the loss of 
the rest (on which they only had access and withdrawal rights). As a result, they lost critical 
grassland, even though they had refused Tozzi Green’s land requests when consulted and that 
decision had been respected by the company. This demonstrates that even free, prior and 
informed refusal does not protect from the risk of unwanted land losses when access and 
withdrawal rights do not warrant a position at the negotiating table. In Mangidy, the outcome 
of the land deal generated a much stronger resentment still, since pastures were lost on a tract 
on which they claimed alienation rights. Their attempt to contest that land transfer was 
defeated on state-legal grounds: since administratively that tract belonged to the 
neighbouring municipality, they were denied the right to challenge it. Their case highlights 
exclusions related to the distortion between lived spaces, on which local rules of land tenure 
apply, and abstract spaces, administrative divisions used by the state to organise country 
planning and regulate private operations (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). 
 
At best, consultation such as those conducted by Tozzi Green make space for voices based 
on alienation rights but exclude others; at worst, they completely ignore local rules and are 
based on formal administrative territories. In this context, those who get to decide who can 
talk on what can yield considerable power, as discussed in the section ‘powers of exclusion’ 
above.  
Moral duties in the context of the land deal 
In the section above, I noted that the land deal represented contrasting implications in terms 
of power according to one’s position within the local society, which partly helped to make 
sense of the variation in perceptions of corporate land access. I also indicated that no pattern 
could be observed along specific social divides, however, since several key dynamics also 
played a key role in informing people’s views on land deals. The 26-village comparison and 
the three detailed village case studies showed that socially-situated perspectives intersected 
with  two main variables:  the type of deal offered and the geography of corporate land access 
with regards to people’s land needs, on the one hand; local people’s experiences with the 
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consultation process (whether and how they were involved, nature of information given, 
which promises were made and so on) and the respect for essential rights and obligations it 
foreshadowed, on the other. These proved at least as, if not more, essential in determining 
people’s perceptions of the land deal than intra and inter-class divides and revealed some 
consensus over a number of moral economic considerations across the local society.  
A moral duty to consult 
Villagers’ accounts of the land deal negotiations revealed that an understanding of the 
potential loss or gain (in terms of livelihoods and/or domination) that could be caused by the 
agribusiness project was not solely determined by one’s social positions, but also influenced 
by people’s experience of the land deal negotiations itself.  
 
These experiences contributed to making some wealthy cattle owners support the 
agribusiness project and some poor or disenfranchised villagers condemn it. In the 26-village 
study, I encountered examples of rich cattle-owners who reported feeling satisfied of having 
complied with Tozzi Green’s land requests: the lonaky of Betongolo, who owned more than 
5,000 head of cattle, explained, for instance, that he had voluntarily agreed to give land and 
did not regret this choice, since their choice of the (small) tract of land for transfer had been 
respected by the company who, subsequently, had provided them with some support in 
exchange (Chapter 5). This deal was looked at as a means to enhance rather than threaten 
their local influence, since it had allowed them to build relations with the powerful foreigner. 
Depending on the engagement with the company and the outcome of the land deal, corporate 
land access was not always seen as a threat to local wealth and domination. There were on 
the other hand cases where poor villagers (such as those from Manosarena or Soavononjy, 
for instance) held strong resentment towards the agribusiness project: their exclusion from 
the consultation had resulted in corporate land access causing the village major problems, 
even though they “only” looked after a dozen heads of cattle borrowed from elsewhere, and 
might therefore have needed less land than more endowed neighbours. In both these villages, 
exclusion from the consultation meant not only that they had not received any compensation, 
but also that they were not able to influence the location of the transfer: located on their best 
grassland (and close to their stockyards for the former), the corporate plantations were a 
serious hindrance to their livelihood activities (Chapter 5).  
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Views also took into consideration the performances of the company in terms of its duty of 
gratitude: observations that the land gifts made by their neighbours had rarely been retributed 
by any kind of compensation or long-term job prospects, Ketaka, a young female from 
Soatanana, expressed scathing criticism towards the company and satisfaction at the fact that 
her village leaders had refused to give them land (Chapter 7).  
 
Lack of consultation and/or of compensation can therefore feed animosities from both 
subaltern and dominant members of the local society: not only are they a violation of moral 
economic standards, they also fare badly in terms of the company’s intention to coexist in 
harmony with local land users.  Conversely, inclusion in a negotiation process allows hope 
for better prospects, of limiting damage at worse, of suffering no impact and getting benefits 
at best.  
Gratitude, measure and respect 
Intangible matters related to relational justice occupied a central position in people’s accounts 
of the outcomes of the land deal. Moral judgements over the land deal were indeed shaped in 
the light of how the company and those brokering the land deal had performed with regards 
to a number of moral economic expectations that were brought to light on that occasion. 
 
Those who expressed satisfaction at the project pointed to the fact that the choice they had 
expressed during consultation, whether they had decided to give (Betongolo, for instance) or 
not give (Marohasina) land had been respected. Measure and gratitude were also appreciated: 
those who said they were happy with the project explained that the location or the size of the 
land transfer meant that they did not suffer from it and that they had received some 
compensation in exchange (Chapter 5).  
 
Research participants who, on the contrary, resented the land deal always brought up the 
feeling of having felt disrespected, in addition to the more material causes for concern. 
Disrespect had been shown in different, sometimes cumulative, ways to different people. For 
many, their voices had been (totally or partially) ignored.  In the letters of complaint that 
were sent to state authorities to contest land transfers made by others, it was the offense to 
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their authority as village leaders and/or as the legitimate land owners, as much the loss of 
land itself, that was being condemned (Chapter 5). In Mangidy (Chapter 8), the lonaky and 
the other village raïamandreny had been totally excluded from the decisions over their land. 
In Antranohazo (Chapter 6), they had been consulted but, whereas they had only given their 
(reluctant) compliance for a tract to the west of the village, the project had also appropriated 
lands to the east of the village. In Soatanana (Chapter 7), the boundary marking had gone 
beyond the line of demarcation villagers thought had been agreed on. However small that 
encroachment was, villagers described it as a bad omen that more land might be taken behind 
their back again in the future.  Behind the lack of respect for their voice, was a violation of 
their authority and of their decision-making power on the land of their ancestors.  
 
Quite a few research participants who had complied with the land deal were lamenting the 
lack of gratitude.  Resentment was especially severe in places where the contribution to the 
land deal had been made at the risk of alienating village authorities. This came across very 
strongly in the hamlets of Antranohazo (Chapter 6) and Mangidy (Chapter 8) that had been 
consulted: as their land gifts were being reciprocated by underpaid jobs and inappropriate or 
non-existent compensation, feelings of betrayal were growing. Not only were their hopes 
disappointed; the treason they had shown to their village leaders to allow for these land 
transfers was made even more difficult to defend. Indignation was expressed at the profits 
that were being made by local state agents to their expense: while they were suffering from 
these pressures on already stretched resources and strained livelihoods, some were making 
money. While extraversion seemed acceptable to a certain degree, this enrichment by treason 
and through suffering was not, and elected officials would be sanctioned for it.  
 
One of the most cited reasons for outrage was the lack of consideration for their hardships 
and their subsistence needs. Shortage of pastures was the main, but not the sole, source of 
concern. In both Antranohazo and Mangidy, people pointed to the extra workload that the 
proximity of Tozzi Green’s plantations with the village grassland had resulted in since that 
meant their cattle’s movement had to be monitored closely to avoid damage. A villager from 
Mangidy observed that they were effectively protecting the corporate fields for free. In both 
villages, as in a few villages visited in 2013 (Chapter 5), issues of the cattle not being able to 
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be taken to the rice paddies for the hitsaky since no cattle corridors had been left were also 
raised. Finally, exclusions and insufficient dialogue between the villagers and the company 
meant that essential social and ritual prescriptions had been utterly violated. In Antranohazo 
(Chapter 6), people lamented the fact that land had changed hands without the benediction 
of ancestors having been asked through ritual ceremonies and cattle sacrifices.  
 
A consensus emerged from these different accounts. They showed indeed that beyond 
conflicting views and contrasted outcomes, local people agreed on what the essential moral 
economic principles of land deals should be. However powerful, those brokering, benefiting 
from or negotiating corporate land access were expected to show respect for who they were 
(their authority, their voices, their livelihoods, their social identities and spiritual obligations) 
and what their needs were (by showing measure and gratitude and an appreciation of their 
subsistence needs).  
Resisting the demoralising of land deals 
Local land deal negotiations are the sites of multiple contentions, some of which divide “local 
communities” themselves. Not only may local people be interested in responding to corporate 
land access with conflicting struggles (for incorporation by some and against dispossession 
by others), they can also have overlapping or colluding claims on lands. Despite these 
tensions, however, agrarian populations agree on basic principles that need to be respected 
in the context of the negotiations. What moral economic considerations, I asked in this thesis, 
underpin responses of compliance with or resistance to corporate land access and with which 
implications on the perceptions of the outcome of the land deal? 
 
Both compliance with and resistance to corporate land access are underpinned by a 
‘legitimising notion’ (Thompson 1961: 68). Resisting corporate land access, on the one hand, 
is usually presented as the reaction to violations of, or the pre-empting of threats to essential 
rights related to subsistence security, to authority and to social and spiritual identities.  
Compliance, on the other hand, is justified by the need to fulfil basic socio-economic needs 
and diversify sources of livelihood incomes in a context where state support structures do not 
exist, and subsistence is insecure. One of the insights brought by this thesis is indeed that 
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compliance is not always the result of power pressures (acquiescence) but that, in some cases, 
it reflects instead a conjunction of ‘constrained hope’ and ‘conditional support’. The hope for 
social change raised by the penetration of foreign capital is constrained in the sense that there 
are hardly any other options to access basic socio-economic services and opportunities of 
livelihood diversification; the support given is conditional on those benefiting from their 
cooperation granting them fair terms of incorporation.  
 
That the same land transaction can be perceived as fair by some and unfair by others reflects 
the complexity of local land tenure, as explained above, but also the fact that moral 
economies of land deals are socially-situated. However contrasted though, villagers’ views 
revolve around the same core values. With slightly different emphasis according to the 
situations, obligations of respect, gratitude and measure are indeed at the heart of both 
discourses. For those who complied, support for, or tolerance of, the land deal is conditioned 
to manifestations of respect for the choices they voiced, to the application of measure in land 
appropriation and to the granting of fair opportunities of compensation and incorporation. 
For the latter, failings to show measure and respect by those brokering and benefiting from 
the land deal is precisely what justifies and defines their resistance.  These three core values 
of respect, gratitude and measure appear to be the conditions for the realisation of a moral 
economic order that respects both who they are and what their needs are. How others 
(corporate and state elites but also other villagers) perform with regards to these rights and 
obligations constitutes an essential lens through which actors will not only develop their 
perceptions of land deals, but also determine whether or not it is worth taking the risk of 
expressing voice, especially if that voice is (vertically or horizontally) subversive. 
 
This brings compelling evidence of agrarian populations’ resistance to the ‘demoralising of 
land deals’.320 Land tenure, as the literature has discussed at length, is embedded within 
broader matrices of social, cultural and political relations (Bassett 1993; Chauveau and Colin 
2010). Land deals are not purely economic transactions and the relations they engage will 
                                               
320 The term ‘demoralising’ is borrowed from Ferguson 2006. In his essay on demoralising economics, he looks at what happens ‘when 
the “demoralising” logic of legitimation that […] is pervasive in “development” of structural adjustments […] meets the insistent moralising 
that is so much a part of discourses on the economy across wide areas of Africa’ (Ferguson 2006: 69). 
234 
 
 
provide a critical lens, according to which they will be judged, across the social divides that 
characterise the agrarian population.   Compliance with dispossession and land privatisation 
does not equate with the wholesale acceptation of capitalist social relations. 
 
The next pages summarise the findings on the conditions under which these expressed voices 
can be heard. 
 
Interstices of influence 
Comparing and contrasting the three village case studies shed light on some of the dynamics 
that are critical to local influence within land deals. Four main conditions were highlighted. 
Successful struggles against dispossession relied on opportunities and abilities to (i) express 
voice in both invited and claimed spaces of participation, (ii) avoid or suppress internal 
dissent, and (iii) gain political support, as well as (iv) on a certain corporate and state 
permeability to voices from below.  
 
The next section pulls together findings regarding spaces, repertoires and cohesion of 
struggles within land deal negotiations, and highlights how the dynamics of influence are 
embedded within village politics of moral ethnicity and contradictory state politics of 
competition, extraversion and territorialisation. 
Spaces and repertoires of struggles 
The Tozzi Green case study gives a sample of the various repertoires and spaces which can 
be used by agrarian populations to try and influence land deals. Some villagers resorted to 
‘everyday resistance’ (Scott 2008). In Antranohazo, for instance (Chapter 6), people were 
refusing to sign papers or trying to minimise land loss by bargaining with topographic 
technicians or low-ranking staff. In those hamlets of Mangidy that expressed regret at having 
cooperated with the company (Chapter 8), village leaders declared intentions to boycott 
work, seek revenge and retake land if commitments were not honoured promptly. While 
indicating that compliance was not a blank cheque to those acquiring land, these low-profile, 
uncoordinated responses were having little impact however, since the land deal was already 
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formalised, and the company’s labour needs had significantly decreased. These voices were 
getting lost in interstitial spaces of non-decision-making.  
 
This case study demonstrates that, in such contexts, the expression of loud, assertive voices, 
and the occupation of several spaces of decision-making constitute a first and necessary 
condition to being heard. This implies feeling emboldened enough to speak one’s mind in 
invited spaces of consultation, whether to reject a land deal altogether, or to try and shape its 
terms. In the case of Tozzi Green indeed, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, the opportunity to 
express some choice in official spaces of negotiations and the respect of that choice by 
decision-makers were not sufficient conditions to allow for a positive outcome of the land 
deal in the village.  Since pressure on the land resource was already strong for many villages, 
any land loss, chosen or not, could cause an adverse impact (for example, Antafika).  There 
could also be unexpected consequences such as those cases where corporate land access 
caused problems even though villagers had been able to choose the tract to offer (for example, 
Isorano). Chances to influence the land deal successfully consisted of controlling the scope 
of answers to bring to land requests (not only ‘where’, but ‘whether’ land could be taken), 
and to envisage a right to reject them fully, as in the cases of Soatanana (Chapter 7) and the 
three villages mentioned in Chapter 5.   
 
As noted above, however, not everyone was invited to speak in consultation. Some voices 
were excluded from the decision-making power from the start and attempts to make up for it 
in claimed spaces only bore fruit for those who had some support within the state 
administration, as those villagers from Ambatolahy who wrote letters of complaint against 
unagreed encroachment of their land (Chapter 5). In the absence of such support, protests 
such as the one expressed by village leaders of Antranohazo at the press conference in 
Antananarivo (Chapter 6) or that formalised by letter by the leaders of Mitatra (Chapter 5) 
did not bring about any results. Expressed outside the official procedure, they were easier for 
politicians or corporate managers to disregard.  
 
However, in the right context, mobilising outside of formal spaces of negotiation did prove 
critical in addressing the shortcomings of the consultation process. The (partially) successful 
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examples of resistance from the village leaders of Ambatolahy (Chapter 2) and Soatanana 
(Chapter 7) support the view defended in Wheeler and Newell’s edited volume that popular 
mobilisation around rights has ‘the potential to provide a measure of access to justice that 
regulation does not, to support claims that other legal procedures do not recognise, and to 
ignite a level of activism that claims grounded in other discourses often fail to achieve’ (2006: 
6). 
Village politics of moral ethnicity 
The comparison of the three village case studies highlights the politics of ‘moral ethnicity’ 
(Lonsdale 1992) as a critical variable in enabling influence within land deals. Lonsdale’s 
concept of moral ethnicity refers to ‘the renegotiation of the bounds of political community 
and authority, the social rights and obligations of moral economy and the rights of access to 
land and property’ (Berman 1998: 324) which underpin the emergence of ethnic identities. 
Although operating at the level of the foko (group of belonging) instead of the broader ethnic 
group, this political ‘search for a moral community of rights and obligations’ and its function 
in bringing the village population together were observed in the context of the land deal 
negotiations.  
 
The study established indeed that those who did manage some influence on the land deal 
were those who proved able to avoid or suppress dissent by galvanising unity around moral 
economies within the village population. In socially-differentiated societies where people 
develop different views of the land deal, this is no easy task. As James Scott noted about the 
possibilities of open resistance in a rural village of Malaysia, ‘the very complexity of the 
local class structure militates against collective opinion and, hence, collective action on most 
issues’ (1986: 14), especially in contexts where the penetration of agrarian economies by 
international capital tends to reveal and accelerate inter-class tensions (Peters 2013). Whether 
struggling for incorporation or against dispossession, the key to success highlighted by this 
research seems to lie in the capacity to activate intra- and inter-class solidarity ties,  thereby 
avoiding the risk of colliding struggles.   
 
The Tozzi Green case study showed indeed that fractured responses risk undermining 
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everyone’s struggles by allowing those pushing for the land deal to target those with less 
power resources to be able to negotiate actively, while generating a level of secrecy and 
tensions within the village making it hard to seek redress or repair together, if outcomes turn 
out to be detrimental for all. In both Antranohazo (Chapter 6) and Mangidy (Chapter 8), the 
aspirations of the poor, dependent segments of the village community for incorporation were 
instrumentalised by the state and the company, providing some legitimacy to the land deal 
while allowing decision-makers to ignore the parallel struggles of the village leaders.  Having 
betrayed the authority of their village leaders and/or undermined the struggles of their elites, 
sometimes in a secret manner, those villagers could not reasonably request help from them 
once hopes for favourable terms of incorporation started fading. In Mangidy (Chapter 6), the 
knowledge that they had endorsed land alienation was feeding a sense of resignation from 
within the village elites regarding the usefulness of their own struggles against dispossession. 
Resentful of initiatives they believed to be solely motivated by jealousies, convinced it was 
too late to act and scared that confronting the village dissent could cause further damage to 
community relations, the latter did not consider the possibility of trying to draw the 
community around a common plan either, now that indignations were converging.  In both 
villages, the elites had also been playing it alone to some extent, not including the others 
neither in their responses to the consultation (Antranohazo) nor in their resistance initiatives 
(Antranohazo and Mangidy). These exclusions did not provide fertile ground for cooperation 
within the village and the lack of dialogue in a context of diverging views increased the other 
villagers’ vulnerability to power pressures.  
 
These dynamics reflected a broader pattern of intracommunity relationships in these villages. 
As explained in Chapters 6 and 8, there were indeed indications that principles of reciprocity 
and solidarity were eroding in both places. Anthropologists and political scientists working 
on Madagascar have noted the detrimental impact that the loosening of relations of 
cooperation could have on feelings of belonging and unity structured around genealogy 
(Bloch 1971; Freeman 2004; Markus 2008). As noted in the closing discussion of power 
above, the decision to disrespect village authorities by negotiating directly with the company 
was certainly not taken lightly. However, the fact that the risk seemed to be worth taking 
certainly reflects a certain distancing from the community of belonging and a belief that 
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social identity and economic livelihoods could, to a certain extent, be achieved outside of the 
foko (group of belonging).  
 
The effort put to revive those feelings of community belonging and to subsume inter and 
intra-class confrontations within debates over moral economy is precisely what has appeared, 
by contrast, to have bolstered Soatanana’s successful efforts at influence (Chapter 7). The 
strive to convince villagers of the major threats and slim opportunities offered by private 
interests as illustrated by previous experiences (attribution of threat and opportunity) 
certainly played a major role in dissuading desires to cooperate with the company. However, 
more critical yet perhaps, were the politics of moral ethnicity that could be observed in their 
efforts to revive, through the mobilisation of customary institutions and ritual (social 
appropriation), the social contract that binds the foko around a common genealogy and 
common ancestors. Ethnographic work in other regions of the island had already noted the 
power of ritual ceremonies to protect against the appeals of individualism in the context of 
the globalised economy (Berger 2006a, 2006b). Soatanana leaders’ success in unifying 
voices within the village also seemed to be sustained by a level of authority and legitimacy 
that seemed to be lacking in the other two villages.  
 
This research therefore revealed the importance of avoiding or suppressing dissent within 
one’s own community, highlighting how this could be done peacefully by wielding 
‘legitimating power’ (Hall et al. 2011: 171), thanks to processes of attribution of opportunity 
and threat and social appropriation (McAdam et al. 2001) and through politics of moral 
ethnicity (Lonsdale 1992).  As crucial as the capacity of being heard within one’s community, 
however, was that of being listened to by decision-makers. This was revealed to rely on a 
certain degree of state and corporate permeability to bottom-up protests, as well as on a 
capacity to mobilise some support from within the ruling elite.  
 
National politics of influence 
This thesis describes how dynamics of influence within land deals are also informed by state 
politics, in which I included (i) historical forms of governance, (ii) the nature of political 
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regimes and (iii) laws in practice.  
 
The discussion of voices in the context of land deal negotiations in Madagascar highlighted 
how historical forms of governance through extraversion, neopatrimonialism and 
bureaucratic authoritarianism play in favour of powers of exclusion and compliance, against 
the spirit of the 2005 land reform aimed at protecting the land rights of agrarian populations. 
 
This section highlights how, despite these unfavourable odds, dynamics related to the nature 
of political regimes in Madagascar can open interstices for local influence. The instability of 
political regimes and the zero-sum game nature of political competition in Madagascar 
provides a fertile ground for social movements that are able to seize favourable political 
opportunities. Local villagers, with material and relational power resources, can also gain 
opportunities for influence through the patron-client networks that pervade neopatrimonial 
states. I make the case that the legal regime governing land deals in Madagascar is an 
important condition for these interstices of influence, despite practices of state power that 
violate people’s rights to oppose land alienation. I conclude by observing that these chances 
are short-lived and precarious: as the state formally appropriates the land to be used by private 
capital in a process of internal territorialisation, it also confiscates future rights to voice on 
the land.  
Space for influence: state and corporate permeability to local struggles 
Only in contexts where political regimes are permeable to the pressures of social movements 
and contention may local struggles stand a chance of transforming into influence. As Rutten 
et al. (2017) note, in authoritarian regimes, social struggles can be swiftly repressed and 
alliances with national and transnational support groups precluded. Instead, as the infamous 
Daewoo land scandal and the Tozzi Green case study presented here have shown, the 
Malagasy state has proved vulnerable to anti-land grab protests. 
 
Initially, most of the senior decision-makers involved in Tozzi Green land deal negotiations 
sought to facilitate corporate land access by accelerating compliance and buffering the 
company from villagers’ refusal of dispossession and requests for reparation. With time, 
however, positions changed, showing that electoral politics and the instability of the political 
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regimes in Madagascar provide political opportunities for agrarian populations, when 
supported by contentious politics.   In the context of elections, the vocal bottom-up resistance 
organised by local elites from Ambatolahy with the help of the civil society indeed had an 
immediate impact on officials. Warned by the Daewoo scandal of the risks associated with 
accusations of association with “land grabbing”, these did not hesitate to suspend the 
corporate land access they had actively supported until then. As argued by Rutten et al. 
(2017), by increasing reputational risks, protest campaigns enhance smallholders’ bargaining 
power while making it harder for both companies and supportive state agents to circumvent 
local consent. As observed in Chapter 2, however, the victories gained in such favourable 
conjunctures can be fragile.  
 
Legal regimes of land also matter. The scrutiny of the Tozzi Green land deal negotiations 
confirms that the land reform in Madagascar and more specifically, its provisions in favour 
of local land rights are not upheld in practice (Ferguson et al. 2014; Burnod et al. 2013b). 
However, I argue that the legal framework regulating corporate land access in Madagascar 
increases local people’s opportunities for influence. As a consequence of the ‘presumption 
of untitled private property’, the state can no longer lease untitled land directly to investors; 
before it can be transferred for use by capital, it needs to be titled in the name of the state 
following a lengthy procedure. I therefore argue that by increasing the time available for local 
people to get information, protest, find allies and so on, these legal-institutional requirements 
governing the trajectories of land deals enhance local people’s chance to have a say. The key 
position of the central state as ‘the ultimate mediator, adjudicator, and power holder’ (Ribot 
and Peluso 2003), regarding formal land access however, makes it essential to have alliances 
within its ranks.  
Gaining political support  
In contexts in which the central state retains the ultimate control of formal land access as in 
Madagascar, it is critical to have state allies heard. The rhizome nature of state apparatus in 
postcolonial Africa (Bayart 1989), with patronage networks linking senior officials to village 
elites, allows for the repercussion of struggles for those who have relational power resources. 
To fulfil their strategies of extraversion, those ‘patrons’ already in power may be inclined to 
lend a deaf ear to the complaints of their ‘clients’. However, contentious politics in certain 
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political conjunctures may entice them to revise their position. In addition, as observed by 
previous research on contemporary land deals in Madagascar, local elites may seek to impose 
constraints on corporate land access as a way to reassert their authority and extract additional 
resources of patronage (Burnod et al. 2013a).  
 
The case of Soatanana (Chapter 7) illustrated how a position of power within the local society 
(through cattle wealth and relations within the state administration) could increase chances 
for voiced struggles to be taken into account by decision-makers. Thanks to their close 
relationship with the Region head (who entrusts the village with his cattle), Soatanana’s 
complaints over the case of encroachment were granted special consideration. The leverage 
that rich village elites can have on local officials was also manifest in the active engagement 
of the mayor of Ambatolahy in the resistance movement (Chapter 2).  
 
State authorities, for their part, may have different reasons for being tempted to deviate from 
the national patterns of bias towards corporate interests.  There are those who are driven by 
frustration over their exclusion from decision-making and/or extraversion rent in the context 
of the land deal, such as the Region head (Chapter 2). There are others such as the mayor of 
Ambatolahy who, because of their own kinship identity and networks of belonging, feel 
accountable to those wealthy cattle owners opposed to the land deal. Finally, there are those 
who, for one or two of these reasons or another one still, may gamble on a different path of 
authority building than extraversion, putting support to struggles against dispossession in the 
context of the land deal at the core of their political agenda, as was the case of the municipal 
agents mentioned in Chapters 2 and 8.  
 
These state officials have differing leverage on higher levels of decision-making depending 
on their insertion in networks of patronage, and lower-ranking officials can be easily side-
lined, as illustrated in the case of that head of fokontany who explained that he had stopped 
being invited to reconnaissance missions since he had manifested his reluctance towards the 
project (Chapter 6). He provided, with others, important support to disgruntled villagers by 
spreading information and organising discussion but being excluded from the negotiation 
process and with little informational or relational resources himself, he had very little power 
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to influence the land deal. Thanks to favourable political circumstances, more senior local 
officials such as the mayor of Ambatolahy and the Region head managed to put pressure on 
the national level of decision-making to take local voices into account, however.  
 
Corporate approach to the land deal negotiations are also key.  Despite all the limitations 
related to the power pressures and complexity of local land tenure outlined above, the village-
by-village consultations carried out by Tozzi Green indeed provided some power-resourced 
villagers with opportunities to contest or shape the land deal, as illustrated by the cases from 
the municipality of Ambatolahy (Chapter 2) and by the examples of Soatanana (Chapter 7).  
By contrast, other entities engaged in negotiations for large-scale land deals in Madagascar 
limited their efforts at consultation to one or two meetings with local authorities and “the 
population” (Burnod et al. 2013a) which did not leave much chance for intervention. The 
way the land dispute was handled in Mangidy (Chapter 8), however, showed that 
permeability to local voices was not as strong in all political conjunctures and could be 
significantly lessened where corporate interests were at risk.  
State confiscation of influence 
Another difference between the current land rush and 19th century ‘primitive accumulation’ 
described by Marx is that the state is frequently the entity legally appropriating the land. The 
institutional routes, required by the land reform for corporate land access, allows the state to 
have land registered and demarcated as ‘state private property’ at the instigation and paid for 
by the corporate actors.  As for many contemporary land acquisitions around the world, land 
is turned into state property as opposed to formally passing under the control of private capital 
(Hall 2013). 
 
Such land deals therefore do not represent a privatisation of commons, but a process of ‘state 
territorialisation’ whereby the state ‘establishes control over natural resources and the people 
who use them’ within national boundaries (Vandergeest and Peluso 1995). Burnod et al. 
underscore the historicity of these political practices: ‘Like their predecessors (Merina kings, 
French colonial institutions and then previous Malagasy governments), state representatives 
formalize new enclosures for powerful actors — from foreign corporations to environmental 
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NGOs (Corson, 2011; Desjeux, 1979)—and deny the legal rights of local inhabitants and 
communities’ (2013: 374). 
 
This provides a compelling illustration of governance by extraversion, in which dependence 
is a major resource of political centralisation and economic accumulation (Bayart 2000): by 
allowing foreign actors to gain land access (to the detriment of local land uses), the state 
recentralises land control and captures resources of patronage that strengthen its rule. This 
also corroborates Corson’s point that internal territorialisation under neoliberalism involves 
non-state as well as state institutions (2011: 703). Whilst these formal land deal trajectories 
give more time to intervene, they ultimately revoke people’s formal rights on this land. 
Opportunities for local influence on land deals are short-lived: as the state formally 
appropriates the land to be used by private capital, it also irreversibly confiscates from local 
people their future rights to voice on the land.  
 
Conclusion 
This thesis evidences the critical intersection of state and village politics in informing local 
people’s voices and opportunities for influence in the context of land deals. 
 
It shows that local people’s perspectives on corporate land access and decisions to express, 
or suppress, voice in the context of land deal negotiations are underpinned by moral economic 
considerations and produced at the articulation of vertical and horizontal power dynamics, 
inter and intra-class relationships, and of local people’s experiences with the land deal 
negotiation process.  
 
It points to social differentiation and power imbalances as critical lenses through which to 
understand variation in local people’s perspectives over land deals. Local responses to land 
deal negotiations can partly be understood as means to either defend one’s power or to 
challenge others’ domination. Power distribution within the local population also contributes 
to influencing whose views stand more chances of being heard. While sharing similar 
agrarian livelihoods and histories of marginalisation, local people can have very different 
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levels of socio-economic capitals and different abilities to develop mediating strategies in 
response to social change, which can translate into different vulnerabilities to power 
pressures.  
 
This thesis documents the role of state politics in enabling or suppressing local people’s 
voices in land deals, through visible and invisible operations of power. In contexts where 
local consultation processes are held, local officials can derive ‘powers of exclusion’ from 
their intervention as brokers and ‘powers of compliance’ from states’ projections of 
verticality, strength and cohesion. 
 
This research shows that top-down processes of exclusion and forced compliance 
(‘compliance as acquiescence’) can be resisted however. By constructing counter-narratives 
of land rights and of accumulation strategies to those conveyed by state officials during 
consultation processes, villagers can successfully offset the feelings of anticipated defeat that 
frequently underpin acquiescence to dispossession. Local villagers with material and 
relational power resources can also gain opportunities for influence by activating some of the 
patron-client networks that pervade neopatrimonial states. 
 
Within socially-differentiated populations, cooperation with land alienation does not solely 
reflect reluctant resignations to top-down pressures (‘compliance as acquiescence’) however 
but can emerge instead from complex feelings of ‘constrained hope’. In contexts where socio-
economic opportunities are scarce, the hopes to diversify livelihoods that are associated with 
the capitalist penetration of agrarian economies as well as related perspectives of gaining 
some autonomy from local structures of domination can embolden unauthorised voices to 
manifest their support to land deals in defiance of village elites. As such, those instances of 
compliance with corporate land access represent some resistance to the prevailing order 
(‘compliance as resistance’).  
 
I argue that internal contentions are one of the main hurdles to local people’s influence on 
land deals. Since unauthorised voices are generally those with the less material and relational 
resources, they are easy to instrumentalise to accelerate corporate land access, while their 
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struggles against adverse incorporation are ignored.  In local people’s decisions to express or 
suppress subversive voices in the context of land deal negotiations, moral economic 
considerations over the village economy are key and only those who succeed in unifying 
village voices beyond class divides may hope to exert influence.  
 
In considerations over the justice of land deals, local people conflict over the question of who 
has the right to be consulted but meet on the essential obligations of those brokering or 
benefiting from corporate land access. The scrutiny of moral economic considerations in the 
context of land deal negotiations highlight agrarian populations’ resistance to the 
demoralising of land deals, across social divides. 
 
The research emphasises the key role of state authorities in mediating local people’s influence 
on land deals, highlighting how their competing struggles for the resources of patronage and 
of authority that are associated with the control of corporate land access and their 
vulnerability to social movements in an era of transnational governmentality opens interstices 
for local influence. I make the case that, by designing complex institutional trajectories for 
capital to gain formal access to untitled land, the legal regime governing land deals in 
Madagascar is an important condition for these interstices of influence, despite practices of 
state power routinely violating people’s rights to free, prior and informed consent to land 
alienation. I conclude by observing that these opportunities for local influence are short-lived 
however: as the state formally appropriates the land to be used by private capital, it also 
irreversibly confiscates from local people their rights to voice on the land.  
 
In terms of policy implications, the thesis highlights two main challenges in promoting a full 
and fair participation of local people in negotiations over large-scale farmland privatisation: 
(i) the complexity of achieving uncontested, inclusive decisions in contexts where 
differentiated local populations develop variegated responses and where land tenure is 
defined by its flexibility and negotiability; (ii) the political, power-laden nature of land deal 
negotiations. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: Official procedure for large-scale land acquisitions in Madagascar 
 
 
 
  
7. Provisional agreement 
Payment of land fees 
2. Submission of 
application 
Council of Ministers and MATD 
approval or rejection 
3. Sensitisation of 
populations 
Exploration of sites 
Solving claims 
Applicants, regions, municipalities, 
local population, fokontany, land 
surveyor, regional officials 
4. Results of exploration 
and legal opinions of 
municipalities and regions  
MATD 
5. Site inspection and 
boundary marking  
Applicant, land surveyor, Cirdoma, 
Cirtopo, regulatory committees 
6. Consultation of regional  
officials 
Regional officials, Cirdoma 
1. Assessment of project  
(business plan) 
MATD 
Cirdoma 
8. Drafting up of 
provisional contract  
Cirdoma 
9. Approval of provisional 
contract MATD 
10. Registration of the right 
to lease and creation of a 
special title 
Cirdoma 
Interministerial Committee 
Procedure for large-scale land acquisitions 
Circulaire 321-10/MATD/SG/DGSF 
25/10/2010 
Other actors   
 
Central 
administration  
Regional 
administration 
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Appendix2:  Memorandum requesting the suspension of Tozzi Green’s land extensions 
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Appendix 3:  Contract between Tozzi Green and the village of Mitatra (1/3) 
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Contract between Tozzi Green and the village of Mitatra (2/3)
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Contract between Tozzi Green and the village of Mitatra (3/3) 
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Appendix 4: Letter of opposition to Tozzi Green-Municipality of Ambatolahy (1/2)
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Letter of opposition to Tozzi Green-Municipality of Ambatolahy (2/2) 
 
